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Catholic moral philosophers and theologians for centuries used Thomas 
Aquinas’s defense of the death penalty as a point of reference in defending the state’s 
right to execute. Recent Church documents such as Evangelium Vitae, however, seem to 
take a different approach to the question than Aquinas did. In secular contemporary 
treatments of the death penalty, Aquinas’s account is often caricatured or simply 
overlooked. One of the reasons for this is the lack of a thorough treatment of the death 
penalty in the thought of Aquinas. This dissertation seeks to address that deficiency.  
I present Aquinas’s account of capital punishment as an example of determining 
civil punishments through the exercise of practical reason. Aquinas’s thought sanctions 
neither an absolute acceptance nor an absolute rejection of the death penalty; for him, this 
is not a question that admits of absolutes. Like other punishments, the death penalty is a 
determination made by human reason. Its justification depends on specific historical and 
cultural circumstances and on the needs of the political community, as well as on the 
severity of the offense. Killing a guilty person is not intrinsically evil, in Aquinas’s view, 
but it is nonetheless a last resort, when nothing else can be done for the good of the 
community.  
It may be that recent Church documents have avoided making use of the 
Thomistic teaching on the death penalty, even where this could have made their 
reasoning clearer, for fear that such arguments would be misunderstood, or in order to 
make a clearer case for forgoing the penalty. If this dissertation contributes to our 
understanding of what Thomas actually says about CP, it will be helpful in reconciling 
the thought of John Paul II with the tradition of Catholic thought on capital punishment, 
as well as in offering a reasonable way for thinking about punishments in general. 
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Introduction 
Why turn to Thomas Aquinas for philosophical insight into the problem of capital 
punishment? There are reasons to doubt the value of this approach. His account contains 
elements repugnant to the contemporary reader.1 In responding to an objection that the 
death penalty cannot be just because “to kill a man is evil in itself,” Thomas says that 
“although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may be 
good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast.”2 He also frequently 
compares the political community to a living body, such that “the whole of man is 
directed as to his end to the whole of the community of which he is a part.”3 We will 
examine both these comparisons in what follows, to see the point that each attempts to 
convey. Yet we will also see that his argument does not depend on these comparisons as 
a conclusion on premises. Rather, he uses them as illustrations that, ironically, are 
supposed to clarify his point about punishment of the evildoer. They may indeed have 
clarified the case for his contemporary readers, but the fact remains that for us they tend 
not to clarify but to obscure.  
Further, Aquinas’s reasoning about the death penalty is informed by the time in 
which he lived: the penal law, the nature of the mediaeval political order, and the 
                                                 
1
 His account also challenges some of our preconceptions about mediaeval political thought, as when 
Thomas says of a free people that “the consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts far more 
in favor of a particular observance, that does the authority of the sovereign, who has not the power to frame 
laws, except as representing the people.” S.T. I-II, q. 97, a. 3, ad 3. References to the Summa Theologiae 
(S.T.) are from the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Benziger, 1948). Where 
the translation might lead to confusion, I provide the Latin text in parentheses or footnotes. In the few cases 
where I give a different translation of a word or phrase, I also give the Latin (Edizioni San Paolo, 1988). 
2
 S.T. II-II, q. 64, a. 2, arg. 3 and ad 3. 
3
 S.T. II-II, q. 65, a. 1. 
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particular threats and concerns of thirteenth-century political life. If the idea in looking at 
Thomas’s theory of capital punishment were to introduce something like mediaeval penal 
law into twenty-first century American political life, this would clearly be ridiculous. 
Moreover, it would be contrary to Thomas’s own conception of law, for he says that 
every change in law undermines the force of custom, which is one of the greatest forces 
in maintaining civil order.  
Finally, one might think that Thomas’s teaching on the morality of capital 
punishment is a matter for theology. This teaching has been a frequent point of reference 
for Catholic theologians and prelates up to the mid-twentieth century.4 Yet in recent 
Church documents, particularly in John Paul II’s Evangelium Vitae and in the Catechism 
of the Catholic Church, one finds a near-total repudiation of the use of capital 
punishment. So the Catholic moral theologian may well want to look for continuity 
between the Thomistic justification and the recent Church statements. Yet is the morality 
of capital punishment only or primarily a theological question? Thomas himself does not 
assume this. Though he draws on scriptural support in his argument, and though there are 
theological foundations for his view of natural law as a whole, his justification of capital 
punishment is in fact a philosophical one.  
In spite of the difficulties just mentioned, reading Thomas on capital punishment 
is a worthwhile exercise. His account, often misunderstood, ignored, or treated 
                                                 
4
 Two recent studies have contributed to an understanding of this tradition: E. Christian Brugger’s Capital 
Punishment and Roman Catholic Moral Tradition (2003) and James Megivern’s The Death Penalty: An 
Historical and Theological Survey (1997). Both works provide evidence for a broad acceptance of the 
death penalty amongst Christian thinkers up until the mid-twentieth century. 
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summarily, has much to offer us, not least in challenging us to think more clearly about 
why and how we punish.5 In this thesis, I present Thomas’s account of capital 
punishment as an example of determining civil punishments through the exercise of 
practical reason.  
My thesis is that for Thomas Aquinas, the justification of capital punishment, like 
other punishments, depends on specific historical and cultural circumstances and on the 
needs of the political community, as well as on the severity of the offense. I do not claim 
to defend all aspects of Thomas’s account in this thesis, which given the breadth of the 
issues involved, such as the nature of a just civil order and of the common good, would 
be impossible. Rather, I claim to explain that account more accurately by placing it in the 
context of his views on punishment in general and on the common good of the political 
community. In understanding this account better, it will be possible to dismiss some of 
the objections leveled against that account. Therefore, after explicating Aquinas’s 
account, I show how some of the common objections to that account misinterpret him. In 
thinking through the question of CP with Thomas, I show how he offers a reasonable and 
internally consistent way for thinking about questions of punishment, in which specific 
punishments are reasonable but not necessary determinations of natural law. 
This project may also be seen in light of the theological framework I mentioned 
above. That is, I am doing the philosophical groundwork for a theological account that 
                                                 
5
 John Finnis and Stephen Long have both given careful analysis to Thomas’s account of CP. Both offer 
valuable insights into his thought, though I will disagree with certain aspects of their accounts (see Chapter 
IV). 
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would reconcile John Paul II’s account of CP with that of Aquinas. Yet this theological 
framework is not essential to understanding my thesis. One of the ways we learn to 
reason about practical matters is by reasoning along with one who possesses the virtue of 
prudence. Thomas possesses this virtue to an exceptional degree. In reasoning along with 
him, then, we will see how the prudent man goes about judging in matters of civil 
punishment, and in so doing become more capable of making prudential decisions in 
matters of punishment in our own circumstances. Aquinas’s account should be of interest 
not only to the Catholic, but also to anyone concerned with the justification of 
punishment in general and of CP in particular.  
 
A Background and Sources 
Thomas Aquinas was born in 1225 at Roccasecca (near the city of Naples) to 
Theodora and Count Landolfo of Aquino.6 Christendom at the time of Thomas’s birth 
was fighting both internal divisions, in the form of heresies and conflicts between 
imperial and papal power, and external threats from Moslem armies. Thomas’s early 
education was at the monastery of Monte Cassino, which he left around 1239 to continue 
his education at the University of Naples. Thomas’s father, Count Landolfo, was 
originally under allegiance to the German emperor Frederick II, but began to support the 
papacy in opposition to the emperor around 1245, a move that put the family in some 
                                                 
6
 Historians consider 1225 the most probable date; he may have been born a year earlier or as late at 1227. 
For a good treatment of the life of Thomas Aquinas, see Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Vol I: The Person 
and His Work. 
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danger; Thomas’s brother Rinaldo was put to death for alleged conspiracy against the 
emperor.  
Political strife did not prevent the thirteenth century from being a time of 
intellectual fecundity. James Walsh points out that this was the century of Gothic 
cathedrals, of the art of Giotto and the poetry of Dante, of the foundation of the 
university, of the signing of Magna Charta, of the origin of representative government, of 
great kings like St. Louis of France, of great saints like Francis and Dominic, and of great 
scholars like Albertus Magnus and of course, Thomas himself.7 The remarkable synthesis 
of Greek philosophy and Christian thought achieved by St. Thomas could not have 
happened at just any time in the Middles Ages. The “scholasticism of the thirteenth 
century occupies a central place in the evolution of ideas in the Middle Ages … it unifies, 
completes and consolidates the doctrines of the earlier Middle Ages … it inspires all the 
speculation of the few subsequent centuries, and is therefore rightly regarded as the 
culmination of Medieval Scholasticism.”8 
 The thirteenth century was a fruitful time for philosophical thinking about law 
and punishment, as well as the more abstract theological questions. Developments in 
canon law at this time are particularly notable. The monk Gratian had collected all the 
scattered canons of ecclesiastical law into a single textbook, called the Concordia 
discordantium canonum (known as the Decretum Gratiani) around 1140. Gratian’s 
Decretum replaced all earlier collections of canons and improved upon them by ordering 
                                                 
7
 Walsh, The Thirteenth: Greatest of Centuries, Introduction to Chapter I. 
8
 Maurice De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, Trans. P. Coffey (New York: Longmans, Green, and 
Co., 1909), c. III, a. 3: n. 265 (italics and note omitted). 
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the texts systematically and attempting to reconcile any contradictory canons. Gratian’s 
work lay the foundation for future canonists such as Johannes Teutonicus (c. 1215), who 
commented on and applied the principles found in the Decretum, continuing to seek 
resolution to the problems produced by contradictory canons.9 In 1234, the Dominican 
Raymond of Peñafort, under Pope Gregory IX, updated Gratian’s Decretum, adding 
recent canons and further systematizing the body of Church law.10  
Civil law also flourished in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The law school at 
Bologna was founded in the early twelfth century and began to draw students from all of 
Italy and from most of Europe. At Bologna, the body of civil law inherited from Rome 
“became an object of systematic academic research and teaching for the first time in 
history.”11 This was a conscious revival of Roman law, following a rediscovery of 
Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis, which had been mostly neglected in the West until the 
twelfth century.12 The Germanic kingdoms that succeeded the Roman Empire had 
personal law codes, in which each person was judged according to the law of his own 
people. At the time of Charlemagne and afterwards, personal law began to be replaced by 
territorial law, which imposed a single legal system on all the inhabitants of a territory.13  
It was not until the twelfth century, however, that scholars attempted to construct 
a system of legal norms to govern social life. The Corpus Iuris Civilis was a compilation 
of Roman law overseen by the emperor Justianian in 533 and 534 AD; it consisted of 
                                                 
9
 Megivern, The Death Penalty: An Historical and Theological Survey, 86, 88, 92 ff. 
10
 Coleman, A History of Political Thought, 30-31.  
11
 Mäkinen and Pihlajamäki, “The Individualization of Crime in Medieval Law,” 525. 
12
 Encyclopedia of the Middle Ages, s. v. “Roman Law.” 
13
 Edward M. Peters, “Prison Before the Prison: The Ancient and Medieval Worlds,” in Oxford History of 
the Prison: The Practice of Punishment in Western Society, 23. 
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three works, the Institutes, Code, and Digest.14 The legal scholars of the 12th to 14th 
centuries used Justinian’s work as a foundation for their own. They adapted to their own 
circumstances the principles of Roman law found in Justinian’s compilation, creating a 
legal system which was, as one political historian puts it, “selectively saturated with the 
law of imperial Rome.”15 
It is worth noting that the center of law study was in Thomas’s homeland; Italy 
was the place where legal thought and practice most flourished in the thirteenth century: 
In spite of the diversity of jurisdictions across the Italian peninsula, a common 
result of the influence of learned law on local custom and practice here … was its 
impact on the area of legal procedure and the rules of evidence. Most jurisdictions 
adopted the inquisitorial procedure of Roman law and canon law, the rules of 
evidence in learned law, the specialization of a legal profession, and the 
institutions of punishment for criminal offenses.16 
   
One example of the effect of this legal renaissance was the implementation of the law of 
proof. “Before the twelfth-century revolution, law of evidence in Europe relied on the 
system of ordeals and oaths.”17 Ordeals were devised in order to ask for divine 
intervention to decide a person’s guilt or innocence.18 By forbidding clergy to participate 
in trials by ordeal, the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) already marked a turn away from 
the practice, a turn that was solidified in the following century: “Ordeals and oaths were 
replaced in the thirteenth century by what have been called ‘rational proofs’… This new 
                                                 
14
 Peters, 17. 
15
 Coleman, 6. 
16
 Peters, 42. 
17
 Mäkinen, 537. 
18
 While clearly alien to modern judicial methods, the ordeal did not always lead to indiscriminate 
persecution. It was usually employed in undecided cases, where there were no witnesses or conflicting 
evidence, for example. It was preceded by a period of fast, in which the parties involved had time to come 
to a settlement. Due to the difficulty of interpreting the results, it often led to acquittal. Sometimes it was 
used mainly as a rhetorical device, willingness to undergo the ordeal being cited as a proof of a defendant’s 
veracity. Encyclopedia of the Middle Ages, s.v. “ordeal.”  
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system was based on the idea that ‘full proof’ consisted of either the defendant’s 
confession or the concurring statements of two eyewitnesses.”19 The legal developments 
are significant to Thomas’s thought on punishment, both because canon law was one of 
his sources, and because of the nature of the subject. 
In general, Scripture is foremost among Aquinas’s sources, and his discussion of 
punishment is no exception. He devotes several questions to the Mosaic Law in the 
Summa Theologiae, to which we can look for the relationship between a Thomistic view 
of punishment and the penal code found in the Pentateuch. The scriptural references 
relevant to the discussion of punishment, from both the Old and New Testaments, will be 
dealt with as they arise in relation to punishment in general, and CP in particular. As 
mentioned above, canon law is a source for Thomas, who cites the Decretals in a variety 
of topics in the Summa Theologiae.20 He also refers, less frequently, to the sources of 
civil law, such as Justinian’s Code.21 For his discussion of topics related to justice 
(including punishment), Thomas relies on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and his 
Politics.  
 
B Assumptions 
In any philosophical undertaking, there must be assumptions. In addressing a 
specific ethical question, such as the legitimacy of CP, one must make many assumptions 
in order to get to the heart of the argument. The assumptions most relevant to this thesis 
                                                 
19
 Mäkinen, 538. 
20
 See S.T. I-II, q. 90, a. 4, s.c.; q. 94, a. 5, s.c.; II-II, q. 1, a. 10; q. 68, a. 1; q. 99, a. 1; q. 151, a. 3.  
21
 See for example S.T. II-II, q. 154, 10. 
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are those pertaining to the Thomistic view of human action and of natural law. I assume 
that we have knowledge of first principles in both the speculative and the practical 
realms. This knowledge of first principles is not something we acquire, but is in us 
habitually. The knowledge of first practical principles is what Thomas calls synderesis. 
These first practical principles are the basis for natural law precepts and the source of the 
precepts of human law. I assume a Thomistic account of human action, of acts of the will 
and the moral analysis of human action, which becomes important in considering the act 
of CP itself. Finally, I assume that there is such a thing as legitimate authority, without 
which it would be impossible to appreciate Thomas’s account of punishment. 
Of course, none of these assumptions is noncontroversial. Books have been 
written in critique and in defense of each one of them. I will not attempt to defend them 
in any systematic way. There is a practical reason for this: to make this a manageable 
project. Yet there is a more fundamental reason as well, for Thomas’s views of natural 
law and human action are founded in his metaphysical and theological views. Thomas 
defines natural law as a participation in the eternal law, and this divine origin is what 
makes natural law a law, and what assures of the goodness of our most basic inclinations. 
Revealed theology, especially in the Decalogue, assures us also of the goodness and 
malice of certain kinds of actions. It confirms the goodness of our inclination to punish 
evil actions, through instances of divine punishment and through the prescription of 
specific human punishments under Mosaic Law. In this thesis, I do not seek to encompass 
the whole of this rich and deeply interconnected view of human activity, but to focus on 
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one particular aspect of it, on the human response to grave evils committed within the 
context of the political community.  
  
C Order of Presentation 
Aquinas defends the use of the death penalty in civil law, but not as a necessary 
conclusion from natural law. In fact, his teaching on the derivation of precepts from 
natural law rules out this possibility. Capital punishment, like other punishments, is a 
specific determination from natural law, which varies according to the circumstances. 
Laws prescribing certain punishments have the force of human law; they do not have the 
force of natural law. For him, then, the death penalty is a legitimate but not a necessary 
penalty for civil society.  
The main source for Aquinas’s theory of CP is an article in the question on 
murder (Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 64, a. 2). A chapter in the Summa Contra Gentiles 
(Book III, c. 146) is a second source. Yet these brief treatments will appear deficient if 
not read in the context of what Aquinas has to say about the nature and end of 
punishment in general. In Chapter I, therefore, I deal with his theory of punishment. He 
maintains that punishment is an evil, but it is not the primary kind of evil. The evil of 
fault, which is an evil in the will, is evil most properly. Punishment, on the other hand, is 
evil in respect to the one who suffers it, but it is not evil per se, as fault is. Considered in 
itself, punishment is good, since it is an act of the virtue of justice. The end of 
punishment is to redress the disorder produced by an offense. This is sometimes called 
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retribution by modern authors. In the realm of human affairs, punishment focuses on 
restoring the civil order, or the political common good. Aquinas also says that human 
punishment is medicinal. Human punishment is still retributive—if it were not, it would 
not be punishment—but it makes use of retributive acts to serve medicinal ends, such as 
deterrence. Human punishment is legitimate insofar as it serves the common good of 
society by curbing evils in the community.  
In Chapter II, I describe Aquinas’s teaching on CP. The first part of this teaching 
is Aquinas’s understanding of the act of killing a person as a form of punishment. This 
teaching is explicitly articulated in the Summa and elsewhere. The morality of a human 
act, according to Aquinas, is determined primarily by its object, which is “the end as the 
reason for willing the means.” The object gives the act its moral species, but 
circumstances may sometimes enter into the description of an act in such a way that they 
alter the object and therefore the moral species of the act. This is the case with CP. The 
guilt of the person being killed and the authority of the one killing both enter into the 
description of the act; they specify the act as an act of punishment, not of murder.  
The second part of this chapter deals with CP as a social institution. What I say 
here is derived from Aquinas’s teaching on human law and custom. For Aquinas, 
particular punishments are determinations of natural law. He distinguishes two ways in 
which something may be derived from natural law: the first is by a necessary conclusion 
from a precept; the second is by determination from a more general precept. The first way 
is similar to the way a conclusion is derived from premises in the speculative reason, and 
the second way is similar to the determination that a craftsman makes in practicing his 
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craft. Aquinas maintains that punishments are determinations of the natural law rather 
than necessary conclusions. Therefore, they have only the force of human law, and not 
the force of natural law. That is, we can say of any particular type of punishment that it 
could be otherwise. In this part of the chapter, I also examine the role that Thomas 
assigns to custom in shaping and modifying human law. He argues that custom, as the 
manifestation of reason in deed, “has the force of law and interprets law.” 
In Chapter III, I address Aquinas’s claim that the political common good is prior 
to the individual good. This claim is founded on the general principle of the priority of 
the whole to the part. Aquinas takes it as evident that every whole, as a whole, is prior to 
its part. He makes the important distinction that political society is not a substantial 
whole, but an accidental whole, having a unity of order. Nonetheless, an accidental whole 
is still a whole, and as a whole, it is prior to its parts. Yet because the political society is 
not a substance, it does not have absolute priority over its parts. The individual person is 
part of the political society, but he also has an end that surpasses the entire political order. 
“Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to all that he is and has.”22  
The priority of the political community is the superiority of the community’s good 
to the private goods of its individual members. When Thomas asserts the priority of the 
political community, he is making the metaphysical claim that the individuals, as parts, 
are ordered to the community, as a whole, and also the normative claim that the 
community’s good ought to be preferred to the individual’s private good. There is an 
order among proper human goods, such that some are higher than others. The political 
                                                 
22
 S.T. I-II, q. 21, a. 4, ad. 3. 
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common good is the highest of proper human goods, since the political community 
includes all other (human) communities; it organizes and governs the whole of temporal 
life. To be excluded from the political community is more radical than to be excluded 
from other human communities. Death is the most certain (and in some cases the only) 
means to exclude a member from the community, but there are others: Aquinas mentions 
exile, and I suggest that life-imprisonment is a contemporary option similar to exile.23 
In Chapter IV, I answer philosophical objections to Thomas’s account of CP. 
Thomas answers some objections in the course of articulating his own view, and these are 
treated in Chapter II, but there are other objections, which he does not explicitly address. 
In order to limit the number of objections to a manageable amount, I have chosen those 
objections that can be posed by reference to other tenets which Thomas holds, those that 
charge him with an inconsistency, or offer an alternative interpretation than the one I 
present. I do not answer objections that disagree with the basic approach that Thomas 
takes to ethical questions. These objections are, however, representative of the objections 
that generally are leveled against his account, from various alternative approaches to 
ethics such as the utilitarian and the deontological.  
The objections are of two main kinds. The first argues that the act of CP is per se 
evil, because Aquinas’s view of human action implies that intentionally killing a human 
person is per se evil. Yet Aquinas’s view of human action does not imply this conclusion, 
and if it did, it would also imply that other forms of intentional harming were illicit. The 
second kind of objection argues that the political common good is supposed to serve the 
                                                 
23
 S.C.G. III, c. 144, n. 4. 
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good of individuals, and therefore the common good is not superior to individual goods. 
Since Aquinas’s justification of CP presumes that the common good is superior, his 
justification fails. I argue that Aquinas can maintain both that the political common good 
serves the good of individuals and that it is superior to the good of individuals. He can do 
this because he understands happiness as a divine good, which is by its genus superior to 
all human goods, while the political common good is the highest good in the genus of 
human goods, and therefore superior to individual human goods.  
In the last chapter, I defend the value of Thomas’s theory of the determination of 
punishment: why we might want to retain the principles of this theory, even if we apply 
them differently. I suggest a way of applying the principles he articulates to present-day 
circumstances, presenting a contemporary philosopher as an illustration.  
 1
Chapter I: Saint Thomas on Punishment 
 One might expect a treatment of a great philosopher’s position on a specific topic 
to begin with his writings on that specific topic. That will not be my approach, and 
perhaps this requires some justification. When read in isolation, Thomas’s treatment of 
capital punishment in the Summa Theologiae (one article of less than 800 words) appears 
perfunctory. After this article, he moves on to other topics such as private revenge and 
suicide. The treatment in the Summa Contra Gentiles is equally terse. The historical 
context helps make sense of why the legitimacy of capital punishment was not a hotly 
disputed question in the 13th century; it was largely taken for granted. Yet the shortness 
of Thomas’s account should not lead us to think his defense of CP was unreflective 
deference to a cultural norm. For Thomas, capital punishment is the most severe form of 
punishment on a continuum with other, less severe forms of punishment.1 His account of 
capital punishment therefore must be understood within the context of his account of 
punishment in general. While Thomas does not devote an entire treatise to punishment, 
he treats it in question 48 of the Prima Pars, and again, more extensively, in De Malo.2  
 In this chapter, I address Thomas’s views on punishment in general, beginning 
with punishment as an evil (A). From the perspective of the one being punished, the 
“patient,” punishment is an evil, something undesirable. Yet from the perspective of the 
one who inflicts it, the agent, punishment is a good. For evaluating the goodness of 
                                                 
1
 While the death penalty does raise particular questions, so do the punishments of maiming, beating, and 
imprisonment, which he also treats. See S.T. II-II, qq. 64, 65. 
2
 The date for the composition of De Malo is uncertain, but Torrell suggests Thomas’s second period in 
Paris (1268-1272). Saint Thomas Aquinas, Vol. 1: The Person and His Work, 201-207. Torrell notes that 
the manuscript was beginning to circulate around 1270. This would make De Malo a later work than the 
Prima Pars. All references to De Malo are from On Evil, translated by Jean Oesterle (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1995). 
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human acts, the perspective of the agent is primary, since the moral species of an act is 
determined by what the agent does (the moral object of the act) rather than what the 
patient suffers. Therefore, the act of punishment is the focus for Thomas, and the focus of 
this chapter. After a preliminary account of the nature of the human act according to 
Thomas (B.1), I address punishment as an act good in kind (B.2), an act of the virtue of 
justice (B.3). The object of an act of punishment, what makes it to be an act of 
punishment, is the restoration of order by depriving the guilty party of some good. This is 
a specifically good act, and therefore the act of punishment is good simply (an act of the 
virtue of justice), and evil only in a relative sense.  
In order for a specific act of punishment to be good, its end must also be good.3 
That is, in addition to serving the good of order, which punishment does simply by virtue 
of the kind of act it is, punishment may serve a number of remote ends, such as reforming 
the offender or deterring others from similar offenses. In the third part of the chapter, I 
address the ends of punishment, both of eternal (C.1) and of temporal punishment (C.2). 
Finally, I explain Thomas’s important and often misunderstood statement that temporal 
punishment is sought primarily as medicine (C.3).  
 
A Punishment is Evil in a Certain Respect 
The word often translated as punishment or penalty in De Malo and the Summa is 
poena, which also may be translated as pain in some contexts.4 In English, we distinguish 
                                                 
3
 In Chapter II, I consider the moral categories of object and end in more detail. 
4
 The Fathers of the English Dominican Province translate it as pain in q. 48 of the Prima Pars. Jean 
Oesterle translates it as punishment in De Malo, q. 1.  Lewis and Short’s Latin Dictionary gives 
“indemnification, compensation, satisfaction, expiation, punishment, penalty” as the first meaning of 
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between “punishment” or “penalty,” and “pain.” Legal punishment is included in 
Thomas’s poena, but that is not all it includes. Poena includes all kinds of pains that 
seem to have no relation to a legal order: sickness, poverty, mental distress, and the pains 
of old age, for example. For Thomas these pains can be called punishments because all 
the pains of this life, all suffering and death itself, are punishment for original sin.5 We 
need not be detained here with the question of whether Thomas is right to refer to all 
suffering and death as punishments. I will follow St. Thomas in speaking of punishment 
broadly, so as not to exclude anything that may potentially fall under that heading. Later, 
our focus will be narrowed to include only civil punishments. 
 
A.1. The Problem 
How can it be right to treat someone who has committed a fault in a way in which 
it would be wrong to treat anyone else? One who punishes inflicts some harm on another, 
and yet because he inflicts it as a response to evil, the character of his act seems to differ 
from other sorts of harm. “Now it is unlawful to do a person a harm, except by way of 
punishment in the cause of justice,”6 says Aquinas, and Aristotle observes that “a victim 
who retaliates does not seem to do injustice.”7 What is this “air of paradox,” as 
contemporary moral philosopher George Sher calls it, “that surrounds the assertion that 
                                                                                                                                                 
poena. The second meaning is a transference of the first: “hardship, torment, suffering, pain, etc.” Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998. 
5
 See S.T. I, q. 48, a. 5. Both the idea of fault and the idea of punishment are contained in original sin. For 
Adam and Eve this sin had the nature of a personal fault. Since all men are present in the first man, all men 
bear the guilt of that original fault. Punishment for that fault is present even in those cleansed of its guilt by 
the sacrament of baptism. 
6
 S.T. II-II, q. 65, a. 2. 
7
 Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), 1138a 22. All references 
to the Ethics are from the Irwin translation. 
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actions that are wrong in ordinary contexts are permissible or mandatory as 
punishment”?8 Aristotle assumes that most people share the sense that there is a 
difference between harming someone for a wrong he has committed and harming for 
other reasons, and experience bears this out.9  
Since loss of one’s life is a particularly serious harm, the difference between 
inflicting death as punishment and inflicting death for any other reason is a critical 
question. Yet the problem is also present in justifying punishments of other kinds. 
Punishment always involves some harm to the wrongdoer.10 The harm may be the loss of 
material goods, liberty, reputation, bodily health or integrity, membership in the civil or 
spiritual community (exile or excommunication), bodily life, or eternal life. All 
punishment carries with it the idea of something unpleasant and painful, of some harm. 
Someone may willingly accept, or even seek, a punishment, but not for the sake of the 
punishment, which in itself is repulsive to the will. For example, a thief may regret his 
crime and turn himself in, desiring to put burglary behind him and begin a new life. He is 
willing to be imprisoned for what he has done; he desires to make things right with 
society and within himself, and for these reasons he in some sense desires punishment.  
Thomas acknowledges that punishment is a form of harm inflicted on another, yet 
he also recognizes punishment as a just exercise of civil authority. If punishment is in 
itself harmful and undesirable, what then must we say about the one who inflicts it? One 
of the first principles of the natural law, according to Thomas, is not to inflict harm on 
                                                 
8
 Desert, 69. 
9
 “If someone illegally and willingly inflicts harm on another, not returning harm for harm, he does 
injustice.” Ethics 1138a7. 
10
 In general, I use the terms wrongdoer, offender, and sinner interchangeably to refer to any violator of law 
(human, natural, or divine). The term criminal has the sense of a violator of human (civil) law. 
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any person.11 Simply put, if to harm another is to do evil, and to punish is to harm, then to 
punish is evil. At the same time, punishments seem to be just responses to certain kinds 
of behavior. The act of punishing seems to be at the same time good (virtuous) and evil.  
 
A.2. The Nature of Evil 
In order to solve the paradox of how punishment can be both virtuous and evil, 
Thomas first distinguishes between the subject of evil (the bad man) and evil itself 
(badness): 
Just as the color white is spoken of in two ways, so also is evil. For in one way 
when white is said, it can refer to that which is the subject of whiteness; in 
another way to the whiteness itself, namely the accident or quality itself. And 
likewise when evil is said, it can refer to that which is the subject of evil, and this 
is something; in another way, it can refer to the evil itself, and this is not 
something but is the privation of some particular good.12 
 
Thomas is following Augustine, who “says that evil has no positive nature, but the lack 
of good has received this name.”13 If we speak of evil itself, we must keep in mind that 
we are not speaking of something that exists in itself, but of a privation in something that 
exists in itself (the subject of evil). Thomas continues: 
In order to show [that evil is a privation], we must consider that good properly 
speaking is something inasmuch as it is desirable, for according to the 
Philosopher [Ethics I.1.1094a2-3], they have best defined good who say that good 
is that which all things desire. But that which is opposed to good is called evil; 
hence evil must be that which is opposed to the desirable as such. But it is 
impossible for this to be something…14 
 
                                                 
11
 See S.T. I-II, q. 94, a. 5, ad 3. 
12
 De Malo, q. 1, a. 1.  
13
 D.C.D. XI, c. 9, in De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, s.c. 
14
 De Malo, q. 1, a. 1. 
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The good is that which all things desire, and every nature desires its own being and 
perfection as good. Here desire is not limited to conscious, much less rational appetite. 
For Thomas, as for Aristotle, every natural thing has a goal and can be said in some sense 
to desire that goal.15 This is an instance of the general principle that potentiality desires 
actuality, since actuality is superior to potentiality. There is a tendency in every nature 
toward its own particular end, its perfection as violet or trout or man.  
Evil, on the other hand, is opposed to what is desirable (we might describe it as 
‘that which all things shun’). As opposed to the desirable as such, evil cannot be 
something. In other words, evil cannot be in a nature; it cannot constitute a nature.16 If 
evil were in a particular nature (that is, if there were a nature per se evil), then a being of 
this nature could not desire its own being, for it is impossible to desire in itself that which 
is in itself opposed to the desirable. This contradicts the principle mentioned above, that 
each nature desires its own being and perfection. Therefore, each nature is good per se 
and no nature is evil per se.  
If no nature is evil then does evil exist at all? Thomas will answer, yes, but only 
accidentally. As noted above, we can speak about evil in two ways: the subject of evil or 
evil itself. When we speak of evil itself, we speak of that which has accidental existence 
and not per se existence. Evil itself “is not a thing; but that to which evil happens is a 
                                                 
15
 “Even things which lack knowledge can be made to work for an end, and to seek the good by a natural 
appetite … For, by the fact that they tend to their own perfection they tend to the good, since a thing is 
good to the extent that it is perfect.” Summa contra gentiles: Book Three: Providence, Part 1, Trans. 
Vernon J. Bourke (Notre Dame, ID: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), c. 24, n. 6. All references to 
the Summa contra gentiles (S.C.G.) are from this edition. Part 2 of Book III (1975) is also translated by 
Bourke. Book I (1975) is translated by Anton C. Pegis, Book II (2001) by James F. Anderson, and Book IV 
(1975) by Charles J. O’Neil. 
16
 S.T. I, q. 48, a. 1. 
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thing.”17 Evil itself is the privation of a particular good.18 A privation, like any accident, 
does not exist in itself; it is the lack in a nature of something that belongs to that nature. 
When we speak of the subject of evil, we speak of that in which the accident of evil 
inheres. The subject of evil is good per se (its nature is good), but evil accidentally.  
The notion of evil as a privation is not a simple notion, but requires another 
distinction, that between a privation that is evil simply and one that is evil in a particular 
respect (a distinction that will be crucial to defining punishment). According to Thomas, 
something is evil simply if it is “deprived of a perfection proper to its nature” (privatur 
aliquo particulari bono quod est ex debito suae perfectionis).19 For example, it is evil 
simply for a dog to be missing a leg, since being a quadruped belongs to the perfection of 
the nature of dog. We would not speak normally of a three-legged dog as an evil dog or a 
bad dog, because we associate those terms with moral evil (i.e., evil in the will, which 
will be treated below), but here there is no question of moral evil.20 We might also speak 
of a driver who lacks depth-perception as a bad driver, depth-perception being a 
perfection proper to one who drives a vehicle (again, no moral evil here). These examples 
show that it is possible to speak of something as evil simply, without implying moral evil. 
Something is evil in a particular respect, on the other hand, “which is not evil in 
itself but to something else because, namely, it is not deprived of some good that belongs 
to its own due perfection but that belongs to the due perfection of another …”21 For 
                                                 
17
 De Malo, q. 1, a. 1. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1. 
20
 When we do call a dog bad, it is usually because we are treating the animal as if his actions proceeded 
from deliberate choice, which is proper to rational creatures. 
21
 “quod est de debito perfectionis alterius rei.” De Malo q. 1, a. 1, ad 1. 
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example, lack of the form of water in fire is not an evil simply speaking, since the form of 
water is not a perfection proper to fire.22 Yet considered in itself, fire lacks the form of 
water, and that lack can be called an evil in a manner of speaking. Punishment is an evil 
of this kind: evil in a particular respect (as a passion), but good simply (as an action).23 
The two senses of evil, evil simply and evil in a particular respect, are called fault 
and punishment when they exist in an intellectual nature.24 The two-fold division of evil 
into fault (culpa) and punishment is based on the two-fold nature of act (and the two-fold 
nature of good, since the degree of goodness corresponds to the degree of perfection or 
actuality). “The first act is the form and integrity of a thing; the second act is its 
operation,” and while the first act is more basic, the second act is more perfect.25 Since 
act and perfection are chiefly what is meant by good, and since evil is understood as a 
privation of the good, the distinction of evil follows the distinction of act. Withdrawal of 
a form is the evil that corresponds to first act; this is the evil of punishment. This evil 
deprives man of something that he can use (well or ill) for operation. Withdrawal of the 
due operation is the form of evil that corresponds to the second act; this is the evil of 
fault.26  
Thus, evil turns out to be a complex notion: we can speak of evil in a subject or of 
evil itself. Evil itself is a lack or privation, but this privation may be evil simply or evil in 
a certain respect. When dealing with rational beings, evil simply is fault, and evil in a 
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 De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1. 
23
 De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1. 
24
 Intellectual natures have a special relation to good and evil, which consists in the fact that good and evil 
in the will make the man a good man or a bad man. De Malo, q. 1, a. 4. 
25
 S.T. I, q. 48, a. 5. 
26
 S.T. I, q. 48, a. 5 and De Malo, q. 1, a. 4. 
 9
certain respect is punishment. Punishment is a privation in the agent, a lack of some form 
in the agent. Fault, on the other hand, is a privation in operation, an evil act. Since our 
concern is with evil in rational creatures, we will now consider fault and punishment 
more closely. 
 
A.3. Punishment and Fault 
Evil has a particular character in rational natures: poena and culpa. In the 
Commentary on the Sentences, Thomas describes poena as a species of malum naturae. 
That is, any privation of a form or perfection in a natural thing constitutes a natural evil. 
When it is a privation of some perfection in a rational nature, it is called punishment. 
Peccatum is a privation in an operation of a natural thing. Culpa is a privation in the 
operation of a rational thing.27 Thomas carries this basis contrast between punishment 
and fault throughout his discussion of evils in later works like the Summa and De Malo.  
In De Malo, he gives three ways in which punishment and fault differ. First, 
punishment “has regard to fault,” which means that in punishment, properly speaking, 
someone “suffers evil for some act he has committed.”28 In other words, punishment is 
suffered on account of a fault. Punishment deprives the offender of some good that he 
desires, or corrupts some form in him.29 Second, punishment is contrary to the will, 
whereas fault is according to the will. “For everyone’s will is inclined to his own good; 
                                                 
27
 Super sent. II, dist. 35, q. 1, a. 1.  
28
 De Malo, q. 1, a. 4. 
29
 A punishment destroys some accidental form, such as wealth or freedom of movement, but not the 
substantial form. For Thomas, the soul, the “first principle of life,” is the substantial form (the form that 
makes something to be a substance). Even the punishment of death does not destroy the substantial form. 
See S.T. I, q. 76, a. 4. 
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hence to be deprived of one’s own good is contrary to the will.”30 Punishment may be 
contrary to the will in three senses. Punishment is contrary to the actual will of the 
wrongdoer, when he knowingly and unwillingly undergoes punishment (this is what most 
commonly goes by the name punishment).31 It is contrary to his habitual will, when he is 
unaware of the punishment he suffers, but would perceive it as a loss (as when someone 
does not know he has been robbed). It is contrary to the natural inclination of the will, 
when what is lost is not perceived as a loss by the person, even though it deprives him of 
a good absolutely speaking (as when punishment is willingly undergone). In order to be 
punishment, the evil must be contrary to the will in one of these senses. Finally, 
punishment “consists in a kind of suffering or undergoing,” since it arises from a 
principle extrinsic to the will, while “fault consists in doing or acting.”32 Thus fault is an 
evil in an intellectual nature that is according to the will and done by an agent, and 
punishment is an evil suffered by an agent, contrary to his will, on account of some fault.  
The word fault is sometimes used interchangeably with the word sin, but since 
Thomas does not mean exactly the same thing by the two terms, it will be helpful to note 
his meaning here. In the general sense, a sin (peccatum) is produced by an agent not 
attaining the end for which he acts. In this sense, the grammarian “sins” when he makes a 
grammatical error, while intending to write correctly, and nature “sins” when she 
                                                 
30
 De Malo, q. 1, a. 4. See also S.C.G. III, c. 141. 
31
 It does not seem necessary that the person suffering the punishment understand his suffering precisely as 
punishment. What is necessary for the punishment to be against his actual will is that he knows that he is 
suffering something and that he does not want to suffer it.  
32
 De Malo, q. 1, a. 4. 
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produces a deformed offspring.33 In De Malo, however, he stresses the proper sense of 
peccatum, which is a deficiency in an agent’s will, when “the will fails in its due end 
through tending to an undue end.”34 This proper moral sense of peccatum is assumed 
where Thomas defines sin as an inordinate (inordinatus) or vicious (vitiosus) human 
act.35 A sin is also an offense against God: Thomas cites Augustine’s traditional 
definition: sin is a word, deed, or desire contrary to the eternal law.36 Yet this theological 
significance does not prevent Thomas from using peccatum in contexts where he is 
specifically concerned with civil justice. For example, when Thomas considers the 
general virtue of legal justice, which is ordered to the political common good, he adds 
that “in like manner [legal] injustice may be called a general sin.”37   
For Thomas, fault is the broader term, including both evil habits (vices) as well as 
evil acts (sins). Evil habits come to be through the action of the agent, but are not acts 
themselves. Sin, on the other hand, denotes an act, and never merely a disposition or 
habit.38 Both, however, are voluntary. For vice, as well as sin, is an evil in an intellectual 
nature that is according to the will and pertains to acting (in that it is produced by acts of 
the will). While an evil habit may also have the aspect of punishment and involuntariness, 
                                                 
33
 “Peccatum enim communiter dictum, secundum quod in rebus naturalibus et artificialibus invenitur, ex 
eo provenit quod aliquis in agendo non attingit ad finem propter quem agit; quod contingit ex defectu activi 
principii; sicut si grammaticus non recte scribat, contingit ex defectu artis, si tamen recte scribere intendit; 
et quod natura peccet in formatione animalis, sicut contingit in partibus monstruosis.” De Malo, q. 3, a. 1. 
See also S.C.G. III, c. 2, n. 7. 
34
 De Malo, q. 3, a. 1: “Quod voluntas deficit a debito fine per hoc, quod in finem indebitum tendit.” 
35
 S.T. I-II, q. 71, aa. 1, 4.  
36
 S.T. I-II, q. 71, a. 6. The two definitions are not opposed: the eternal law is the source of the order which 
is violated by disordered acts, and so every disordered act is an offense against God. 
37
 S.T. II-II, q. 58, a. 5, ad 3: “et eadem ratione iniustitia potest dici peccatum commune.” 
38
 See S.T. I-II, q. 71, a. 5, which addresses the question of sins of omission. Even sins of omission that do 
not include some act in their essence (to will not to do something one ought) still include an act in their 
cause. For if there is no act of the agent which can be pointed to as cause of the omission, then the omission 
is not voluntary and therefore not a sin. 
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as noted above, its origin is in action and is voluntary. Thomas contrasts punishment with 
fault, which is an evil in an intellectual nature that is according to the will and consists in 
acting.39 But he says that punishment is due specifically to sin, as we will see below. 
The distinction between first and second act helps explain why faults are more 
properly called evils. First, the greater evil is that which is opposed to the greater good. 
Punishment is a privation of the first act; fault of the second. The second act is a greater 
good than the first. Therefore, the evil of fault is a greater evil than the evil of 
punishment.40 For example, it is an evil of punishment for a man to be born blind (a 
privation in the first act, by which the form informs the matter). It is an evil of fault for a 
man to have sight but to use it for an act of lust.  
Second, fault makes the agent evil while punishment does not. Punishment 
deprives the agent of something he may use for good or for evil, but it does not make him 
evil. Fault is an evil in the agent’s voluntary action, a disordered act of the will. Good 
acts make the will good, since good absolutely is in acts rather than in potencies, and 
similarly, evil acts (faults) make the will evil.41 A man is called good or evil (as a man) 
insofar as his will is good or evil, so fault, which makes the will evil, makes the man evil. 
Thus, fault has more of the nature of evil than punishment.  
 
We have seen in this section what Thomas means when he says that punishment is 
an evil. He treats punishment in conjunction with fault, distinguishing between these two 
                                                 
39
 “Fault is in acting, punishment in suffering” (culpa est in agendo, poena vero in patiendo). De Malo q. 1, 
a. 4. “The evil that consists in the removal of a due operation in voluntary things has the nature of fault” 
(Malum autem quod consistit in subtractione debitae operationis in rebus voluntariis, habet rationem 
culpae). S.T. I, q. 48, a. 5. 
40
 De Malo, q. 1, a. 5. 
41
 S.T. I, q. 48, a. 6. 
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forms of evil in an intellectual nature. Evil in general is a privation of some good. Fault is 
an evil in an intellectual nature that is according to the will and done by an agent; 
punishment is an evil suffered by an agent, contrary to his will, on account of some fault. 
Fault, evil in the agent’s will, is evil simply, while punishment, the loss of some form or 
perfection in the agent, is evil in a certain respect. It is possible to affirm that punishment, 
because it deprives an agent of some good, is an evil. Yet evil is only fault when it is a 
privation in the will. Punishment does not entail the privation of a good that makes a man 
bad by not having it. Yet the distinction between fault and punishment does not dispel 
Sher’s “air of paradox.” Punishment is not evil in the will of one who suffers it, but it 
could still be evil in the will of one who inflicts it. We need to see, then, how Thomas 
claims that the act of punishing is a good act. 
 
B Punishment is Good Simply 
We have seen that for Thomas, punishment is not evil simply. Rather, he will say 
that punishment is good simply; that is, to punish is (or at least can be) a good act: 
Punishment as it is compared to the subject is evil inasmuch as it deprives the 
subject in some way; but according as it is compared to the agent who inflicts the 
punishment, it sometimes has the nature of good, when the one who inflicts the 
punishment does so for the sake of justice.42 
 
In this section, we will consider what makes an act of punishment a good act. While the 
treatise on justice in the Summa Theologiae contains no question specifically addressing 
the act of punishing, we may gather a coherent account of it from questions on 
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 De Malo, q. 1, a. 4, ad 9. 
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commutative justice, judgment, and vengeance. First, however, we need to be clear about 
what makes a human act in general to be a good act, in Thomas’s view. 
 
B.1. Human Acts 
In setting out the basics of Aquinas’s theory of human acts, it is not my purpose to 
prove the correctness of his view. I do think, however, that the theory is a reasonable and 
illuminating way of talking about human acts, qualities that appear most readily when the 
theory is applied to specific human acts. One of the strengths of the theory is that it is 
able to account for commonly-held moral differences, such as the difference between acts 
of punishment and other harmful acts. If the theory does help illuminate acts of 
punishment, it provides significant, though partial reason for affirming this view.  
Human acts are voluntary acts, which is to say that they “proceed from a 
deliberate will.”43 Human acts vary in their degree of voluntariness, but a purely 
involuntary act is not a human act. The digestion of food, for example, though the act of a 
human, is not subject to the will (not voluntary), and therefore not a human act. 
Voluntary acts are distinguished by two characteristics: their principle is within the agent, 
and they are intended by the agent. The principle of a voluntary act is within the agent 
himself, which distinguishes voluntary acts from acts caused by force. If someone grabs 
my arm and uses it to hit another, this is not a voluntary act.44 Voluntary acts are 
intentional acts, which distinguishes them from acts caused by ignorance.45 If a man dies 
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 S.T. I-II, q. 1, a. 1.  
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 Aristotle Ethics III.1.1111a23.  
45
 S.T. II-II, q. 43, a. 3. 
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from eating a poisonous plant, not knowing it to be poisonous, his self-destruction is 
involuntary, because it is caused by ignorance.  
The will performs a number of different acts; the ones most important to the 
moral analysis of an act are volition, choice, and intention. Volition (voluntas), which is 
willing in the strict sense, is the interior act of the will, by which the will is moved to an 
end. The end, the term of an act of volition, is that which is willed for its own sake. In the 
act of volition, the will is moved to the end as its object, without implying a movement to 
the means necessary to attain that end.46   
Choice (electio) is the act of the will in respect of means. As Aristotle says, “We 
wish for the end more [than for the things that promote it], but we decide on things that 
promote the end.”47 In order to achieve the end, the will deliberates about possible means, 
and chooses among those means. One wills the means, insofar as the means are directed 
to the end.48 The means are the term of the act of choosing. There is a one-way 
dependence in the relationship of the will to ends and means: the willing of the means is 
dependent on the willing of the end, but not vice versa. The will is only moved to the 
means on account of some end, but the end can be willed without willing the means.  
In volition, the end is willed absolutely, and in choice, the means are willed for 
the sake of the end. There is another movement of the will, which accompanies an 
exterior act. In this act, means and end are willed by one movement of the will. The end 
is the reason for willing the means, or “the term [end] towards which something [some 
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 S.T. I-II, q. 8, a. 2. 
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 Ethics III.2.111b27.  
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 S.T. I-II, q. 8, a. 2. 
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means] is ordained.”49  The act by which one wills the end as a reason for willing the 
means is called “intention” (intentio).50  In the act of intention, the will is not moved to 
the end alone, but in a single movement, it wills the end and the means. The end willed as 
a reason for willing the means, which Thomas calls the object of the act, is the term of 
the act of intending.51  
The object of a human act, therefore, is more than simply the physical description 
of the act, though it includes or presupposes the physical description. A human act has a 
natural species, which is the bare physical description of the act.52 But a human act is 
also intentional, and its intentionality (how the physical act is directed by the agent to 
some end) gives the act its moral species. The object answers the question, ‘what are you 
doing?’  
Now, for any given act, there is more than one possible answer to the question, 
‘what are you doing?’ For example, one may ask a man walking down the street what he 
is doing. His answer could be, ‘I’m walking down the street,’ but most likely, this bare 
physical description would leave the asker unsatisfied. He was not looking for the natural 
species of the act, the bare physical description of his activity, (that was already known). 
He seeks the intentionality of the act: what is he doing walking down the street? The 
answer to this question is the moral species, which presupposes the natural species, but 
also gives an account of the intentionality of the act. A more satisfactory answer in our 
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example might be ‘I’m going to church.’ This reveals the intentionality and therefore the 
moral character of the act.  
But now we must introduce another feature of human acts. All human acts have 
an object, which is the term of the act of intention, what the agent actually proposes to do.  
But the object, the end willed as reason for willing the means, may itself be the means to 
some further end. This further end is what the agent really wants, his reason for 
performing the act, which is commonly called his end. To distinguish between end as part 
of the object and end as what the agent wants to achieve through the object, I will refer to 
the end that is willed in intending the object as the proximate end, and the end for which 
the object is a means as the remote end.53 Thus, we find that two acts identical in object 
may have different remote ends. For example, giving alms to aid a person in need and 
giving alms to incite another to envy are acts with the same external description, but with 
different ends. In our previous example, the walker’s response might have been, ‘I’m 
trying to please my mother,’ i.e., by going to church. Thus, what was first perceived as an 
act of worship now appears as an act of filial piety. This new information does not negate 
the previous description, ‘going to church,’ but it shows that the proximate end contained 
in that description is itself directed to another, remote, end. The difference between the 
remote and the proximate end is that the latter is achieved in the performance of the act, 
and the former is achieved by means of the act. The proximate end cannot be separated 
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from the object (for example, one cannot separate the end of death from the act of 
running someone through with a sword). 
We have considered three acts of the will: volition, choice, and intention. Volition 
is the interior act of the will, whose term is the end. Choice is the act by which the means 
are willed. Intention is the willing of the end as reason for willing the means. The term of 
an act of intention is the object, and it is the object that gives the act its moral species. 
But we must also keep in mind that the end included in the object (the proximate end) 
may be directed by the will to another (remote) end. This will be essential as we go on to 
consider the source of goodness in human acts in the next section. 
 
B.2. Good and Evil in Human Acts 
The intended object determines the moral species of the act, which is the primary 
element in the goodness of the act. Yet the object is not the only thing relevant to the 
goodness of an act. In fact, Thomas describes a fourfold goodness in human action: 
First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because as much as it has 
of action and being so much has it of goodness…. Secondly, it has goodness 
according to its species; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has 
goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its accidents. Fourthly, 
it has goodness from its end, to which it is compared as to the cause of its 
goodness.54   
 
In order to be good simply, an action must be good in its genus, species, circumstances, 
and end, but “the primary goodness of a moral action is derived from its suitable 
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object.”55 All human acts are good in their genus; that is, good insofar as they are acts, 
and so genus is not a source of moral goodness.56 The object of an act determines the 
species, which is the primary source of the goodness (or evil) of the act. Again, the moral 
species of an act is distinct from the natural species. Two acts may be of the same natural 
species, but different moral species, and two acts may be of different natural species, but 
the same moral species (e.g., two acts of eating have the same natural species, but 
different moral species: one is an act of nourishment and one is an act of gluttony).57  
The end and the circumstances must also be good, if a human act is to be good. 
Here the end means the remote end, which we considered above. Thomas describes the 
circumstances in the following way: 
[T]he word “circumstance” has passed from located things to human acts.  
Now in things located, that is said to surround something, which is outside it, but 
touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly, whatever conditions are outside the 
substance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called 
circumstances. Now what is outside a thing’s substance, while it belongs to that 
thing, is called its accident. Wherefore the circumstances of human acts should be 
called their accidents.58  
 
Since “it is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is essential and not 
from that which is accidental: because what is accidental is outside the specific nature,” it 
appears that circumstances do not affect the species of an act.59 It is true that 
circumstances do not change the substance of an act, but some circumstances bear moral 
                                                 
55
 S.T. I-II, q. 18, a. 2. 
56
 S.T. I-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3.  
57
 “Contingit autem aliquos actus dupliciter considerari: vel secundum speciem naturae, vel secundum 
speciem moris: et quandoque conveniunt secundum speciem quantum ad unum dictorum, et differunt 
secundum aliud” (But it happens that some acts are to be considered in two ways: either according to 
natural species, or according to moral species: and sometimes things agree according to [one] species so 
much as they are said to be one, and differ in another way). Super Sent. III, dist. 23 q. 3 a. 1 qc. 3 co. 
58
 S.T. I-II, q. 7, a. 1. 
59
 S.T. I-II, q. 72, a. 1. 
 20
relevance. The natural species (which seems to be what Thomas means by the ‘substance 
of an act”) is not affected by when it is done or by whom. But the moral species may be 
affected by such accidents. In this way, that which we call an accident when considering 
the act as a substance, if it has a special relation to reason, may be included in the essence 
of the act: 
Just as the species of natural things are constituted by their natural forms, so the 
species of moral actions are constituted by forms as conceived by the reason…. 
And consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added to 
the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by the directing reason, as 
the principal condition of the object that determines the action’s species. Thus to 
appropriate another’s property is specified by reason of the property being 
“another’s,” and in this respect it is placed in the species of theft; and if we 
consider that action also in its bearing on place or time, then this will be an 
additional circumstance. But since the reason can direct as to place, time, and the 
like, it may happen that the condition as to place, in relation to the object, is 
considered as being in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason forbids damage 
to be done to a holy place. Consequently to steal from a holy place has an 
additional repugnance to the order of reason. And thus place, which was first of 
all considered as a circumstance, is considered here as the principal condition of 
the object, and as itself repugnant to reason. And in this way, whenever a 
circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must needs 
specify the moral action whether good or bad.60  
 
In natural substances, the natural form gives a specific difference, and the accidents are 
things that lie outside of this form. In human acts, an act that was first placed in a certain 
species may be reevaluated in light of additional information. A new form may be 
presented to the reason, which causes reason to place the act in a different species.  
How do we know when we have reached the end of this process? Can reason ever 
determine the moral species of a particular act, given the unlimited number of 
circumstances that it might consider?  
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Thomas reassures us on this count, saying that we need not consider “accidents 
which are altogether accidental,” but only those accidents, which while “they are 
extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it.”61 
Only circumstances that have a “special relation to reason” (but all things that have such 
a relation) need to be considered in specifying an action. These are the answers to the 
questions put by Aristotle: “who is doing it, what he is doing, about what or to what he is 
doing it, sometimes also what he is doing it with—with what instrument, for example; for 
what result, for example, safety; in what way, for example, gently or hard.”62 Other 
circumstances, such as what the weather was like, or height of the ceiling, or the number 
of buttons on the victim’s shirt, except perhaps by some relation to one of the primary 
circumstances (they may help us determine who did it, or when, or why). Of themselves, 
such circumstances bear no relation to the morality of the act. So it is not necessary to 
consider every circumstance before determining the species of a particular act, and 
therefore the goodness of the act.  
Determining which circumstances touch the essence of the action is an exercise of 
practical reason. It is not possible to say in general that all circumstances of place are 
relevant to the morality of an action. While the circumstance of place may be relevant, as 
in Thomas’s example of stealing from a holy place (which specifies the act as sacrilege), 
the fact that a murder occurs in the attic and not the basement of a house does not have a 
similar effect. This applies as well to the other circumstances; sometimes they will be 
relevant to the moral analysis of an action, and sometimes they will not. The only way to 
                                                 
61
 S.T. I-II, q. 7, a. 2, ad 2. 
62
 Ethics III.1.1111a5-6.  
 22
know is to actually analyze specific actions. If, in regard to a particular action, reason has 
something to say about when the action is done, or to whom, or by whom, then these 
circumstances need to be considered in the moral analysis of the act. If reason makes no 
determination about these circumstances, then they do not need to be considered in the 
moral analysis of the act. 
In summary, the object of a human act determines its moral species and so makes 
it a good (or evil) act in itself. The end for which the act is performed (the remote end) 
and the due circumstances further determine the goodness of a human act. In order for a 
human act to be a good act, its object must be good, its end must be good, and its due 
circumstances must not be lacking.  
 
B.3. The Object of an Act of Punishment 
To ask what makes an act of punishment a good act, the question we are 
considering in this section, is to ask what the object of an act of punishment is, for the 
object determines the moral species of a human act. The object is what the agent is doing, 
not only the physical description of the act, but that act precisely as done by a rational 
agent; i.e. intentionally. Thus the object includes the (proximate) end and the means 
willed for that end. For example, consider the man making a loaf of bread. Making bread 
is an accurate shorthand description of the object of the act, including the proximate end 
(the loaf of bread) and the means (everything included under the verb “making”: 
collecting ingredients, measuring, mixing, kneading, waiting for the dough to rise, 
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baking).63 The object of the act does not include possible remote ends, which cause the 
agent to act. For example, the man may be baking a loaf of bread to feed his son: the 
remote end. A more detailed discussion of Thomas’s view of human acts is found in 
Chapter II. Thomas describes punishment as an act of vindicatio, which belongs to the 
virtue of justice, and its object as the restoration of order through the infliction of an evil 
on the offender (i.e., by depriving him of some good). To see what he means by restoring 
order, we need to look at the virtue of justice. 
Justice is the cardinal virtue that directs man in his relations with others, the virtue 
that “renders man’s operations good.”64 The end of an act of justice is the just or the 
right, which is a kind of equality. The act of justice is to render to each one what is his 
own, and “each man’s own is that which is due to him according to equality of 
proportion.”65 The proper matter of the virtue of justice is those things that have to do 
with the relations between men.66 The just or the right in relations between men is a kind 
of equality: an equality of order. This equality is not absolute but proportional. That is, 
justice does not require that all men receive the same, but that each receives equal to his 
merit (what he is, what he has done, or what he has been promised). 
There are two kinds of order within the community, and correspondingly, there 
are two kinds of justice. One is the order of whole to parts, and this is directed by 
distributive justice, which has to do with the distribution of common goods to the 
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members of the community.67 The other order is that of part to part, and this is directed 
by commutative justice, which has to do with the relations between persons.68 Equality is 
achieved in different ways in the two types of justice, distributive and commutative. 
Distributive justice aims at a geometrical proportion, such that goods are distributed 
justly when each receives in proportion to his possession of the relevant kind of merit or 
quality.69 So, for example, if suffrage is one of the goods distributed by society, and the 
single “merit” that obtains this good is having reached the age of eighteen, then all 
eighteen-year-olds should receive the benefit of suffrage.  
Commutative or rectificatory justice has to do with the relation of part to part, 
rather than part to whole. It reestablishes an order which has been upset (the term 
“rectificatory” captures the idea that this kind of justice makes right something that is not 
right, that is out of proportion).  
[I]n commutations something is paid to an individual on account of something of 
his that has been received, as may be seen chiefly in selling and buying, where the 
notion of commutation is found primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing 
with thing, so that the one person should pay back to the other just so much as he 
has become richer out of that which belonged to the other. The result of this will 
be equality according to the arithmetical mean which is gauged according to 
equal excess in quantity.70 
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For example, if a buyer and seller agree upon a certain price, the buyer is obliged to 
produce the good for that price and the seller is obliged to pay that price for the good. 
This is an example of voluntary exchange.  
In the case of voluntary commutations, the just is clear; the debtor has rendered to 
the lender his due when he has paid back the loan in full, with any agreed upon interest. 
This idea can be extended easily to some involuntary exchanges, such as theft: 
rectificatory justice clearly requires a restitution of what was taken. Other crimes, 
however, are not so easily understood in terms of exchange and restitution. Yet Aristotle 
and Thomas both use the idea of exchange of goods as a model for punishment in 
general. By understanding the terms used in voluntary exchange (profit and loss) in a 
broad sense, we can extend the idea of rendering a man his own to acts that do not 
involve the transfer of material things.71 Aristotle describes (the special vice of) injustice 
as a kind of overreaching, who grasps at goods: 
Since the unjust person is an overreacher, he will be concerned with goods—not 
with all goods, but only with those involved in good and bad fortune, goods which 
are, [considered] without qualification, always good, but for this or that person 
not always good.72 
 
 One man takes more than his due, whether of money, honors, power, or something else, 
or else he deprives another what is the other’s due, such as his reputation, his bodily 
integrity, or his life. When one man has harmed another, the offender has profited in 
some way, while the victim has sustained a loss.73 
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Punishment addresses the inequality that someone’s overreaching has produced, 
and “by means of punishment the equality of justice is restored, in so far as he who by 
sinning has exceeded in following his own will suffers something that is contrary to this 
will.”74 Is there a common measure between crimes and punishments, as money is for 
voluntary exchanges, which can be used to determine what punishment is due for an 
offense? If not, how does the concept of equality apply here at all? Aristotle rejects the 
idea of a strict reciprocity, “[f]or in many cases reciprocity conflicts [with rectificatory 
justice].”75 Rather, he says, rectificatory justice aims at what is proportionate. In 
voluntary exchanges, money is the means of achieving proportionality between unlike 
things. But to achieve proportionality between crimes and punishments, there does not 
seem to be such a measure. Perhaps this is because punishment responds to an exchange 
that has already taken place. The offender has taken something and the victim has lost 
something. Punishment seeks to reverse the involuntary exchange that has already taken 
place. Thus, Aristotle says, the judge subtracts from the offender’s profit and restores the 
victim’s loss.76  
In the case of bodily injury, it is not in the judge’s power simply to restore what 
was lost by the victim, but he may further this goal, for example by forcing the offender 
to pay the victim’s medical expenses. In the case of murder, one might object, it is 
impossible to speak of restoring equality between offender and victim. However, the 
crime has also taken something from the community, so that one can speak of 
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rectification between the offender and the community. In the clan or tribe system, the 
death is a loss to a family group, and that family seeks rectification by killing a member 
or members of the offending family group. There is also a history of families accepting 
monetary or other compensation in place of blood vengeance.77  
The first step toward the rectification of an order that has been disturbed by sin is 
the identification of the guilty party. This pertains to the act of judgment, which in its 
original meaning is the proper act of justice, though it can be used more broadly to mean 
a right decision in any matter.78 The act of judgment, properly speaking, is about relations 
between men, and for it three things are necessary: “first, that it proceed from the 
inclination of justice; secondly, that it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it 
be pronounced according to the right ruling of prudence.”79 In other words, judgment 
cannot be motivated by hatred, it cannot be a matter of the will of the individual, and it 
cannot be made rashly or made in the face of serious doubt. Judgment of a particular act 
as unlawful is necessary for restoring order, but it is not sufficient.  
The reason why judgment alone is insufficient is that “punishment is due to sin” 
(poena debetur peccato).80 Although this principle is found in the sed contra of q. 108, 
a.4, no particular authority is cited. Thomas seems to be citing the authority of a pre-
theoretical, universally held principle—a natural law precept, in other words. The same 
principle appears in De Malo, in the question on original sin: “Now clearly sin, as we are 
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now speaking of sin, is that to which punishment is due.”81 Yet how is something “due” 
to sin? Or, to put the question in another way, how does punishment effect order? 
Thomas appeals to natural forces for a comparison: 
It has passed from natural things to human affairs that whenever one thing rises 
up against another, it suffers some detriment therefrom. For we observe in natural 
things that when one contrary supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for 
which reason hot water freezes more rapidly, as stated in Meteor. i, 12. Wherefore 
we find that the natural inclination of man is to repress those who rise up against 
him. Now it is evident that all things contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, 
in relation to the principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up against 
an order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is 
an inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins, commits an offense against an 
order: wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which 
repression is punishment.82  
Unfortunately, the example taken from Aristotle’s Meteorologics is not particularly 
helpful. We need not accept Aristotle’s explanation of this phenomenon in order to accept 
the general principle, “whatever rises up against an order is put down by that order.” Yet 
the idea of a civil order is still vague. What is the civil order that and how does one “rise 
up” against it, and how does punishing “put down” one who has risen up against it? 
It is clear that for Thomas this order has to do with justice. We will see in Chapter 
III how he describes the political common good as a just order. Order exists in a human 
community when the individual members of the community act in right relation to one 
another and to the whole, in other words, when they act justly (to draw on an Aristotelian 
distinction, it does not imply they all have the virtue of justice, but that they act in accord 
with justice). Thomas takes this phenomenon to be evident in human affairs: the more a 
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particular offence threatens the civil order, the more severely it tends to be punished. The 
object is ordering/equalizing what is disordered/unequal (proximate end) through 
depriving the offender of some good (means). The remote ends include deterring others 
from committing crimes, protecting innocent persons from future attacks by the offender, 
etc.  
There is another component we must add to Thomas’s view of punishment. We 
have seen that punishment orders: the descriptive element, but there is also a need to 
punish: a prescriptive element. The reaction against an evil act is not a necessary reaction, 
as it is in the hot water example. There is a “natural inclination” for men to repress evil 
with punishment, which Thomas calls vindication, but this inclination does not 
automatically produce an act of vengeance. Thomas takes the inclination itself to be an 
obvious feature of human nature: all men have a sense that evil acts should be punished. 
And the worse the offense, the more severely they think it ought to be punished.83 This 
sense is subject to many limits, as Thomas’s treatment of vengeance will show, but the 
limits presuppose that there is an underlying inclination, and that this inclination is 
natural and good.  
Vengeance is one of the virtues annexed to justice. A virtue annexed to a principal 
virtue is one that has something in common with it, but in some way falls short of the 
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perfection of the virtue.84 Vengeance has in common with justice the fact that it relates 
one person to another, but it falls short of giving the moral due in that it fails fully to 
repay the person for what he has done.85 It may surprise the modern reader to find 
vengeance described as a virtue in the Treatise on Justice (S.T. II-II, q. 108), since we 
often use vengeance to describe a desire for revenge that arises from malice or envy. This 
is not what Thomas means, of course. The virtue of vengeance is the perfection of the 
natural inclination, the inclination to remove harm, which is also called vengeance.86 The 
natural inclination of vengeance directs us to avenge harms already inflicted, “with the 
intention, not of harming, but of removing the harm done.”87 The natural inclination is 
the foundation for the virtue, but not yet the virtue. Left to itself, a natural inclination 
tends to exceed or fall short of the mean. In the case of vengeance, the natural tendency is 
toward the excess of brutality or cruelty, rather than toward the deficiency of remissness 
in punishing. When the inclination is directed by reason, however, it achieves the mean, 
which “consists in observing the due measure of [the natural inclination of] vengeance 
with regard to all the circumstances.”88  
The object of an act of vengeance, the object of punishment, is the restoration of 
order (or equality) through depriving the offender of some good (which is the same as to 
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say, the infliction of an evil). Order is the proximate end of an act of punishment, since 
order is achieved in the act of punishment itself. Punishment achieves the good of order 
by eliminating (or at least limiting) the disorder produced by an offense. Punishment may 
also serve a number of remote ends, which affect the moral goodness of the act.  
Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the 
avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom 
he takes vengeance and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: 
because to take pleasure in another’s evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to 
the charity whereby we are bound to love all men….  
 
If, however, the avenger’s intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be 
obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned (for instance 
that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others be not 
disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God honored), then vengeance may be 
lawful, provided other due circumstances be observed.89  
If the avenger wills the amendment of the sinner, his end is good. But a good end does 
not render an evil act good, and so if vengeance itself is evil, using it for the good of the 
offender would be evil. Only if the act of vengeance is already specifically good, as it is 
for Thomas, does it make sense to consider the goodness of its remote ends. 
It is possible to overemphasize the idea of something rising against an order and 
being put down by that order. This is part of Thomas’s thought on punishment, but it is 
not the whole. There are several limitations we should keep in mind. First, the 
order/disorder talk belongs more to divine punishment than to human punishment, as we 
will see below. Second, it is always individuals, whether representing the community or 
not, who actually take vengeance. An order is not an agent. In each individual, the 
inclination to vengeance seems to arise first as the response to injuries against oneself, 
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and later in response to injuries against others. This inclination is extended to violations 
against an order. Talk of injury against an order and redressing order needs to be 
supplemented by an account of the limits of temporal punishment and a more concrete 
discussion of specific vicious acts.  
To sum up, punishment for Thomas is a specifically good act, an act of justice. 
Human acts, Thomas says, fall under different moral species. The morality of a human 
act is essentially determined by this species, which is determined by the object of the act. 
The object is the end willed as the reason for willing the means; it is what the agent 
intends to do. The object of an act of punishment is the restoration of order by depriving 
the offender of some good. Punishment is an act of vindicatio, which belongs to 
commutative justice, and its object is the restoration of order through the infliction of an 
evil on the offender (i.e., by depriving him of some good). Justice is the virtue that 
renders to others what is due, and commutative justice renders what is due from 
individual to individual. Punishment or vengeance is due to those who have done evil. 
Vengeance seeks to rectify disorder through “the infliction of a penal evil on one who has 
sinned.”90  
 
B.4. Levels of Order Addressed by Punishment 
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We have seen that for Thomas, the object of punishment is restoring order, but 
what kind of order does punishment restore? The order achieved in punishing may be one 
of three distinct orders to which man belongs: 
Man can be punished with a threefold punishment corresponding to the three 
orders to which the human will is subject. In the first place a man’s nature is 
subjected to the order of his own reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order of 
another man who governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a 
member either of the state or of the household; thirdly, it is subjected to the 
universal order of the Divine government. Now each of these orders is disturbed 
by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine law. 
Wherefore he incurs a threefold punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. 
remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God.91 
 
The first punishment to which the human will is subject is an intrinsic punishment, which 
follows immediately from the wrong act: the act that makes a man deserving of 
punishment also inflicts the punishment, for in acting against reason and creating disorder 
within his soul, the wrongdoer inflicts a punishment on himself. This kind of punishment 
is not directly relevant to civil punishment, since remorse cannot be inflicted by one man 
on another, but arises from within the one who has done wrong.  
Insofar as each evil act is an act against the divine government of the world, it is 
subject to divine sanction, the third kind of punishment. This kind of punishment is the 
deprivation of a divine good: the loss of sanctifying grace, and finally the loss of the 
vision of God. This kind of punishment is also outside the civil arena, though the 
presence of divine retribution is important for Thomas in considering even human 
punishment, because it serves as an exemplar, but also because it justifies the limited 
character of human punishment. The second kind of punishment, however, is our primary 
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concern; it regards that order by which the wrongdoer is related to his fellow men. This 
kind of punishment is inflicted by human authority, and according to human laws. Civil 
punishments fall into this category, as do ecclesiastical punishments such as 
excommunication. Punishment, then, always redresses disorder, but it does so according 
to the level of order that was violated, and the corresponding competence of the authority. 
  In this section, we have been concerned with describing the object of an act of 
punishment. This object is the redressing of the disorder caused by an offense through the 
infliction of an evil on the offender. The object of a human act determines its moral 
species. Punishments are acts of vengeance, which is a virtue annexed to justice. 
Punishing, therefore, is a specifically good act, because it is an act of the virtue of justice. 
Punishment redresses disorder, whether disorder in the soul, in the civic community, or in 
the universe as a whole. The ordering of all things belongs to God, their creator, and it is 
part of his goodness to leave nothing unordered. But civil authorities, having care over an 
earthly community, have the power to inflict punishments for offenses against that 
community. Their punishments are not intended as rectifying the order in the universe as 
a whole, but in rectifying the civil order. 
 
C Remote Ends of Punishment 
Contemporary writers often distinguish four purposes for punishing: 
rehabilitation, defense or incapacitation of the criminal, deterrence, and retribution.92 
Thomas also talks about these ends, but for him the end of retribution is an end in a 
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different way than rehabilitation, defense, and deterrence. Retribution is another way of 
describing the object of punishment: the restoration of order by inflicting an evil on the 
offender. The act of punishing itself is the restoration of order, so the punishment’s 
efficacy as punishment does not depend on some further result. Rehabilitating the 
offender and preventing other criminal acts (whether by the offender or by others), are on 
the other hand, what Thomas calls the medicinal ends of punishment.  
Medicinal ends are not accomplished in the act of punishing itself, but through the 
punishment; they are remote ends. Yet like retribution, the medicinal ends of punishment 
are goods of order. In its penal or retributive quality, a punishment seeks to restore an 
order that was upset by the offense, by causing the offender to suffer something contrary 
to his will. In its medicinal quality, punishment seeks the restoration of order, insofar as it 
aims at reform and the promotion of virtue; it seeks the prevention of disorder, insofar as 
it aims at deterrence. Therefore, retribution, defense, rehabilitation, and deterrence all 
participate in some way in the good of order. 
A punishment must be retributive in order to be punishment, properly speaking, as 
Thomas argues in S.T. I-II, q. 87. It may be only retributive, or retributive and medicinal. 
Only eternal punishment is purely retributive, and only eternal punishment is perfectly 
retributive. Temporal punishments are retributive, but not perfectly and not solely. It is 
fitting, and even obligatory, that temporal punishments be used to serve medicinal ends. 
Now if men had no retributive authority, they could not punish at all. But their authority 
is derivative and limited. God alone has knowledge of what each deserves and has power 
 36
to bestow it. Human authorities participate in that divine power, in order that human 
society may be possible.  
 
C.1. Perfect Retribution: Eternal Punishment 
One might wonder why it is necessary to restore order through punishment. Why 
not just let things remain disordered? The ultimate answer to this, according to Thomas, 
lies in the goodness of God: 
To leave nothing unordered among things pertains to the perfect goodness of God; 
as a result, we observe that every evil in things of nature is included under the 
order of something good. So, the corruption of air is the generation of fire and the 
killing of a sheep is the feeding of a wolf. Hence, since human acts are subject to 
divine providence, just as things in nature are, the evil which occurs in human acts 
must be contained under the order of some good. Now, this is most suitably 
accomplished by the fact that sins are punished. For in that way those acts which 
exceed the due measure are embraced under the order of justice which reduces to 
equality.93 
 
God punishes because he is good, Thomas says in this passage from the Summa Contra 
Gentiles. “To leave nothing unordered” is characteristic of God’s goodness. Evil is a 
disruption of order, a lack of some form that forms a part of the order of the universe. In 
the natural order, the evil of one creature is the good of another: the air ceases to exist so 
that fire may be generated; the sheep dies so that the wolf may live. Sins, as disordered 
human acts, must also be brought into an order, and this is accomplished through 
punishment. A disordered human act creates an inequality, which punishment removes 
(tollitur). Thus through punishment, God brings good out of evil human acts.  
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To say that God punishes because he is good is not to say that punishment is good 
in itself. God wills the order of his justice, of which punishment is a conditionally 
necessary part. The condition that makes punishment necessary is of course sin. Were 
there no sin, punishment would not form a part of justice. This indicates that punishment 
is related to justice in an accidental and not an essential way. Thomas argues that 
vengeance cannot be unlawful in itself, for “We should look to God for nothing save 
what is good and lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on His enemies: for it 
is written (Luke 18:7): ‘Will not God revenge His elect who cry to Him day and night?’ 
as if to say: ‘He will indeed.’ Therefore vengeance is not essentially evil and unlawful.”94 
Vengeance is not unlawful, but neither is it an end in itself: “God does not delight in 
punishments for their own sake, but He does delight in the order of His justice, which 
requires them.”95 Again, “God does not will the damnation of a man, considered precisely 
as damnation, nor a man’s death, considered precisely as death, because, ‘He wills all 
men to be saved’ (1 Timothy 2:4); but He wills such things under the aspect of justice.”96 
The object of the divine will is not the punishment itself, but the good of order, which is 
achieved in punishing.  
Yet even if punishment is part of the order of justice, one might object that eternal 
punishment is unjust. Eternal damnation appears to violate the proportional equality of 
justice, since eternal damnation is an infinite punishment, and all sins are finite acts.97 In 
                                                 
94
 S.T. II-II, q. 108, a. 1. 
95
 S.T. I-II, q. 87, a. 3. 
96
 S.T. I-II, q. 19, a. 10, ad 2. 
97
 A similar objection could be made against capital punishment: how can any finite crime merit the 
punishment of death, which is in some sense endless (since final and irrevocable)? This objection can be 
answered as Thomas answers the current question.  
 38
response to this objection, Thomas argues that the eternal duration of punishment is 
necessary for the order of the universe. An effect remains as long as its cause remains; 
thus as long as a disorder endures, so does its punishment.98  
[S]in incurs a debt of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect 
remains so long as the cause remains. Wherefore so long as the disturbance of the 
order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of 
an order is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which 
destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the principle be saved, defects can 
be repaired by virtue of that principle … Consequently if a sin destroys the 
principle of the order whereby man’s will is subject to God, the disorder will be 
such as to be considered in itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by 
the power of God.99 
 
A disturbance of the order of man’s will to God is “irreparable” when the principle by 
which it could be repaired has been removed from man (this is also called a mortal sin). 
From the human perspective, the disorder is irreparable, but divine action can restore the 
principle (sanctifying grace) by which it can be repaired. Since God does not force 
sanctifying grace on a soul, those who reject grace do indeed have an irreparable 
disorder. But God brings order even out of this; the disorder that can no longer be 
repaired is made part of a greater order through punishment. If there were no eternal 
punishment, there would be an eternally unresolved disorder, which would be repugnant 
to the divine goodness, Thomas says. It would be as if a playwright left his drama without 
a final scene, failing to bring conflicts to resolution. An eternal disorder, like an 
unfinished creation, is contrary to the notion of divine providence, for “to leave nothing 
unordered among things pertains to the perfect goodness of God.”100  
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Thomas also points out in this article that the proportionality between punishment 
and offense consists not in duration, but in severity.101 Serious crimes like murder and 
assault can be committed in a moment, while their punishment may last for years. The 
punishment is based on the severity of the offense, and the severity of the offense is not 
determined by its duration, so we should not expect the punishment to be determined by 
the duration of the offense. Thus, eternal punishment is not opposed to proportionality. 
  Retribution, then, most properly belongs to God. God punishes because he is 
good. He does not love punishment, but justice, to which punishment belongs. Given that 
perfect vengeance is possible only in eternity, one might well question whether temporal, 
human punishment is legitimate or necessary. In the next section, then, we will consider 
the specific role of temporal punishment, especially civil punishment. 
 
C.2. Medicinal Retribution: Temporal Punishment 
Some object that since only God punishes perfectly, only God should punish. 
Saint Paul seems to say this when he admonishes the Romans, “Beloved, never avenge 
yourselves, but leave it to the wrath of God, for it is written, ‘Vengeance is mine, I will 
repay, says the Lord’ [Deuteronomy 32:35]” (Romans 12:19). Thomas admits that human 
punishment, and in fact all temporal punishment, is imperfect. To this objection, he 
replies, “He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping with his rank and position 
does not usurp what belongs to God but makes use of the power granted him by God.”102 
That is, human authorities share in the divine power to punish. Thus, human punishments 
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are also penal or retributive, we might say by participation. Yet human punishment is 
always restricted by the limitations of human knowledge and power. Human punishment 
is imperfect in extent, because it does not punish every sin; and it is imperfect in 
accuracy, because its judgments are fallible and not exactly proportioned to merit.  
First, human punishment is limited in the extent of offenses it treats. Human 
punishment imitates divine punishment in its limited way. Like the punishments of God, 
human punishments seek to bring good out of evil, or at least to curb evil. But while God 
punishes all evils, human law punishes only those that are most grievous and “…from 
which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of 
others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained: thus 
human law prohibits murder, theft and such like.”103 It belongs to God, as the one who 
orders the entire universe, to punish all evil acts and to reward all good acts. It belongs to 
a more limited order, such as the order of a civil state, to punish only offenses against the 
civil order. This limit on human punishment corresponds to its object, which is not 
universal order but the order of a particular human community. Second, human 
punishments are fallible. Even when judging within their competency, human judges are 
liable to err. Thus in judging others, Thomas maintains that we ought to interpret doubts 
for the best; we should judge others to be good, unless there is evident proof of 
wickedness.104  
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Human punishments, because they do not achieve perfect retribution, are sought 
for what Thomas calls “medicinal” ends: 
the punishments of this life are sought, not for their own sake, because this is not 
the final time of retribution, but in their character of medicine, conducing either to 
the amendment of the sinner, or to the good of the commonwealth whose calm is 
ensured by the punishment of evil-doers.105 
 
And again in his treatise on evil: 
 
Punishments that are inflicted by God in a future life correspond to the gravity of 
fault; hence the Apostle says in Romans 2:2, that “the judgment of God is 
according to truth against those who do such things.” But punishments that are 
inflicted in the present life either by God or by man do not always correspond to 
the gravity of fault, for sometimes a lesser fault is punished with a graver 
punishment temporarily in order that a greater danger be avoided; for 
punishments in the present life are used as medicines.106 
 
The fact that temporal punishments “do not always correspond to the gravity of fault” is 
not a condemnation of temporal punishments.107 These punishments are imperfect 
(incomplete) because this world is not “the final time of retribution.”108 By saying that 
temporal punishments are sought “in their character of medicine,” Thomas excludes the 
errors of those who say that human punishment should be concerned only or primarily 
with retribution. Punishments in this life are not sought for their own sake, he says; they 
are not sought simply as retribution, but for some other good that may be obtained 
through retribution.  
We should note that Thomas does not deny all retributive character to human 
punishments, but says that these punishments are sought for their medicinal character. All 
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punishments are retributive; retribution simply describes the object of an act of 
punishment, and if a punishment was not retributive it would not be punishment, properly 
speaking. In the case of human punishments, the retributive end is also a means toward 
another (remote) end or ends. For any human act, the object must be good before it can 
be used to serve another good ends. And so temporal punishments must first be just as 
punishment before they can be directed to the ends of amending the sinner or protecting 
the good of the commonwealth. Thus, no act that is objectively evil can be used for its 
“medicinal” value. 
Just because human punishments are sought for their medicinal value does not 
mean that they will always be lighter than purely retributive punishments. Thomas notes 
that there is sometimes reason for a human judge to punish more severely than is strictly 
proportional to the crime. Since “the punishments of the present life are medicinal … 
when one punishment does not suffice to compel a man, another is added: just as 
physicians employ several medicines (medicinae corporales) when one has no effect.”109 
For example, Thomas describes the punishment for sacrilege in another article: 
[T]he fitting punishment of one guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to 
a sacred thing, is excommunication whereby sacred things are withheld from him. 
The second point to be considered is utility. For punishments are inflicted as 
medicines, that men being deterred thereby may desist from sin. Now it would 
seem that the sacrilegious man, who reverences not sacred things, is not 
sufficiently deterred from sinning by sacred things being withheld from him, since 
he has no care for them. Wherefore according to human laws he is sentenced to 
capital punishment, and according to the statutes of the Church, which does not 
inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary punishment is inflicted, in order that men 
may be deterred from sacrilege, at least by temporal punishments.110  
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Another example arises in Thomas’s discussion of the Mosaic Law. Under this law, the 
person who stole a single sheep had to restore four sheep to the owner. Strict retribution 
seems to be satisfied if the offender restores one sheep he stole, but the crime of sheep-
theft was a particularly serious threat to social order among the Israelites, since sheep had 
to graze in open places, making them easy to steal. Because of this affect on the common 
good, sheep-theft received a greater penalty.111 
So the fact that human punishments are sought for medicinal ends does not mean 
that human punishments are always less severe than those sought purely as retribution. 
Rather, it means that decisions about which evils to punish and how to punish them will 
be based on either “the amendment of the sinner” or “the good of the commonwealth.”112 
Since the medicinal effect of punishment is not limited to the one being punished, this 
characteristic does not rule out even the severest of punishments available to human 
authority: 
Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human laws, is not always 
intended as a medicine for the one who is punished, but sometimes only for 
others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not for his own amendment, but for the 
sake of others, that at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the 
punishment, according to Proverbs 19:25: “The wicked man being scourged, the 
fool shall be wiser.”113 
 
Capital punishment is not ruled out as a human punishment. 
So far we have been considering human punishments as coextensive with 
temporal punishments, but this is not strictly accurate. All punishments inflicted by man 
are temporal, but temporal punishments are not all inflicted by man. In several places, 
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Thomas discusses the divine infliction of temporal, medicinal punishments. In fact, God 
is able to inflict medicinal punishments in a perfect way, because of his omniscience.114 
He knows whether any particular medicinal punishment will restrict evil or promote 
good. Therefore, he is able to punish in each case with perfect justice. If he chooses not to 
punish because this will produce more good than punishing will produce, this too is just, 
for the good to be produced by not punishing (right order between man and God) is the 
same good at which punishment aims. God’s eternal punishments are primarily and 
characteristically penal or retributive; these are punishments in the most proper sense, 
because their purpose is to take what is disordered and make it subject to a greater order. 
Those suffering eternal punishment cannot be converted, they are no longer a threat to 
others, and since their identity and punishment is hidden from us, their punishments 
cannot directly deter others from evil.115 Thus eternal punishments are “not medicinal, 
but a result of spiritual condemnation.”116  
In conclusion, Thomas maintains that human punishment (and temporal 
punishment in general) has both a retributive, or penal end, and a medicinal end: it is 
penal insofar as it deprives an evildoer of some good, and it is medicinal insofar as it 
seeks some extrinsic end such as the future safety of innocent members of society. All 
punishments are retributive, but only eternal punishment is perfectly retributive. The 
retributive object of human punishments is directed toward a further (medicinal) end, 
such as the individual good of the evildoer, or the common good of the society.  
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D Conclusion 
In closing this chapter, it may be helpful to summarize Thomas’s doctrine of 
punishment in a short list of propositions, which will carry over into our examination of 
his treatment of the penalty of death in the next chapter.  
1. Punishment is an evil suffered by an agent, contrary to his will, on account of 
some fault. 
2. Punishment is evil in a certain respect (to the one who suffers it), but good simply 
(as an act of justice). 
3. Punishment is due to disordered human acts (sins). 
4. The object of punishment is the restoration of order through depriving the 
offender of some good (also called retribution). 
5. Perfect retribution is achieved in eternal punishment, given by God, who orders 
all things in the universe.  
6. Human punishment is imperfect retribution because it does not punish all sins, 
and because it does not punish sins with perfect proportionality. 
7. Human punishment is sought as medicine, i.e., for remote ends to be achieved 
through (imperfect) retribution. 
 
It is only because punishment is understood as an evil suffered by an agent (#1), and not 
an evil done by an agent, that punishment can be understood as good simply (#2). 
Punishment is part of justice because it supplies what is due (order) to disordered acts 
(#3). Punishment does this by depriving the offender of a good (#4). Only divine 
punishment, and for that matter, only the divine punishment inflicted in eternity, can 
punish perfectly by punishing all sins in exact proportion to desert (#5, 6). Therefore, 
human punishments, besides seeking to restore order, are directed to further ends, which 
Thomas calls medicinal (#7). When determining temporal punishments for those under its 
power, civil authorities are obliged to consider not only what punishment is proportional 
to the offense, but how punishments may harm or benefit the common good.  
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Given our concern with a specific civil punishment, the death penalty, it may be 
surprising how often the account so far has referred to divine judgment. This is not 
accidental, because for Thomas, the justification for civil punishment is founded on the 
existence of divine punishment. It is only by a share in God’s authority over the world, 
which includes the power to punish, that one man can have the authority to punish 
another. Thus, Thomas’s account of punishment depends on the acceptance of #5, the 
existence of a perfect, divine retribution. In this context, it is not surprising that temporal 
punishments provide only imperfect retribution, and that they are desirable for other ends. 
As a temporal creature, man himself is always incomplete and subject to change until his 
death. Aristotle notes in Book I of the Ethics that we cannot truly pronounce a man 
blessed unless his activity in accord with virtue spans a complete life, but no one’s life is 
complete until it is over. Since full judgment on a man’s life is impossible while he is in 
statu viae, so too are perfect punishment and reward impossible on earth. 
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Chapter II: The Act and the Institution of Capital Punishment According to St. Thomas 
 
A The Act of Capital Punishment 
If human punishments must serve a medicinal end, as we saw in Chapter I, capital 
punishment seems to be ruled out, since it would be like killing the patient instead of 
trying to cure him. But in fact, Thomas defends CP precisely on medicinal grounds. For 
punishment is not always intended as medicine for an individual offender; sometimes the 
“patient” is the community. The punishment of death has the good of the community as 
its end, rather than the good of the offender. Thomas will argue that the community may 
execute an evildoer when this is necessary to preserve the common good. Thomas’s 
justification for CP presupposes that killing a human person is not already an act bad in 
its species. If it were, then it could not be used to serve the good of the community. The 
first part of this chapter will analyze the act of killing as punishment. Thomas maintains 
that the act of killing is further specified by the circumstances ‘to whom’ and ‘by whom,’ 
with the result that an act of CP has a moral object different from an act of murder. 
To say that CP is morally licit is not the same as to say that it is necessary, or that 
those who commit grave wrongs must be executed. The second part of this chapter treats 
Thomas’s understanding of CP, not merely as an individual human act, but as a social 
institution. CP, like other punishments, is a specific determination of the natural law, 
which can vary according to time and place. Therefore, CP is not a necessary 
punishment. Where it is useful to the common good and in accord with human custom, it 
ought to be used, but where it is not useful to the common good, and is not in accord with 
custom, it ought not to be used.  
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A.1. Central Texts: S.T. II-II, q. 64, a. 2 and S.C.G. III. c. 146 
The most direct source for St. Thomas’s view of CP is the second article of S.T. 
II-II, q. 64, “Whether It Is Lawful to Kill a Sinner.” He also addresses the legitimacy of 
the death penalty in Chapter 146 of the Summa Contra Gentiles, entitled “That it is 
Lawful for Judges to Inflict Punishments.” In q. 64, Thomas undertakes a moral analysis 
of different forms of killing, and determines which kinds of killing are forbidden by 
moral and divine law, and which are not.1 Thomas of course introduces his own position 
in q. 64, a. 2 by referring to the relevant authorities, in this case Scripture. The sed contra 
has two passages, one from Exodus (22.18), “Wizards2 thou shalt not suffer to live,” and 
one from Psalm 100 (v. 8), “In the morning I put to death all the wicked of the land.” 
When Thomas quotes from Exodus, he does not enlist the authority of Mosaic 
Law in order to assert that everyone who accepts the authority of Scripture must accept 
the Mosaic list of capital crimes. Rather, he explains that the judicial precepts of the Old 
Law, received through Moses, lost their binding force with the coming of Christ, when 
the state of the people changed.3 This is generally what happens when there is a change in 
regime, as Aristotle notes (a democracy, for instance, requires different laws than an 
oligarchy).4 The Law of Moses was given to the Hebrew people, and as long as the 
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community of Israelites remained under the old covenant; that is, before the coming of 
the Messiah, they were bound by these laws.  
Those judicial precepts directed the people to justice and equity, in keeping with 
the demands of that state. But after the coming of Christ, there had to be a change 
in the state of that people, so that in Christ there was no distinction between 
Gentile and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial precepts 
needed to be changed also.5  
 
This does not mean that a Christian state could not use some of the judicial precepts of 
the Law of Moses, Thomas notes, but they no longer carry the binding force of the Old 
Law.6  Thus, a mediaeval state could punish murder, adultery, etc. with death, but it was 
not always obligated to do (as those under the Old Law were).  
So far, we have only established what Thomas does not do in his approach to CP: 
he does not argue that because CP is mandated in the Pentateuch, it is mandated for all 
times. Instead, his central argument is related to the danger presented by the evildoer to 
the good of the (political) community. The body of q. 64, a. 2 reads: 
As stated above [a. 1], it is lawful to kill dumb animals, in so far as they are 
naturally directed to man’s use, as the imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now 
every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is 
naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the health of 
the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or 
infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to 
have it cut away. Now every individual person is compared to the whole 
community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to 
the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that 
he be killed in order to safeguard the common good, since “a little leaven 
corrupteth the whole lump” (1 Corinthians 5:6). 
 
                                                 
5
 S.T. I-II, q. 104, a. 3, ad 3. 
6
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In the first sentence, Thomas lays out the principle that the imperfect is naturally directed 
to (for the sake of) the perfect, and he gives dumb animals as an application of the 
principle. The argument may be formulated as follows: 
What is imperfect compared to man is naturally directed to man’s use. 
A dumb animal is imperfect compared to man. 
Therefore, a dumb animal is naturally directed to man’s use. 
 
Thomas then introduces the part/whole relationship as another application of the 
principle, for part is to whole as imperfect is to perfect: 
What is imperfect compared to the community is naturally directed to the 
community’s use. 
The individual is imperfect as compared to the community.  
Therefore, the individual is naturally directed to the community’s use. 
 
When a criminal is executed for the common good, he is being “used” for the good of the 
community.  
 Thomas’s argumentation in the S.C.G. is the same: 
Moreover, the common good is better than the particular good of one person. 
So, the particular good should be removed in order to preserve the common good. 
But the life of certain pestiferous men is an impediment to the common good 
which is the concord of human society. Therefore, certain men must be withdrawn 
by death from the society of men. 
 
Just as a physician looks to health as the end in his work, and health consists 
in the orderly concord of humors, so, too, the ruler of a state intends peace in his 
work, and peace consists in “the ordered concord of citizens.” Now, the physician 
quite properly and beneficially cuts off a diseased organ if the corruption of the 
body is threatened because of it. Therefore, the ruler of a state executes 
pestiferous men justly and sinlessly in order that the peace of the state may not be 
disrupted.7 
 
The common good is better (melius) than the particular good, and this is the good 
intended by the ruler of a state (rector civitatis). This common good is peace, or “the 
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ordered concord of citizens” (civium ordinata concordia), which may be disrupted by 
“pestiferous men” (homines pestiferi). The meaning of pestiferous must be understood 
from the context. Since the common good of human society is the ordered concord of 
citizens, one who corrupts this order is destructive to it, or as illness is to health.8  
The Aristotelian foundation for the claim that the whole is prior to the part is the 
priority of the actual over the potential. What is perfect, or what is whole, is actual, and 
what is imperfect, or part, is potential. That what is actual is prior to what is potential, 
and that therefore “the whole is of necessity prior to the part,”9 is known through simple 
apprehension, according to Aristotle and Thomas. It is evident to anyone who knows 
what is meant by actual and potential, perfect and imperfect, and whole and part, that the 
first is prior to the second in each pair. Chapter III will address this principle in more 
detail. 
Not surprisingly, many have found fault with this line of argumentation. Even if 
we grant that the part is to the whole as imperfect to perfect, on what grounds does 
Thomas say that the imperfect is “naturally directed to” the perfect? What is directed to 
another exists for the sake of that other. As matter is for the sake of form, so the part is 
for the sake of the whole, and the imperfect for the sake of the perfect. For example, since 
an animal’s foot is part of the animal, the foot exists for the sake of the animal. This does 
not exclude the possibility that what exists for the sake of another also, in another sense, 
exists for its own sake. For that which is a part of a whole may itself be a whole, on 
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another level of being. For example, a word is a whole, composed of syllables, but also a 
part of another whole, the sentence. Each substance is a whole, for it has “unity of 
form.”10 As a substance, each human being is a whole, even if he is also a part of some 
greater whole.  
If a part exists for the sake of the whole, then its natural (formal) function is to 
serve the good of the whole. If it does not serve the good of the whole, but in fact 
threatens it, then the part has lost its reason for being qua part. In such a case, the part can 
only contribute to the good of the whole by ceasing to be a part. Again, this argument 
leaves open the possibility that what is for the sake of another may also be, in another 
sense, for its own sake. From the perspective of the whole, the part has no reason to exist 
and may be disposed of. From the perspective of the part qua whole, it exists for itself, 
and therefore always preserves its reason to exist. 
Thomas asserts that the relationship of part to whole, of imperfect to perfect, is 
true of the individual man in relation to the community to which he belongs. The 
individual man is part of the political community, or the state. Therefore, if he poses a 
threat to the community by his evil acts, he may be killed for the good of the community. 
This conclusion is repeated in the next article: 
It is lawful to kill an evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole 
community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the community’s 
welfare. Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a decayed limb, when he has 
been entrusted with the care of the health of the whole body.11 
 
Again, in a later question on whether maiming is ever justified, we read that 
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since a member is part of the whole human body, it is for the sake of the whole, as 
the imperfect for the perfect. Hence a member of the human body is to be 
disposed of according as it is expedient for the body. Now a member of the 
human body is of itself useful to the good of the whole body, yet, accidentally it 
may happen to be hurtful, as when a decayed member is a source of corruption to 
the whole body.… [T]he whole of man is directed as to his end to the whole of the 
community of which he is a part … [hence] by public authority a person is 
lawfully deprived of life altogether on account of certain more heinous sins.12 
 
Thomas’s choice of medical analogy communicates the gravity of the situation. Medicine 
regards amputation as a last resort; if anything else can be done to preserve the bodily 
health of the patient, then the doctor will not choose to amputate a limb. Thomas 
articulates the principle in q. 65: 
A member should not be removed for the sake of the bodily health of the whole, 
unless otherwise nothing can be done to further the good of the whole.13   
 
Thomas cites this principle in response to an objection on the legitimacy of maiming, but 
it is also the principle assumed in q. 64, a. 2, where he says that “if the health of the 
whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or infectious to 
the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away.” 
Just as it is lawful to maim someone only when there is nothing else to be done for the 
welfare of his whole body, so it is lawful to cut off a person from the political community 
only when nothing else will preserve the welfare of the whole community. 
It is worth noting that when Thomas addresses killing an evildoer for the good of 
the community, he does not use the Gospel passage where Jesus admonishes his 
followers, “And if your hand causes you to sin, cut it off…” (Mark 9:43). There is good 
reason why Thomas might not have wanted to use this passage. The Council of Nicaea 
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(325) rejected the literal interpretation of this passage when it condemned castration as an 
aid to chastity. His use of the passage in this context might have implied a literal 
interpretation. In the question on maiming, one of the objections says that since “the 
welfare of the soul is to be preferred to the welfare of the body … [and] it is not lawful 
for a man to maim himself for the sake of the soul’s welfare … Therefore it is not lawful 
for any other reason to maim a person.”14 Thomas responds with the principle that it is 
legitimate to remove a member, only if nothing else can be done for the good of the 
whole. However, “it is always possible to further one’s spiritual welfare otherwise than 
by cutting off a member, because sin is always subject to the will.”15 Therefore, it is not 
lawful for a person to maim himself for the good of his soul, because there is always 
another way to preserve his spiritual health.  
On the other hand, it is lawful for a person to maim himself for the good of his 
body, if there is nothing else he can do to preserve the life or health of his whole body. 
Similarly, Thomas argues that it is lawful to cut off a person from the political 
community, when nothing else will further the good of the whole. He says nothing to 
indicate that the good he has in mind is an abstract, spiritual good. Rather, following his 
own logic in the question on maiming, the good being threatened by the evildoer is 
precisely the good of public order and safety. There are always ways to promote public 
respect for justice other than killing evildoers. Therefore, when an evildoer does not 
present a threat to the safety of others and to public order, the justification for CP is 
lacking. 
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In this section, we have seen Thomas’s primary philosophical argument for the 
legitimacy of. He says the political community has the power to inflict death on those 
evildoers who threaten its existence. This power is based on the relationship of individual 
to community as a relationship of part to whole. The individual man is a part of the 
political community. It is true of any whole that it is greater than its parts and that its 
parts are for the sake of the whole. This is an instance of the more general principle that 
the imperfect is for the sake of the perfect. Thomas compares the political community to 
another kind of whole, a living body. He does not mean to imply that the state is an 
organism or a substance, something he explicitly denies elsewhere. Rather, he considers 
both cases to fall under the principle of the priority of the whole to its parts, a principle 
which is true of all wholes.  
 
A.2. Objections and Replies 
We now turn to the objections that Thomas considers to his defense of CP. Most 
of these objections are drawn from Scripture. There are three objections in q. 64, a. 2. 
The first cites Matthew 13, where Christ “forbade the uprooting of the cockle which 
denotes wicked men according to a gloss.”16 Sometimes there is a danger of cutting off 
the healthy along with the unhealthy, i.e., that if CP is used, some innocent men will be 
killed. In his response, Thomas agrees that in cases where it is not possible to punish the 
guilty without also punishing the good, “vengeance is delayed.”  In following this 
principle, human authorities imitate divine authority, since God does not immediately 
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punish every sin. However, when the good are not harmed, but actually protected, by the 
death of the wicked, “then the latter may be lawfully put to death.”17 The same objection, 
using the same Gospel passage, is raised in the S.C.G., and Thomas answers in the same 
way: “the execution of the wicked is forbidden wherever it cannot be done without 
danger to the good.”18 
 The second objection is also scriptural, this time from Ezekiel, where the Lord 
says, “I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and 
live” (33:11). Since human justice ought to imitate divine justice, the argument goes, the 
state should not kill criminals but allow them time to repent. A similar objection is 
presented in the S.C.G., without direct reference to Scripture, where Thomas says that 
some “also allege that so long as a man is existing in this world he can be changed for the 
better.  So, he should not be removed from the world by execution, but kept for 
punishment.”19 
To the objection that human justice ought to imitate God in sparing evildoers, 
Thomas responds, Thus,  
God sometimes slays sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas 
sometimes He allows them time to repent, according as He knows what is 
expedient for His elect. This also does human justice imitate according to its 
powers; for it puts to death those who are dangerous to others, while it allows 
time for repentance to those who sin without grievously harming others.20 
 
Thomas does not provide examples of divine slaying of sinners, but they are not difficult 
to find. In Numbers, God causes the earth to open up and swallow alive Korah and his 
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followers for their rebellion against Moses (16.32); in Acts, Ananias and Sapphira fall 
down dead at the feet of Peter for their deception of the apostles (5.1-10). 
In Thomas’s response, we see both how human justice imitates divine justice and 
how it focuses on the medicinal ends of punishment. Like divine justice, human justice is 
concerned with the welfare of the good and the conversion of the wicked, both of which 
are medicinal ends. Human justice must imitate divine justice not simply, but as it is able 
(pro posse). In pursuing either of the two medicinal ends mentioned here, the human 
judge is faced with uncertainty. Will allowing the criminal to live make him more likely 
to amend his ways? Will he pose a continued threat to others as long as he lives? Perfect 
certainty on either question is unattainable, so the judge must proceed cautiously. Does 
this mean that he should always err on the side of sparing the criminal’s life, since there 
is always a chance that he may convert? Thomas answers this when he addresses the 
objection in the S.C.G.: 
Finally, the fact that the evil, as long as they live, can be corrected from their 
errors does not prohibit the fact that they may be justly executed, for the danger 
which threatens from their way of life is greater and more certain than the good 
which may be expected from their improvement.21   
 
Thomas mentions two goods that are relevant to the determination of punishment: the 
good that may be expected from the converted criminal and the protection of the 
innocent. Although this does involve a weighing of different goods, Thomas has not 
abandoned natural law for a kind of consequentialism. For this weighing of goods 
presupposes that punishment is already justified in response to the evil that has been 
committed. But the natural law precept that says evil is to be punished must be specified, 
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which is done by human law. Human law aims at the political common good, and so what 
Thomas mentions here are two courses of action, each of which might benefit the 
community.  
If the evildoer is allowed to live, he may turn away from his evil path and 
contribute to the good of the community. If he is executed, the innocent are protected 
from any further evil by this particular agent or by those under his influence. Thomas 
asks us to think about which of these ways of serving the common good is more 
reasonable. The first way offers a double benefit to the common good; if the evil man 
turns from his evil way and does good, then the innocent are protected and the former 
evildoer can contribute to the community’s good. Yet the success of this way depends in 
the end on the will of the evildoer himself, and is for that reason uncertain. The second 
way to benefit the common good is within the power of the state to achieve and is more 
certain than the first. It assuredly protects the innocent, at least from this particular 
evildoer, but does not achieve the other benefit, since the evildoer (even if he were to 
convert from his ways before death) no longer belongs to the community and can no 
longer contribute to it. The judge, or whoever has authority to sentence, is bound, within 
the confines of law, to choose the punishment most likely to promote the common good. 
For Thomas, when an individual presents a grave threat to the common good, and when 
other means would be insufficient to protect this good, it is just to choose execution, 
which is a choice for a lesser but more certain benefit to the common good. 
It is essential to note that the goods Thomas compares here are both common 
goods, i.e., different ways of benefiting the community. He does not get embroiled in 
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weighing the good of the individual against the common good, which for him would be a 
futile exercise. It would be futile because the individual’s good and the political common 
good are goods of different genera, as we will see in Chapter III. Law properly regards 
not the good of the individual, but the common good. Therefore the lawmaker must 
consider what course is best for the community. This does not mean that the good of 
individuals is irrelevant to law; on the contrary, it has their happiness always in sight. But 
the happiness of individuals depends on obedience to a law that is directed toward the 
specifically common good. Again, Chapter III will address the common good in greater 
depth. 
Even though capital punishment rules out the possibility of future contribution to 
the common good by the sentenced individual, it does not rule out the possibility of 
conversion altogether. Thomas notes that evildoers “also have at the critical point of 
death the opportunity to be converted to God through repentance.”22 In another place, 
Thomas adds “moreover the death inflicted by the judge profits the sinner, if he be 
converted, unto the expiation of his crime; and, if he be not converted, it profits so as to 
put an end to the sin, because the sinner is thus deprived of the power to sin any more.”23 
The third objection of q. 64, a. 2 is the most challenging so far to Thomas’s 
position. For while the first two objections focus on practical limitations in applying the 
death penalty (the danger of harming the innocent and the possibility of repentance), this 
last objection, if successful, would amount to an absolute prohibition of capital 
punishment: 
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Further, it is not lawful, for any good end whatever, to do that which is evil in 
itself, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. VII) and the Philosopher (Ethics 
II.6). Now to kill a man is evil in itself, since we are bound to have charity 
towards all men, and we wish our friends to live and to exist, according to Ethics 
IX.4. Therefore it is nowise lawful to kill a man who has sinned. 
 
A related objection to corporeal punishments is found in the S.C.G., from “these people 
[who] adduce as a basis for their error the text of Exodus (20:13): ‘Thou shalt not kill.”24 
We may group these objections together, since they both claim that to kill is evil in itself, 
whether the authority is Aristotle or the Ten Commandments. This objection is crucial, 
for two reasons. First, if killing a man is evil in itself, it cannot be justified by being 
directed to any good, no matter how great a good. Second, if killing a man is always in 
itself an evil act, we will be forced to conclude either that God commanded the ancient 
Israelites to do evil, or that the Scriptures are wrong in attributing a divine origin to the 
authority to punish certain crimes with death.  
The objection based on the Fifth Commandment has a fairly straightforward 
answer; Thomas in fact calls the argument “frivolous,” since even a cursory knowledge 
of the Old Testament reveals its flaws: 
In the law which says, ‘Thou shalt not kill’ there is the later statement: 
‘Wrongdoers (maleficos) thou shalt not suffer to live’ (Exod. 22.18). From this we 
are given to understand that the unjust execution of men is prohibited.25   
 
Moses and the ancient Israelites did not understand the Fifth Commandment to forbid all 
kinds of killing, but only killing of innocent men. If Aquinas had been reading the 
original Hebrew of Exodus, he might also have pointed out that the Hebrew word is more 
restricted in meaning than the Vulgate’s occidere: “Old Testament scholars tell us that 
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the word—rasah—used in the decalogue and elsewhere of prohibited killing, was never 
applied to killing criminals by the society, or to killing in war.”26 In any case, Aquinas 
follows Augustine and most of the Fathers of the Church in interpreting the 
commandment as forbidding murder:   
The slaying of a man is forbidden in the decalogue, in so far as it bears the 
character of something undue: for in this sense the precept contains the very 
essence of justice. Human law cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. 
But it is not undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence 
this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue; and such a killing is no murder 
as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine observes (De Lib. Arb. I.4). In like 
manner when a man’s property is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose 
it, this is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue.27  
 
For Aquinas, as for Augustine, there are no exceptions to the precepts of the Decalogue. 
For “precepts admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in which, if the 
letter of the law be observed, the intention of the lawgiver is frustrated.”28 Some laws, 
however, “contain the very intention of the lawgiver,” and so cannot be dispensed. The 
intention of the law prohibiting murder is to protect the lives of innocent men. This 
intention can never be served by violating the letter of the law, since the letter contains 
the intention. The Ten Commandments contain the very intention of the lawgiver, God; 
“consequently the precepts of the decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever.”29 Thus 
there are no exceptions to the precept, “Thou shalt not kill.” 
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 So the theological objection to killing as punishment is not tenable, but the 
objection was offered in philosophical terms as well, that one must not do evil for a good 
end, and that to kill a man is evil. To this, Thomas offers a philosophical response: 
By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away 
from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as he is naturally free, and exists for 
himself, and in a certain way he falls into the slavery of the beasts, so that he may 
be ordered to what is useful for others (incidit quodammodo in servitutem 
bestiarum, ut scilicet de ipso ordinetur secundum quod est utile aliis). This is 
expressed in Psalm 48:21: “Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he 
hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them,” and Proverbs 
11:29: “The fool shall serve the wise.” Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a 
man so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has 
sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast, and is 
more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Politics I.1 and Ethics VII.6).30 
 
There is a difference between killing a good man and killing an evil man, who has put 
himself outside the order of reason. The difference is that the former preserves and 
furthers the common good, while the latter corrupts it.31 In the very next article (q. 64, a. 
3), however, Thomas seems to contradict this notion. The article asks whether a private 
man can kill an evildoer, and the second objection makes use of the evildoer-beast 
comparison. If the evildoer is like a beast, the objection goes, and it is lawful for a private 
man to kill a wild beast, then it is also lawful for a private man to kill an evildoer (who, 
as Aristotle says, is worse than a beast).32 Thomas replies, 
A beast is by nature distinct from man, wherefore in the case of a wild beast there 
is no need for an authority to kill it; whereas, in the case of domestic animals, 
such authority is required, not for their sake, but on account of the owner’s loss. 
On the other hand a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from good men; 
hence a public authority is requisite in order to condemn him to death for the 
common good.33  
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The evildoer shares in the same nature as other men. A man’s bad acts can never deprive 
him of his essential nature, and so he cannot be dealt with in the same way as an 
irrational animal. It is only lawful to kill a sinner “in so far as it is directed to the welfare 
of the whole community,” whereas a beast can be killed for a man’s private good.34  
From this it is clear that we must understand Thomas’s statement that an evil man 
“falls into the slavery of the beasts” as a figure of speech. Though the evildoer may lose 
“the dignity of his manhood,” he does not lose his manhood itself. The psalm he quotes in 
support of the comparison speaks in terms of simile: “compared to senseless beasts, and 
made like to them.”35 Even the idea that the bad man is worse and more harmful than a 
beast supports the fact that even the worst evildoers retain their human nature. The reason 
the bad man is worse, according to Aristotle, is that he has an internal principle of his 
badness: his intellect.36 A beast can destroy, but it can never act with malicious design. 
Thomas states the case even more exactly when he says that moral evil (fault) exists only 
in an intellectual nature.37 Thus, the wickedness of the evildoer does not indicate a 
change of nature; rather, it presupposes the possession of that nature.  
What then is the servitus bestiarum, if not a change in nature? Thomas contrasts 
this state of servitude with the dignitas humana: the good man “is naturally free and 
exists for himself.” Essentially, the evildoer is a man, but in relation to the whole 
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community he is like a beast precisely in his state of servitude. For Thomas, as we will 
see in Chapter III, all individual men are parts of a civil community. They are free parts, 
voluntarily subjecting themselves to the civil order. Those who refuse to subject 
themselves to that order by committing grave crimes can still be subject to that order, but 
only involuntarily, through punishment. It is not that because a man has become like a 
beast, he may be treated like a beast. Rather, because he does not order himself to the 
common good, he must be ordered to the common good by an extrinsic agent, as a beast 
is. 
What of the idea that while the good man exists for himself, the evildoer is 
ordered according to what is useful for others? “What is useful for others” here can mean 
nothing else than the political common good. The good of one individual is not 
subordinate to the good of another individual, but the good of an individual is subordinate 
to the common good. All civil law aims at the common good and not the good of an 
individual; this is part of Thomas’s definition of law.38 So both good and evil men are 
ordered according to what is useful for the common good. The good, however, order 
themselves to the common good, while evildoers must be ordered to that good by force.  
Yet in pointing out the difference between killing the innocent and the guilty, it 
may seem that Thomas is assuming the very thing he is trying to prove, i.e., that killing a 
man is not always evil in itself. In fact, this is not a case of question-begging, but in order 
to see this, we need to recall the idea that “whenever a circumstance has a special relation 
to reason, either for or against, it must needs specify the moral action whether good or 
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bad.”39 The objection does not consider rationally significant differences when it comes 
to killing a man, or perhaps assumes that none exist. Thomas’s response is to describe a 
rationally significant difference: the one being killed has departed from the “order of 
reason” and the “dignity of his manhood.” An act directed against someone who has 
departed from the order of reason, on account of that departure, is an act of a different 
species than a similar act directed against one who has not departed from the order of 
reason. Therefore, there is a rational difference between killing the guilty and killing the 
innocent, which specifies these acts as acts of punishment and acts of murder.  
In his Commentary on the Sentences, Thomas describes the difference between 
CP and murder as one of moral species (species moris):  
[T]o kill the guilty and the innocent do not differ according to natural species, but 
according to moral species: because one is an act of vice, namely homicide, the 
other an act of virtue, or justice …40  
 
Human law and custom confirm the idea that CP belongs to a different moral species than 
murder. Practical reason, as we will see below, manifests itself both in words (law) and in 
deeds (custom).41 In every government with which Thomas was familiar, human reason 
had made CP a part of its law and custom. For him, this would confirm the existence of a 
rational distinction between killing as punishment and murder. 
 In response to the three objections to his argument in q. 64, Thomas has given the 
following answers: first, it is not good for human authorities to punish evildoers with 
death when to do so would harm the good members of the community, but they may do 
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so when such punishment protects and saves the good. Second, human authorities are 
right to be concerned with the welfare of the evildoer as they inflict punishments. Yet the 
welfare of the whole community is more properly their concern, and this sometimes 
requires the killing of an evildoer. Finally, there is a rationally significant difference 
between killing the guilty and killing the innocent, and this lies in the fact that the 
evildoer departs from the order of reason. We may come to a better understanding of this 
last and most controversial claim by understanding some of the other differences that 
specify acts of killing. 
 
A.3. Other Acts of Killing 
So far we have focused on the article of q. 64 that deals directly with CP, but it is 
now necessary to place that article within the context of the question as a whole. Each 
article of q. 64 addresses one or more of the circumstances affecting the moral analysis of 
the act of killing. The articles are: (1) the killing of plants and non-rational animals 
(“beasts”), (2) the killing of evildoers, (3) the killing of evildoers by private persons, (4) 
the killing of evildoers by clerics, (5) suicide, (6) killing the innocent, (7) killing in self-
defense, and (8) accidental killing. In the articles on killing of animals, of evildoers, and 
of just men, Thomas considers the act of killing with regard to the one being killed. In the 
articles on suicide and killing by private persons, he considers the act of killing with 
regard to the authority of the agent who kills. In the article on killing by clerics, he also 
considers the circumstance by whom the killing is done, not on account of authority but of 
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fittingness. In the articles on killing in self-defense and killing by chance, he considers 
acts with a different proximate end. 
The first kind of killing that Thomas considers is the killing of plants and non-
rational animals. It is not unlawful, Thomas says, to use something for the purpose for 
which it exists. In the order of nature, the imperfect is for the sake of the perfect, and thus 
plants are for the preservation of animal life and beasts for the preservation of human life. 
To use plants and beasts in this way requires killing them. Since the act of killing a plant 
or beast is an act of using what is for the use of rational animals, it cannot be wrong by its 
species. Still, this kind of killing can be made evil by the lack of due circumstances. 
Since private property is the customary way of regulating the use of things destined for 
the general use of man, it is one of the due circumstances of the act of using a cow for 
food that the cow belong to the one using it. The end may also affect the goodness of the 
act. Even though beasts are rightfully for the use of men, the destruction of a beast for an 
end that is not due (e.g., out of spite) would not be a good act.  
Articles 2-8 deal with the killing of human beings under different circumstances. 
The acts addressed in these chapters fall under the same natural species, but not the same 
moral species. In the action of killing a man, the due circumstances answer the questions 
‘to whom’ (articles 2, 6) and ‘by whom’ (articles 3, 4, 5).  Articles 7 and 8 pertain to 
circumstances answering the questions ‘why’ and ‘in what manner.’  We have already 
considered a. 2, so now let us turn to the other kinds of killing. 
Article 3, “Whether It Is Lawful for a Private Individual to Kill a Man Who Has 
Sinned,” considers the circumstance, ‘by whom the act is done.’ This circumstance bears 
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a rational relationship to the act. The reason for killing the evildoer is that he is 
corrupting or will corrupt the common good (a. 2). Since it is only right to kill a man 
insofar as it is directed to the good of the whole community, “… it belongs to him alone 
who has charge of the community’s welfare” to instigate such an act.42  The one who has 
charge of the common good is the public authority, whether this is one person or many. 
Thus, in the third article, we read that it is not lawful for a private person to kill an evil 
man. We can call this the due circumstance of authority. Suicide (a. 5) is unlawful for a 
similar reason: the individual man is part of the good of the whole, and so in killing 
oneself, he harms the good of the community. Lacking authority to direct individuals to 
the community’s good, he cannot lawfully kill himself, even if this were for the common 
good. Thus, even a man sentenced to death cannot rightly kill himself.43 
Article 4, “Whether It Is Lawful for Clerics to Kill Evildoers,” also pertains to the 
circumstance, ‘by whom the act is done,’ but here it is not a question of authority, but 
fittingness. The presence of legitimate authority is presupposed in this article; otherwise, 
the answer would be evident from the previous article. Rather, even if a cleric has care 
for the common good, his proper concern is the spiritual good of persons. Thomas gives 
two reasons for the impropriety of clerical involvement in the death penalty:  
First, because they are chosen for the ministry of the altar, whereon is represented 
the Passion of Christ slain “Who, when He was struck did not strike” [Vulgate: 
‘When He suffered, He threatened not’] (1 Peter 2:23). Therefore it becomes not 
clerics to strike or kill: for ministers should imitate their master, according to 
Sirach 10:2, “As the judge of the people is himself, so also are his ministers.” The 
other reason is because clerics are entrusted with the ministry of the New Law, 
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wherein no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is appointed: wherefore 
they should abstain from such things in order that they may be fitting ministers of 
the New Testament.44  
 
Some see this as a double standard, wherein priests are held to the full demands of the 
Gospel message, while lay persons are held to a modified standard, more fitted to their 
life in the world. But it is only a double standard if CP is morally evil. If, as Thomas 
argues, the death penalty is not morally evil, then clerics are being called to forgo 
involvement in something legitimate for the sake of a greater good. That is, while it is 
legitimate to be further the common good of the temporal community through the 
execution of those who threaten it, it is even better to further the common good of the 
spiritual community through the ministry of the priesthood.  
Article 7 asks “Whether It Is Lawful to Kill a Man in Self-defense.” Thomas’s 
analysis of self-defense shows that it is legitimate insofar as the act has a different object 
than an act of murder. The object of an act of murder includes the killing of a person in 
its description, but the act of (legitimate) self-defense does not. The proximate end of 
self-defense is to preserve one’s own life: “Therefore an act of this sort, from the fact that 
the preservation of one’s own life is intended, is not unlawful, as any natural thing will 
preserve itself in being, as far as possible.”45 The means in the act we are considering is 
some kind of physical force. The object of an act of self-defense is thus to preserve one’s 
life by using force against an aggressor. If the object is to preserve one’s life by killing 
the aggressor, the act is not justified, Thomas argues. If killing enters into the act of self-
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defense as part of the object (i.e., if the defender intends to kill the aggressor), then the 
act is no longer an act of legitimate self-defense, but an act of murder. 
The act of intending to kill in self-defense falls short of the due circumstance of 
authority (a. 3), unless of course, authority is present. Thus, when St. Thomas says that 
“… it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as 
have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the 
public good …”46 So, for instance, the soldier in battle and “the minister of the judge 
struggling with robbers” (i.e., a policeman or prison guard), when defending themselves 
in the course of duty, may intend to kill, “although even these sin if they be moved by 
private animosity.”47 In other words, even if the object of the act (the killing of an unjust 
aggressor by a lawful authority) is good, the act may be bad if it is motivated by evil 
desire. 
Besides the circumstance of end, the means (‘with what’) and manner (‘in what 
way’) are also relevant in the moral analysis of self-defense. The force used to repel the 
attack must be proportional to the attack itself. In the act of self-defense, the means and 
manner may determine the morality of the act, by touching on its essence. Therefore, if I 
defended myself from an unarmed aggressor by shooting him in the head, my act would 
be unlawful. My chosen means (a gun) and manner (aiming for the head) have rational 
significance for this kind of act, which is an act of intentional killing by a private person, 
i.e., murder.  
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In killing by chance (a. 8), the very fact that the act is ‘by chance’ (casualiter) 
means that the intended end of the act is not the death of a person. In the case of 
legitimate self-defense (a. 7), it is also true that death is not the intended end, but it is 
perceived as a possible outcome. In the case of killing by chance, however, the action is 
not one that typically or foreseeably results in a person’s death: “Now it sometimes 
happens by chance that a person is killed as a result of something done for a good 
purpose. Therefore the person who did it is not accounted guilty.”48   
The Book of Deuteronomy (19:5) gives the example of  the man who “goes into 
the forest with his neighbor to cut wood, and his hand swings the axe to cut down a tree, 
and the head slips from the handle and strikes his neighbor so that he dies .…” The end of 
this act is not the neighbor’s death, but the felling of the tree. The killing of the neighbor 
happens by chance, similar to the way “natures subject to generation and corruption fail 
in some few cases on account of some obstacle.”49 Mosaic Law recognizes the difference 
between intentional and accidental killing; while for the former, it mandates the death 
penalty, for the latter it designates certain cities as places of refuge for those guilty of 
manslaughter, protecting them from reprisal by the Avenger of Blood (Deut. 19:4-6).  
On the other hand, both the Mosaic and the Thomistic tradition allow for the 
punishment of involuntary homicide, which, since it results from culpable neglect, is 
somewhat voluntary. In Exodus (21:29), a man whose ox gores another man may be 
punished with death “if the ox has been accustomed to gore in the past, and its owner has 
been warned but has not kept it in.” This is an example of acting without due care, one of 
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the categories of involuntary homicide given by St. Thomas. The other category is the 
causing of another’s death (though unintentionally) while engaged in something 
unlawful.50 So for example, the man who, while breaking into another’s house, 
accidentally sets the house on fire, killing the owner of the house, is guilty of the murder 
of the owner.  
Now, for any kind of action, there is no limit to the number of possible 
circumstances. Yet some circumstances do not affect the goodness of the act because they 
have no rational significance. For example, the city in which a murder occurred or the 
time of day at which it occurred do not affect the morality of the murderous act. In q. 64, 
we have seen Thomas analyze the most important circumstances of an act of killing, i.e., 
to whom, by whom, and for what end. When one of these circumstances is lacking, the act 
falls under another moral species, as we have seen in Thomas’s analysis of other kinds of 
killing. In order for the killing of a man to be an act of punishment (a specifically good 
act) it must be done to one who is guilty of grave evil, by one who has the proper 
authority to punish evildoers, and for the sake of the common good.  
In this section, we have seen how Thomas defends the killing of some evildoers 
by civil authority in certain cases for the sake of the common good. He does so with 
reference to the political community as a whole, of which individual citizens are the 
parts. The good of this whole is the end that civil punishment serves. Those who act for 
the good of the whole (civil authorities) are right to prefer this good to any private good.  
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B The Institution of Capital Punishment 
To say that the killing of a wrongdoer is lawful is not the same as to say that it is 
necessary, or that those who commit grave wrongs must be executed. Does Thomas think 
that capital punishment is not only permissible, but also required? Is it unjust to punish 
certain crimes with anything less than death? In this section, I argue that according to 
Thomas’s view of punishment, capital punishment is not necessary; where the penalty is 
useful to the common good and in accord with human custom, it is right to use it, but 
where it is not useful to the common good, and is not in accord with custom, it is wrong 
to use it.  
I begin with a brief look at Thomas’s teaching on human law (A). I then examine 
the Thomistic basis for the determination of specific punishments: first, the derivation of 
human law from natural law (B), and second, the determination of specific punishments 
through consideration of utility, equity, and custom (C). Finally, I apply these three 
elements of determination to the death penalty, showing how Aquinas’s own treatment 
takes them into account. While these elements lead him to conclude that CP ought to be 
used, consideration of the same three elements in a different historical/social context may 
lead to a different conclusion.  
 
B.1. Thomas on Human Law 
In q. 90 of the Prima secundae, Thomas develops his famous definition of law in 
general is “an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of 
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the community, and promulgated.”51 Reason is the first principle and the “rule and 
measure” of human acts. As to the first part of the definition, the first principle in matters 
of action is the end, because when we act, we are moved toward a certain end, and if 
there were no end preceding action, there would be no reason to act and therefore no 
action.52 The first principle is also the rule and measure of things in that genus.53 And law 
is a specific act of the reason in a matter pertaining to action; thus, a law is called an 
ordinance of reason.  
But human actions can be directed towards diverse ends, and we would not call 
all rulings of reason laws (for example, reason makes rulings within the exercise of a 
craft). What distinguishes law from other acts of reason is that it is directed to “the 
common benefit of the citizens,” says Thomas, quoting the 6th-7th century theologian and 
encyclopedist, Isidore of Seville.54 Since laws are ordered to the common good, they 
must be ordered by the whole whose good is in question, or by someone who represents 
that whole. Thus law is made by one who has care for the community.55 Finally, law, in 
order to be a rule and measure of human acts, must be applied to those whose actions are 
to be ruled by it. Therefore, the law must be promulgated in order to serve its purpose as 
law.56 
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As is well known, Thomas describes natural law as man’s participation in the 
eternal law: “[The rational creature] has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a 
natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the 
rational creature is called the natural law.”57 The precepts of natural law are the first 
principles of human action;58 they direct us toward the good and away from the evil. The 
first precept of natural law, “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided,”59 
has a role in the practical realm like the first indemonstrable principle in the speculative 
realm. In the speculative realm, there is no more basic principle than the principle based 
on being and non-being: “the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same 
time.” Other principles can be proved on the basis of this first principle, but the first 
principle itself is not susceptible of proof. Likewise, in the practical realm, there is no 
more basic precept than that based on good and evil. Other precepts of natural law can be 
traced back to this first precept (e.g., that one should not take innocent human life), which 
itself cannot be demonstrated. 
In q. 95, a. 2, Thomas asks whether every human law is derived from natural law. 
He responds in the affirmative, saying that human law is derived from natural law, and 
“has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature.”60 Human 
laws may be derived in two ways from natural law. The first is compared to the 
demonstration of conclusions from principles in the speculative sciences. The second is 
compared to the particularization of general forms in the arts. The examples Thomas uses 
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are felicitous for our purposes, since they deal with killing and with punishment. As an 
example of the first way of derivation, Thomas says that “one must not kill” is a 
conclusion that follows from the general principle “one should do harm to no man.”61 As 
an example of the second way of derivation, he says that from the general principle “the 
evil-doer should be punished,” specific punishments (“that he be punished in this or that 
way”) are derived by way of determination.62 Later in the Treatise on Law, he gives a 
name to precepts of law derived in the first way. These precepts “are called ‘moral’ 
precepts: since human morals are based on reason.”63 Since they are based on reason, 
these praecepta moralia are universal. Thomas goes on to say that other precepts, “which 
derive their binding force, not from the very dictate of reason (because, considered in 
themselves, they do not imply an obligation of something due or undue) … are certain 
determinations of the moral precepts.”64 When these precepts have to do with man’s 
relation to his fellow man, they are called judicial precepts (praecepta iudicialia). These 
are not universal, as appears from Thomas’s replies to two of the objections in q. 95, a. 2.  
The first objection cites Aristotle’s claim that human law (“the legal just”) is 
about things that are in themselves indifferent. Since things that come from the natural 
law are not indifferent, the objection concludes that human laws cannot all be derived 
from natural law.65 But the objection fails to consider that human laws may be derived in 
more than one way from the natural law. Aristotle’s point about indifferent matters 
becoming law applies not to all human laws, but to “those enactments which are by way 
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of determination or specification of the precepts of the natural law.”66 In specifying the 
natural law, human law may make something that was initially indifferent into a precept. 
For example, although Thomas argues that it is lawful for men to own property, he does 
not think that the natural law dictates how material goods are to be distributed in a 
particular society: “the division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but 
rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law.”67  
In the third objection, the argument is made that since the natural law is the same 
for all, and human laws differ from place to place, human laws cannot all be derived from 
natural law. Thomas answers, “The general principles of the natural law cannot be 
applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of human affairs: and 
hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various people.”68 We should expect 
that those things derived from the natural law as conclusions (like the prohibition of 
murder) will be found more universally among different peoples, while those things 
derived by way of determination will vary. Thomas does not exclude the possibility of 
variation from place to place regarding praecepta moralia, but he views them as 
aberrations—not specifications of a general principle.69 Since punishment is a 
determination of natural law, different societies may determine different forms of 
punishment.  
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Judicial precepts, or determinations of the natural law, are mutable, as Thomas 
argues in q. 97. He cites the authority of Augustine, who says: “[De Lib. Arb. I.6] A 
temporal law, however just, may be justly changed in course of time.” Thomas suggests 
two causes for changing human law: the first has to do with man as a giver of law, since 
“it seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the 
perfect,” whether in practical or in speculative matters.70 In the realm of practical reason,  
Those who first endeavored to discover something useful for the human 
community, not being able by themselves to take everything into consideration, 
set up certain institutions which were deficient in many ways; and these were 
changed by subsequent lawgivers who made institutions that might prove less 
frequently deficient in respect of the common advantage (utilitas).71 
 
Human lawgivers always produce imperfect laws, which in time can be further perfected.  
The second cause of a just change in human law is on the part of man as subject to 
the law: 
On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be rightly 
changed on account of the changed condition of man, to whom different things 
are expedient according to the difference of his condition.72 
 
Thomas uses a passage from Augustine as an example for the second cause of change in 
human law. Augustine says that it is right for a moderate and responsible people, who 
make political decisions with the common good in mind, to be allowed to choose their 
rulers. On the other hand, if corruption abounds and the common good is ignored, the 
people forfeit their right to choose their rulers.73 Thomas gives no example for the first 
cause, but we might supply one from his own century: this was the time when the trial by 
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ordeal, which had been popular in the early Middle Ages, was replaced by “rational 
proofs” of guilt or innocence.74 Trial by ordeal, while better than no trial at all, was found 
to be deficient as an institution, and so lawgivers sought to replace it with something 
better. 
One of the objections to the mutability of human law is that since a law, by 
essence, is just and right, and what is just and right is always just and right, laws should 
not be changed.75 In response Thomas says that “right is predicated of law with reference 
to the common weal, to which one and the same thing is not always adapted … wherefore 
rectitude of this kind is subject to change.”76 A law that serves the common good at one 
time may not serve it at another. 
 While change in human law can be advantageous to a community, frequent 
changes would be disastrous, Aquinas warns: 
Human law is rightly changed, in so far as such change is conducive to the 
common advantage. But, to a certain extent, the mere change of law is of itself 
prejudicial to the common good: because custom avails much for the observance 
of laws, seeing that what is done contrary to general custom, even in slight 
matters, is looked upon as grave. Consequently, when a law is changed, the 
binding power of the law is diminished, in so far as custom is concerned. 
Wherefore human law should never be changed, unless, in some way or other, the 
common good be compensated according to the extent of the harm done in this 
respect.77 
  
Thomas recognizes here that custom (consuetudo) is a great force in promoting obedience 
to law. Therefore, the benefit to obtained or the evil to be avoided by a change in law 
must be compared to the diminution of custom that occurs with every change in law. 
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There are other kinds of force besides custom, but it is better when men obey the law 
because they are accustomed to do so, and not through fear of punishment. For the force 
of custom is present even when there is no fear of punishment. The common good is 
compensated for the negative effect that a change in law has, when there is some great 
and evident benefit to be obtained by the change, or when there is an evident or very 
harmful injustice in the law.78 If only a small benefit is to obtained or a small evil 
prevented, then it is unwise to change a long-standing precept.  
 Custom not only promotes obedience to written law, custom itself carries the 
weight of law, and may overrule written law. Thomas argues in a. 3 of q. 97 that human 
law, as an ordinance of human reason, may be manifested either by words or deeds. 
Reason manifested in words is written law and reason manifested in deeds is custom. 
Repeated external actions can make and change law; “Accordingly, custom has the force 
of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law.”79  
Yet custom, as an objection points out, “grows by the acts of private individuals,” 
and it is public authorities who have the power to legislate, not private individuals; 
“therefore custom cannot obtain force of law, so as to abolish the law.”80 In response, 
Thomas argues that among free peoples, the real power to frame laws lies in the whole 
people, whose representative the ruler is. “Wherefore although each individual cannot 
make laws, the whole people can.” 81 Even among a people who are not free, “a 
prevailing custom obtains force of law, in so far as it is tolerated by those to whom it 
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belongs to make laws for that people.”82 Of course, this assumes that the custom does not 
violate a higher law, for if the custom contradicts one of the precepts of natural law, 
Thomas does not hesitate to declare it evil, and says that in this case, custom must yield 
to authority.83 But as long as custom does not violate natural law, it may (and ought to) 
influence written law.  
What is most striking about Thomas’s discussion of custom is that he understands 
custom to be something rational. In his view, custom is not unthinking submission to 
what has always been done; it is a declaration of reason in deed. The fact that an act is 
customary does not make it less rational. It also proceeds from a “deliberate judgment of 
reason,” even if the reason is not original.84 A deliberate act that proceeds from habit, as 
long as it is in accord with reason, is a rational act, and in a sense it is more rational, 
because it follows reason more easily and swiftly. 
Custom is one of the external forces that promotes the formation of virtue in those 
who are subject to it. In the Aristotelian-Thomistic view, moral virtues come to be 
through a process of habituation. The formation of virtue, Aristotle says, has three causes, 
“There are three things which make men good and virtuous; these are nature, habit, 
rational principle.”85 As James Bernard Murphy points out, there is a hierarchy among 
these three elements: custom and habit build on nature, and (practical) reason builds on 
custom and habit.86 Nature is the fundamental requirement: the natural powers of reason 
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and sensation and the appetites associated with those powers, but also whatever natural 
dispositions the individual has, which make it easier for him to acquire virtue.87 But man 
does not possess moral virtues by nature, though neither are they opposed to nature; 
“Rather, we are by nature able to acquire them, and we are completed through habit.”88  
Yet “the soul of the student needs to have been prepared by habits for enjoying 
and hating finely, like ground that is to nourish seed.”89 Some of this preparation is done 
within the family, but good laws and good social customs contribute much to the 
formation of good habits of character: 
For this reason the rearing of children and their activities must be regulated by 
good laws; thus they will be forced, as it were, to become accustomed to good 
things which will not be distasteful but pleasant after the habit has been formed…. 
He says that it is not enough for young men to be reared under good laws and to 
be well taken care of, but even more, adults must discover honorable ways to act 
and become accustomed to them.90 
 
Moral virtues come to be through repetition (one becomes just through doing just 
actions), so that virtuous acts become natural, as it were. 
But moral virtue is derived from customary activity. Now moral virtue, found in 
the appetitive part, implies a certain inclination to something desirable. This 
inclination is either from nature, which tends to what is agreeable to itself, or from 
custom, which is transformed into nature.91  
 
In one sense, then, custom precedes reason. The person who is trained by good customs is 
prepared to acquire virtue. Aristotle says of the virtuous man, “First, he must know [that 
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he is doing virtuous actions]; second, he must decide on them, and decide on them for 
themselves; and, third, he must also do them from a firm and unchanging state.”92  
In another sense, however, custom is an expression of (practical) reason. Customs 
will only promote virtue when they are in accord with reason, which requires that they be 
formed by those who already possess virtue. For the mean in virtue is determined as the 
prudent man would decide it.93 Customs formed by the repeated actions of rational agents 
are rational. Custom in this sense is an expression of reason, and interprets and changes 
law. Of course, custom does not change moral precepts (those derived as conclusions 
from natural law), but only judicial precepts (determinations of natural law). It is not that 
virtue itself means something different, or that the prudent man in one society would be 
an entirely different kind of man than the prudent man in another society. Rather, the 
prudent man would not make the same determination of a particular law in every 
situation. Moral law requires, for example, that one use money well (the virtue of 
liberality).94 But as to how much money one gives, and to whom, this will be determined 
differently in each situation—not randomly, but in response to particulars and in 
conformity with custom.  
 In summary, human law contains two kinds of precepts: moral precepts and 
judicial precepts. Moral precepts are derived from natural law as conclusions from 
premises. Moral precepts are universal; they apply to all societies. Judicial precepts are 
derived from natural law as determinations of more general principles. These are 
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particular precepts, and they will vary according to custom. Precepts about specific 
punishments belong to the second class of precepts.  
 
B.2. Utility, Equity, and Custom Determine Specific Punishments 
We have seen that law about punishment is the kind of human law derived by way 
of determination or specification from the natural law. For Thomas, the fitting of 
punishment to crime is not determined simply from the law of nature; nor is it given by 
divine command (in the New Law, that is). The determination of punishment is an 
exercise of political prudence. The person who possesses the virtue of justice and the 
virtue of political prudence judges rightly about matters pertaining to the political order, 
for “to decide rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from the habit of 
virtue (ex habitu virtutis) … Therefore judgment, which denotes a right decision about 
what is just, belongs properly to justice.”95 But this judgment cannot be made in the 
abstract; it occurs when the just person comes into contact with certain particulars. 
Prudence must take particulars into account, since “actions are in singular matters: and so 
it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and 
the singulars about which actions are concerned.”96 In determining civil punishments, one 
must know not only the general principle that evil ought to be punished, but singulars 
such as the severity of the specific crime, the range of punishments available, the customs 
of the place, and the possible consequences of various penalties. Such particulars are 
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infinite, and cannot all be known, but this does not prevent the prudent man from judging. 
It means that “our counsels are uncertain (Wis. 9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces 
the infinity of singulars to a certain finite number which occur in many cases (in pluribus 
accident), and the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.”97  
Thomas gives three kinds of particulars that the prudent man considers in 
determining punishments: equality, utility, and custom. In order to avoid 
misunderstanding, we must keep in mind that these considerations presuppose that some 
punishment is already justified; it is merely a question of which punishment to use. 
Thomas mentions two considerations in the following passage, taken from a question on 
the punishment of sacrilege: 
In the award of punishments two points must be considered. First equality, in 
order that the punishment may be just, and that “by what things a man sinneth by 
the same . . . he may be tormented” (Wisdom 11:17)…. The second point to be 
considered is utility. For punishments are inflicted as medicines, that men being 
deterred thereby may desist from sin.98 
 
The first consideration is equality between offense and punishment. This equality is the 
numerical equality of commutative justice. By punishing, the judge seeks to restore what 
was lost to the victim of a crime, and to take away what was gained by the wrongdoer: 
[Aristotle] says that if one of two contestants receives a wound and the other 
inflicts it, or even if one commits murder and the other is murdered, this division 
of action and passion brings about inequality because the assailant and the 
murderer have more of what is esteemed good, inasmuch as they have done their 
own will and so seem as it were to have gained. But the man who is wounded or 
murdered has more of evil insofar as he is deprived against his will of well-being 
or life, and so he seems as it were to have suffered loss. The judge tries to 
equalize this by subtracting from the gain and allotting compensation for the loss, 
inasmuch as he takes away something from the assailant and the murderer 
                                                 
97
 S.T. II-II, q. 47, a. 3, ad 2. 
98
 S.T. II-II q. 99, a. 4. Emphasis mine. 
 86
contrary to their will and bestows it to the gain or honor of the person wounded or 
murdered.99 
 
Following Aristotle, Thomas speaks here of equality between offenses and punishments. 
One might question the legitimacy of comparing offenses and punishments in this way. 
One can only compare things in the same genus,100 and so perhaps it makes no more 
sense to speak of equality between crime and punishment than it does to speak of equality 
between colors and sounds.  
But what exactly is Thomas comparing when he talks about inequality and 
equality in this passage? There are two comparisons: a comparison of two evils: the loss 
suffered by the victim and the loss suffered by the one being punished; and a comparison 
of two goods: the goods taken by the offender and the goods restored by judge. The 
offense produces an inequality because the offender has “more of what is esteemed 
good,” while the offended party “has more of evil.” Punishment and restitution aim at 
righting this inequality. Restitution does so by giving to the offended party a good 
comparable to the good taken by the offender. Punishment does so by inflicting an evil on 
the offender comparable to the evil he inflicted.  
Equality of punishment does not take into account the identity of the offender or 
the one offended, except insofar as this bears on the severity of the injury itself. For 
example, striking one’s father is a more serious injury than striking a stranger.101 In 
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general, however, “[t]he law takes into account only the nature of the injury, so that the 
man who has done more damage, whatever his condition, must make more restitution.”102 
The second consideration in determining punishments is utility, that is, the degree 
to which a punishment serves the remote ends of punishment: the reform of the offender, 
the protection of society, the deterrence of others from crime. In the passage cited above 
(S.T. II-II q. 99, a. 4), Thomas mentions the end of deterrence. Deterrence and the other 
remote ends of punishment are not things achieved in punishing itself, but by means of 
the punishment. Nor do they justify punishment in itself, but rather the determination of 
particular punishments.  
We can imagine cases where equality and utility might come into conflict. 
Thomas envisions a case in which a king has committed a serious wrong. Equality 
suggests that the king be punished severely, in accord with the severity of his crime. 
Utility suggests that punishment be forgone for the sake of the common good, to avoid 
scandal and disorder. In this conflict, Thomas sides with utility. The more reasonable 
choice, he says, would be to forgo punishment for the sake of civil order, i.e., for the 
common good. To prefer utility is reasonable in light of the object of punishment, which 
is to redress disorder. In this case, punishment would create more disorder than it 
redressed. The order the punishment achieves is part of the order that constitutes the 
political common good. They are not two different orders, but all part of the just order 
that defines the community and allows its members to flourish.  
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The third requirement in determining specific punishments is human custom. The 
first two considerations, utility and equality, depend simply on the order of reason, but 
human discipline, which is encouraged and upheld by human laws, depends not only on 
the order of reason, but also on the state of the human agent.103 That is, human laws, as 
dictates of reason, must take into account the state of the subjects to which these dictates 
are given. This is done by making determinations that accord with human custom. This 
requirement can be found in Thomas’s discussion of vengeance (S.T. II-II, q. 108), where 
he argues that vengeance should be wrought by means of punishments customary among 
men. In the sed contra he cites the authority of the divine law, which makes use of 
punishments of this sort.104 When the Old Law was given to Moses, it made use of 
punishments that were customary for the time: fines, beatings, death, etc.105 Human 
lawgivers do the same thing, in using customary punishments to enforce the laws they 
make. It should not surprise us to find Thomas approving the use of customary 
punishments, given his agreement with Isidore of Seville, who says that law should be 
“according to the customs of the country,” and “adapted to place and time.”106 
 Custom is determined by the repeated acts of private persons (S.T. I-II, q. 97, a. 
3). Private persons do not determine punishments directly, but they exert indirect 
influence on such determinations, precisely through the force of custom (i.e., 
communally). For example, private persons may influence punishment by encouraging 
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judges to sentence more leniently. Augustine107 in the fourth century and John Paul II108 
in the twentieth have both used this strategy with regard to the death penalty. This kind of 
influence may well affect custom. Thomas’s logic dictates that if it can be determined 
that custom has changed with regard to the use of a particular punishment, it is right that 
the law be changed, assuming always that the custom does not violate natural law. 
Elsewhere, Thomas emphasizes the importance of custom in the formation of human law, 
which “should be adapted to each one according to his ability … and should be according 
to human customs; since man cannot live alone in society, paying no heed to others.”109 
We have seen that in determining specific punishments, the prudent lawgiver will 
consider the equality, utility, and custom of any proposed punishment. When these 
features come into conflict, utility takes precedence over equality. Custom is a necessary 
foundation, presupposed by the other considerations, since in choosing equitable and 
useful punishments, lawmakers choose from the range of customary penalties. The 
political common good unites all of these considerations, as the end which civil 
punishment seeks. 
 
B.3. Determining the Death Penalty 
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For the most part, Thomas does not consider determinations of specific 
punishments in his own time. However, he does consider the specific punishments used 
in Mosaic Law in his Treatise on Law. Thomas divides the Old Law into three parts: 
moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts. The moral precepts are reducible to the 
Decalogue, and these are “dictated by the natural law,” i.e. derived as conclusions from 
principles of the natural law.110 The ceremonial precepts are “determinations of the divine 
worship,” and the judicial precepts are “determinations of the justice to be maintained 
among men.”111 The judicial precepts play the same role that human law would play in 
other societies, regulating relations between men, whether between one Israelite and 
another (laws about lending, property rights, and punishments), between the Israelites and 
foreigners (laws about aliens and enemies), and between the members of a household 
(laws about wives, slaves, and children).112 
The priestly laws of ancient Israel prescribed the punishment called kareth 
(excising) for about three dozen offenses. While this could mean exile or death, “many 
offenses punished by kareth are elsewhere in the priestly law punished [explicitly] by 
death … [and] it thus appears that a death penalty, rather than banishment or 
excommunication, as has been supposed, is involved.”113 Some of the crimes which 
merited “excision” were murder, sorcery, necromancy, idol-worship, blasphemy, 
adultery, incest, sodomy, bestiality, and cursing of parents.114 Offenses aimed directly at 
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God (especially idol-worship) threatened the public good, and an obligation was imposed 
on the witness and on the entire community to punish the offender, usually by stoning:115  
If there is found among you, within any of the towns which the Lord your God is 
giving you, a man or woman who does what is evil in the sight of the Lord your 
God, in transgressing his covenant, and has gone and served other gods and 
worshiped them, … then you shall bring forth to your gates that man or woman 
who has done this evil thing, and you shall stone that man or woman to death with 
stones. (Deut. 17:2-6) 
 
Crimes against one’s fellow man were punished by the offended party or his relatives. 
For example, it was the duty of a husband to prosecute his adulterous wife, and the duty 
of the kinsman (the “Avenger of Blood”) to prosecute his relative’s murderer.116 For most 
injurious crimes, a fine could be substituted for the punishment of death, if acceptable to 
the prosecutor, but the life of the murderer was not subject to ransom. “This prohibition 
of compensation for murder is unparalleled among the laws of the ancient Near East … it 
is the legal expression of the sanctity of human life expressed in Gen. 9:6b”: “for God 
made man in his own image.”117   
The shedding of human blood was a particularly serious crime, for blood 
represented the very life of a creature. Even taking non-human life carried certain 
conditions. While the legitimacy of killing beasts was never questioned, it was done with 
divine permission, since it is God, the giver of life, who has authority also to take life. 
Therefore, there were specific regulations concerning the slaughter of animals. Naturally, 
the laws regarding the taking of human life were even stricter. The offender had to be 
convicted of a grave violation of the law, by two or more witnesses. The punishment of 
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death was to purge the people of the “bloodguilt” that was incurred by the crime 
(particularly a crime that involved the spilling of human blood), and to help right the 
injured relationship of the people to God.118 
While to us, the penal code of ancient Israel seems harsh, historians tell us that the 
practice of blood vengeance was customary at the time, and that in fact Israel’s law was 
significantly less harsh than the penal codes of other ancient peoples. In Israel’s 
contemporaries, familial and tribal loyalties demanded a vengeance of blood when a 
family or clan-member had been killed. It was not necessary to identify the killer, much 
less to produce several witnesses; the idea was simply to take revenge on the killer’s 
family or clan, nor was the revenge limited to a life for a life. Thus the lex talionis of 
Deut. 19:21 should be taken as a limiting rule: you may take only a life for a life, an eye 
for an eye, etc. For Israel, punishment was demanded not by clan loyalties, but by the 
Lord of Life.119 CP was imposed for murder, regardless of the identity of the victim; even 
the murder of a slave was punishable by death. Nor could the wealthy murderer bargain 
for his life by substituting a fine as punishment for a murder.120 Israel’s penal law used 
punishments that were already customary at the time, but exercised them with greater 
equality.  
 The judicial precepts of Mosaic Law, Thomas notes, “derive their binding force 
not from reason alone, but in virtue of their institution.”121 This distinguishes them from 
the moral precepts, which are binding on all men. Thomas defends the judicial 
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prescriptions of the Mosaic Law as good, for the time in which they were valid, including 
the prescriptions for capital punishment.122 On the other hand, he does not view the 
catalogue of capital crimes as perpetually binding. The judicial precepts lose their 
binding force with the coming of Christ, because when the state of the people changes, 
the laws governing them must change as well.123 With the coming of Christ, there was a 
change in the state of the people, since in the community of the Church there was to be 
no distinction between Jew and Greek, as St. Paul says (Gal 3:28). Therefore, the judicial 
precepts were no longer in force.124 Under the New Law, there are no prescriptions at all 
for civil punishments. For judicial precepts “are not essential to virtue in respect of any 
particular determination, but only in regard to the common notion of justice.”125 
Therefore, the New Law leaves it to civil authorities to specify precepts relating one man 
to another, including the prescription of specific punishments. 
We know that CP was in use when Thomas wrote, but he does not give 
contemporary examples of precepts relating to this penalty. From other sources, however, 
we may gather an idea of its extent. There was no prison system as we know it today. 
There were places of confinement, but these were used mostly to remand defendants and 
to detain those awaiting execution or other punishment.126 The idea of using 
imprisonment itself as a punishment was opposed to a principle inherited from Roman 
law through the late-Roman jurist Ulpian (d. 222/224 AD):  
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In the Roman law that guided much of the law learning and lawmaking in 
thirteenth-century Italy, Ulpian’s statement that prisons should be used for 
confinement, not for punishment, was generally understood to be the formal 
doctrine on the subject. In other learned law, however, notably canon law, prisons 
were certainly used for both punishment and correction.127  
 
Mediaeval monasteries typically had a prison cell for the punishment of monks or nuns 
for violations of their monastic rule. Canon law also provided for confinement in a 
monastery as a punishment for clerics and lay people. Moreover, because mediaeval 
courts gave much discretion in punishing to individual judges, Ulpian’s principle does 
not seem to have prevented prisons from sometimes being used as places of punishment, 
and indeed, this practice had become more common in some places by the thirteenth 
century.128 Nonetheless, imprisonment was one of the less common forms of punishment 
in the Middle Ages; nor were facilities constructed exclusively for this use, as they are 
today. Instead, the most common Mediaeval punishments, according to The Oxford 
History of the Prison, were mutilation, death, exile, and monetary compensation.129  
A broader list can be found in St. Thomas, who divides customary punishments 
into eight categories: death, stripes, retaliation (an eye for an eye), slavery, imprisonment, 
exile, fines, and ignominy (public defamation).130 Thomas considers death to be the 
severest of these punishments, because it is the deprivation of the greatest of those goods 
that can be taken away by human power. Fines and ignominy deprive one of external 
goods; slavery and imprisonment deprive one of bodily liberty; stripes and retaliation 
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deprive one of bodily integrity. Exile and death both deprive one of life in the 
community, but death does with greater completeness and finality.131  
The sentence of death took a variety of forms in the Middle Ages, and the specific 
form depended on the nature of the crime, the place, and the discretion of the judge. 
Among the Anglo-Saxons, one guilty of homicide might be bound to the corpse of his 
victim and buried alive.132 Death by hanging was reserved for royalty, and did not 
become the standard mode of administering death until the seventeenth century.133 In 
German lands, “custom dictated both procedure and punishment. Nobles were beheaded, 
and serious offenders of lower social status were broken on the wheel, burned, or hanged. 
These forms of shameful execution [were] often accompanied by mutilation.”134 A 
nineteenth century review of modes of capital punishment in the Middle Ages details 
several other forms of execution: “By the laws of the Burgundians, the adulterous woman 
was smothered in mud. Grimm informs us that the punishment of drowning was awarded 
especially to women and sorceresses.”135 Burning became the accepted sentence for 
heretics in the thirteenth century. The diversity in modes of execution corresponds to a 
diversity of crimes. Murder was not the only crime punishable by death in the Middle 
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Ages; theft, forgery, adultery, assault on a king, sacrilege, and heresy were also capital 
crimes.136 
Capital punishment was generally accepted by Mediaeval theologians as a licit 
form of punishment. There were a few exceptions, “for example Duns Scotus teaches that 
it is never licit to kill a man, and only those may be killed whom God excepts in the 
law.”137 But in general, those who dealt with CP as a disputed question (such as Peter 
Lombard), defended its practice. In his own defense of the death penalty, Thomas does 
not attempt to prescribe which offenses should be punished with death. When he does 
refer to execution for a specific offence, he does so by way of example, or in order to 
remove a specific difficulty, as in the question on punishment of heretics.138 If asked 
when death should be used as a punishment, he might direct us to the Corpus iuris civilis, 
for in his view it is the task of civil authorities to choose punishments, taking into account 
what is customary, not unquestioningly, but with a view to the common good.  
In reference to equality, Thomas says that the person who acts against the political 
community itself may be deprived of the good of association in the political community: 
Natural equity seems to demand that each person be deprived of the good against 
which he acts, for by this action he renders himself unworthy of such a good. So it 
is that, according to civil justice, he who offends against the state is deprived 
completely of association with the state, either by death or by perpetual exile.139 
 
As we have seen, Thomas also considers the utility of the death penalty: 
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[Evil persons] may be justly executed, for the danger which threatens from their 
way of life is greater and more certain than the good which may be expected from 
their improvement.140 
 
The main concern in the decision to execute is the danger which the evildoer presents to 
the common good. In some cases, the good to be served by executing is not only greater 
(because common) but more certain (because the amendment of the evildoer is unlikely). 
Yet the latter consideration is always secondary to the common good, for Aquinas; those 
in civil authority are obliged to consider the common good above private goods. If 
authority must choose between acting to improve the individual (an uncertain end, in any 
case) and acting to protect the common good, it should choose the latter. It would be rash 
to assume, however, that every punishment involves a choice between the good of the 
community and the good of the offender. One and the same punishment may serve both 
the good of the criminal and the common good. Thomas even suggests, as we have seen, 
that the death penalty can do this, in that it at least prevents the criminal from doing more 
evil.141 
As for custom, the death penalty was well-established and regularly used in 13th 
century Europe. To do away with CP would have meant major changes in the law and its 
implementation, and so there would have to have been a strong reason to change. 
Thomas’s presupposition is always against changing the law, because “when a law is 
changed, the binding power of the law is diminished, in so far as custom is abolished.”142 
In order to justify changing law, there must be some great benefit to be obtained or 
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injustice to be avoided. However, when custom changes in regard to a specific 
punishment, it is right to treat this custom as law, and to change the written law 
accordingly. Thomas evidently saw no such reason. He understood this customary 
punishment to have a rational basis, and not to violate the natural law. Therefore, 
objections to the death penalty were easily answered. It is necessary to emphasize that 
Thomas’s support of the customary punishments of his time was not an unreasonable 
support, because he understood custom itself as an expression of reason. He sought to 
articulate the reason inherent in such custom, without maintaining that custom was 
infallible. 
In ancient Israel and in 13th century Europe, the death penalty was a useful, 
equitable, and customary punishment. However, utility, equity, and custom will not 
prescribe the same thing to every time and place. If the death penalty is no longer useful 
or customary, and if there are alternative punishments that would also be proportional to 
serious offenses, Thomas’s theory of punishment would reject its use. Judicial precepts, 
Thomas writes in his commentary on the New Law, “are not essential to virtue in respect 
of any particular determination, but only in regard to the common notion of justice.”143 
Positive precepts, that is, are not necessary conclusions from the natural law. According 
to natural law’s “common notion of justice,” what is necessary is that evil be punished, 
and that the punishment be useful, equitable, and in accord with custom. It is not 
necessary that each society prescribe the same penalties.144 It is not necessary for any 
particular class of crimes to be punished with death. For “the obligation of observing 
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justice is indeed perpetual. But the determination of those things that are just, according 
to human or Divine institution, must needs be different, according to the different states 
of mankind.”145  
In this section, we saw how Thomas regarded the death penalty as a political 
institution. Punishments, in general, are determinations or particularizations of the natural 
law precept that punishment is due to evil. In making specific determinations of this kind, 
one ought to consider what is equitable or proportional to the evil that has been 
committed. One ought also to consider what punishment will be most useful to the good 
of the community. Finally, one ought to choose from among those punishments that are 
customary to a particular time and place. Considering all these factors, CP was a 
reasonable penalty to use in the thirteenth century. Today, however, different conditions 
obtain, and one who would reason well about CP must judge according to these new 
circumstances. 
 
C Conclusion 
We have seen that according to Thomas, CP is a legitimate form of civil 
punishment, but it is not in itself necessary to good social order. It is just for political 
authority to execute offenders, when there is nothing else that can be done for the good of 
the community. CP may be conditionally necessary—that is, if nothing else will serve the 
common good—but it is not necessary in an absolute sense.  
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Essential to this thesis is the idea that CP does not violate a moral law (either 
natural or divine). Thus, I showed how Thomas distinguishes CP from murder. In his 
view, intentional killing is morally specified by the circumstances who (the agent) and to 
whom (the receiver). As for divine commands, the 5th Commandment prohibits 
intentional killing by one’s own authority, but not killing as punishment. The love that we 
should have for all men does not rule out punishment, when that punishment is done for 
the good of others and not out of hatred. 
Having argued that executing a man is not evil per se, Thomas can then show how 
CP may sometimes be conducive to the common good by curbing or restricting evil in 
some way. Whether CP will do this in a particular circumstance is a determination of 
practical reason. For Aquinas, the determination of specific civil punishments is directed 
toward the common good, and depends on three considerations: utility (the benefit to be 
obtained for the common good), equality (making the punishment proportionate to the 
offense), and custom (what punishments are approved by custom in a certain time and 
place).  
We have seen how equality and how custom determine punishment, but the 
question of utility requires further exploration. Thomas’s theory requires the judge or 
lawgiver to consider what will most benefit the common in determining punishment. 
Depending on what view he takes of the common good, this could produce significantly 
different results. If, for example, the common good is the sum of individual goods, then it 
is difficult to see how punishment contributes to the common good at all, since it inflicts 
an evil on one of those individuals, and does not clearly add to the good of others. On the 
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other hand, if the common good is the material prosperity of the state, then it will make 
sense to punish a homeless man more severely than a successful businessman for the 
same offense, since one is a drain on the common good and the other contributes to it. It 
should come as no surprise that Thomas takes neither of these views of the common 
good. In Chapter III, we will see that for Thomas, the political common good is the just 
and peaceful order of civil society, which punishment serves immediately by redressing 
disorder, and remotely by discouraging future disorder.
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Chapter III: The Political Common Good According to St. Thomas 
It may be difficult to say in what respects a man is, and in what respects he is not, 
a part of the community. What is not open to doubt is that insofar as the 
individual has the character of a part, the principle of the primacy of the whole 
signifies not only that the common good is greater, but also that the private good 
may have to be sacrificed to the greater good of the community. Remarkably, 
these views command a large amount of consensus so long as they remain 
unformulated. It is generally agreed that members of the police or of the armed 
forces or of the fire department are sometimes under strict obligation to expose 
themselves to probable, or almost certain, or humanly certain death in the service 
of the community. Disagreements begin when such principles as that of the 
primacy of the common good are formulated.1 
 
It is not difficult to recognize the nobility of individual actions that serve the good of a 
community at the sacrifice of an individual good: the fireman who risks his life to put out 
a dangerous fire, the soldier in wartime, the mother who sacrifices a promising career to 
care for her children. It is more difficult to explain what justifies the sacrifice of an 
individual good for the common good. We are rightly wary of attempts to impose such 
sacrifices, or to make individuals mere instruments of the state. Yet if the common good 
is not superior to the individual good, why should we acclaim those who are willing to 
sacrifice their own good for the good of the community?  
The relationship between individual and common goods is essential to our 
consideration of capital punishment. Thomas’s assertion that a criminal may rightly be 
executed to serve the common good is based on the priority of the common good. In this 
chapter, I consider the principle of the priority of the common good and its application to 
the realm of political society. I will consider the principle of the preeminence of the 
common good, using the works of Thomas (especially the Summa Theologiae and his 
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commentaries on Aristotle) and Aristotle (especially the Nicomachean Ethics and the 
Politics).2 In the first part of this chapter, I consider what kind of community Thomas 
means when he speaks of the priority of the common good (A). Since the foundation for 
the priority of the common good is the more general principle of the priority of the whole 
over the part, I devote the next section to what it means to call the political community a 
whole, and citizens parts of that whole (B). The next section treats the notion of the 
common good itself (C). Finally, I consider the specifically political common good: what 
it is, in what sense it is prior, and how this is compatible with individuals’ pursuit of their 
own goods (D).  
 
A The Political Community 
 
Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established 
with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which 
they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political 
community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at 
good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.3 
 
Aristotle begins his Politics with these words about the primacy of the political 
community. The state is the highest kind of community and it aims at the highest good.  
Each community seeks some good, and the good defines and specifies each community. 
The political community aims not only at the good of a few, or at one particular good 
such as wealth, but at the good life for all its members.  
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3
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Aristotle does not immediately say what this highest good is, but after the passage 
cited above, he begins to consider the source of the political community, since “he who 
thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will 
obtain the clearest view of them.”4 Moreover, in looking to the source, we will see the 
reason for the formation of the community, the good for which it is formed and at which 
it aims. “In the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each 
other; namely, of male and female, that the race may continue.”5 The association that 
forms the family is the most basic and natural of human associations, and provides “for 
the supply of men’s everyday wants.”6 Since a single household is not self-sufficient, 
families naturally join together and form villages. From several villages joined together, a 
state is formed.  
If households and villages are natural, Aristotle reasons, so is the state, for the 
state is the end and goal of the process, and “the end of the natural sources from which 
something comes to be is the thing’s nature.”7 In other words, the aim of human 
association is the satisfaction of human needs. The self-sufficient society is the one that 
provides for all human needs (as far as any human society can), and this is the state. The 
state, therefore, is the end of the natural activity of human association, and as the end of a 
natural activity, the state is itself natural.  
If we consider the state from the perspective of the human need for political 
association, we again arrive at the conclusion that the state is natural. That man is a 
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political animal is shown by the human capacity for language, which is ordered to 
communication about the harmful and the useful, the just and the unjust, “but 
communication about these things produces the household and the political community. 
Therefore, human beings are by nature domestic and political animals.”8 In his 
Commentary on the Politics, “Aquinas accentuates Aristotle’s argument that human 
beings are naturally political over the Philosopher’s prior argument that the city exists by 
nature, as the natural outgrowth and end of prior natural associations.”9 The two 
arguments are not mutually exclusive, but differ in that the former focuses on political 
activity (communication about good and evil, just and unjust), and the latter on the 
existence of a political order.  
Aristotle asserts that while the joining of men and women as couples is more 
natural and more necessary than political association, the state is prior to the family: 
The state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the 
whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be 
destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might 
speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that … 
The proof that the state is … prior to the individual is that the individual, when 
isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the 
whole.10 
 
If the state is a whole, composed of individuals and families as parts, and the whole is 
prior to the parts, then the state is prior to the individual and the family.  
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Commenting on this passage, Thomas says, “The whole is necessarily prior to the 
parts, namely, in the rank of nature and perfection.”11 The part is corrupted when the 
whole is corrupted, because “every part is defined by its activity and the power by which 
it acts.”12 The severed foot no longer has the power to walk and the operation of walking, 
and immediately begins to corrupt. When something is corrupted, it loses its species and 
therefore its definition.13 Therefore, it cannot be called by the same name (since the name 
implies the definition), except equivocally. The severed foot is a foot only equivocally. 
So, Thomas concludes, “the whole is clearly by nature prior to its material parts, although 
the parts are prior in the order of coming to be. But individual human beings are related 
to the whole political community like the parts of a human being to the human being. For, 
as hands and feet cannot exist apart from a human being, so neither is a human being self-
sufficient for living apart from a political community.”14 
In the first book of the Politics, there is some ambiguity about whether the state is 
composed of households, of all the persons who live within the state, or of citizens alone. 
In Book III, Aristotle returns to the definition of the state, commenting on this point: “But 
a state is a composite, like any other whole made up of many parts;--these are the 
citizens, who compose it.”15 Now, there are other persons who in some sense compose 
the state, but who are not citizens (for Aristotle these would be slaves, women, children, 
and resident aliens). Since the government joins the parts of the state together, and 
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citizens are those who can participate in governing,16 citizens are the principal parts of 
the state. Non-citizens are parts of the state in a secondary sense.17 Thus, “a state is a 
body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life.”18  
Aristotle uses two comparisons to convey the priority of the state as a whole: a 
checkers game and a living body. The first of these comparisons is used only once, when 
he likens a man without a state to an isolated checkers piece.19 A checkers piece by itself 
is not really a checkers piece at all; the piece “gains its very identity, and thus in a sense 
its existence, by its relation to the game of which it is a part.”20 Just as an isolated 
checkers piece is an equivocal checkers piece, an isolated man is an equivocal man (such 
a man would be either like a beast or a god, Aristotle adds). Aristotle gives more 
attention, however, to the second comparison: 
Again, the state, as composed of unlikes, may be compared to the living being: as 
the first elements into which a living being is resolved are soul and body, as soul 
is made up of rational principle and appetite, the family of husband and wife, 
property of master and slave, so of all these, as well as other dissimilar elements, 
the state is composed.21 
 
Through both the checkers game and the bodily comparisons, Aristotle affirms the idea 
that the individual man is to the state as the part is to the whole. Perhaps he focuses more 
on the comparison with the living body because it more accurately represents the 
naturalness of the state, which he has already affirmed. 
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Man’s identity as part of a whole recurs in many different contexts in the Summa 
Theologiae.22 Thomas adopts the language of the living body, rather than the checkers 
game as a metaphor for the state. However, he does not use the comparison in quite the 
same way as Aristotle does. In the passage just quoted, Aristotle uses it to explain the 
differentiation of social roles (husband, wife, master, slave). Thomas, on the other hand, 
uses it mainly to explain the relationship between the individual and the society: 
Just as a physician looks to health as the end in his work, and health consists in 
the orderly concord of humors, so, too, the ruler of a state intends peace in his 
work, and peace consists in “the ordered concord of citizens.” Now, the physician 
quite properly and beneficially cuts off a diseased organ if the corruption of the 
body is threatened because of it. Therefore, the ruler of a state executes 
pestiferous men justly and sinlessly in order that the peace of the state may not be 
disrupted.23 
 
Though Thomas conceives the individual as a part of the state, he says elsewhere, “man 
is not ordained to the body politic, according to all that he is and has.”24 Here Thomas 
departs from Aristotle because he has man’s supernatural end in view. Although every 
man is ordered to the state, he is not in every respect ordered to the state. The individual 
man is a part of the state, but he also transcends the state. He is ordained to a supernatural 
end, eternal beatitude, which does not negate, but surpasses, his natural end. The living 
body comparison raises some important questions for Thomas’s account, which will be 
addressed in the next section. 
 We have seen thus far that every community seeks some good; the highest 
community seeks the highest good. The political community is the highest community, 
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because of all human communities, it is the most complete and self-sufficient. The state is 
natural: first because it is the end of a natural activity (men associating with each other), 
and the end of a natural activity is natural; and second because man’s capacity for 
language is ordered to communication about the just and the unjust, and communication 
about the just and unjust is the source of political communities. The state is prior to other 
human communities because it is more perfect and complete. The state is a whole, which 
is like a living body in that it is composed of different elements; citizens are the primary 
parts of the state. For Thomas, though man is part of the state, he also has an end that 
surpasses the state, and therefore is not a part of the state according to all that he is and 
has.  
 
B The Political Community as a Whole25 
 
The priority of the common good over the private good depends on the more 
fundamental priority of whole over part.26 “Whole” is an equivocal term; it signifies 
different realities. “Animal” means the same thing whether it is said of a man or an ox, 
but this is not the case with “whole,” which does not mean the same thing when it is said 
of a lake, a house, a man, an argument, or an action.27  Yet this is not a case of pure 
equivocation, because there is a rational relation between different uses of “whole.” All 
wholes signify a kind of unity; it is only by virtue of being in some way one that we call 
anything a whole.  
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Yet not everything that is one is properly called a whole. Like the term “whole,” 
the term “one” has many senses.28 A thing may be one accidentally, as ‘musical man’ is 
one. To be musical is an accident of man, and therefore ‘man’ and ‘musical’ are united 
accidentally. Things that are one in this way are not said to be wholes. A thing may also 
be one in virtue of its nature. The things that are one by their nature are more truly one 
than those things that are accidentally one.29 But not all things that are one by nature are 
wholes either. There are three different senses in which something is one by virtue of its 
nature. First, something may be one as continuous; as a line or of a part of the body is 
one. Second, something may be one as indivisible, as a point (the limit of a line) is one. 
Third, something may be one as having the same formula of essence, as “raiment” and 
“dress”; these are one because they have the same definition.30  
Only when something is one in the third sense—one in form or definition—is it 
properly one. What is properly one is called whole: “While in a sense we call anything 
one if it is a quantity and continuous, in a sense we do not unless it is a whole, i.e. unless 
it has unity of form.”31 For example, we would not say that Mount Everest, a whale, and 
the Summa make up a whole. Even though the three could be one in some sense, e.g. by 
having the term “large” predicated of them, this is only an accidental unity and not a 
unity of form.  
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The form is the principle of unity in a whole, but as wholes are united by different 
forms, they are one in different senses. There are two main senses in which something is 
said to be a whole: 
For the universal whole is in each part according to its entire essence and power; 
as animal in a man and in a horse; and therefore it is properly predicated of each 
part. But the integral whole is not in each part, neither according to its whole 
essence, nor according to its whole power. Therefore in no way can it be 
predicated of each part.32 
 
One kind of whole can be predicated of its parts, and this is a universal whole. A species 
is a universal whole, and this kind of whole is predicated of its member or part (e.g., man 
is an animal). The other kind of whole, an integral whole, is not predicated of its parts. 
For example, a house is a whole of which its wall is a part, and we do not say that a wall 
is a house. We might predicate the integral whole of all the parts together, “as if we were 
to say that the wall, roof, and foundations are a house,” but this is not strictly true. To 
have a house, it is not enough to have wall, roof, and foundations; these must be arranged 
in a certain order, so that the foundations support the walls, and the walls support the 
roof.33  
The wholes which we most associate with the name are integral wholes, which 
include human communities. Among integral wholes, another distinction is relevant: an 
integral whole, which again is a whole that is not predicated of its parts, may be one per 
se or one because of a certain order. Something is one per se, or essentially one, if it is 
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one matter (a lake) or if it is one substance (a man).34 In this kind of whole, the parts have 
no proper activity apart from the activity of the whole.35 If a boat sails in part of the lake, 
it also sails in the lake as a whole. If a man’s hand kills, the whole man kills.36 Any 
proper activity of the part is also the activity of the whole.37  
On the other hand, an integral whole may be a whole because of some order, 
either a real order, or an order of reason. In wholes that are one only because of some 
order, the parts may have a proper activity that is not also the activity of the whole. For 
example, a flock of sheep is a whole by virtue of a real order. A single sheep has an 
activity apart from the flock; if one sheep is sleeping, it is not necessarily the case that the 
flock is asleep. This kind of whole is an accidental whole, which must be distinguished 
from something accidentally one: an accidental whole is essentially one, because it is 
united by a form, but it is an accidental whole, because it is united by an accidental form. 
Having examined the different senses of “whole,” we can now consider the part in its 
relation to the whole, a relation that depends on the kind of whole. 
For Aristotle and Aquinas, the principle that every whole is greater than its part 
serves as the foundation for arguments about the priority of the common good.38 This is 
not a principle susceptible to strict proof, Aquinas notes, “certain axioms or propositions 
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are universally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions whose terms are known 
to all, as, ‘Every whole is greater than its part,’ and, ‘Things equal to one and the same 
are equal to one another.’”39 We know this principle through sense experience of material 
parts and wholes, but we apply the principle more broadly to immaterial parts and 
wholes. The child offered the choice between part of a cookie and a whole cookie will 
immediately recognize the whole as the superior choice; he perceives that the whole is 
greater than the part. With reflection, this principle can be applied to nonmaterial 
realities: the speaker wants to have the whole attention of the listener, and not just a part 
of it; the listener wants to hear the whole story, and not just an episode (moreover, he 
wants to hear those parts in their right order, since a story is an integral whole made one 
by a rational order); the lover desires the whole heart of the beloved, and not a partial 
affection.  
Yet in what sense is a whole “greater” than its parts? Why do we prefer the first 
item in each of the examples above? The whole, according to Aristotle, is to the part as 
complete to incomplete, as perfect to imperfect.40 Aristotle and Aquinas also state the 
relationship between whole and part in terms of priority: “The whole is prior to its part.” 
This either seems to be the same as or closely related to the statement “the whole is 
greater than its part.”41 Both “greater” and “prior” are relative terms. Both express some 
                                                 
39
 S.T. I-II, q. 94, a. 2. See also S.C.G. III, c. 112, n. 5: “Further, it is evident that all parts are ordered to the 
perfection of the whole, since a whole does not exist for the sake of its parts, but, rather, the parts are for 
the whole.” 
40
 Physics III.6.207a14 : “The whole and the complete are either entirely the same or quite close in their 
nature.” See also In V Metaph., lect. 18, n. 1033 “For the terms perfect and whole have the same or nearly 
the same meaning.” 
41
 While Aristotle and Aquinas clearly define the senses of “prior,” they do not do so for the senses of 
“greater.” 
  114
sort of precedence. “Greater” is used of both material and immaterial wholes, while 
“prior” applies more to the consideration of nonmaterial wholes: one event is prior to 
another; the cause is prior to the effect, etc. Since “prior” has a narrower sense, and 
because priority is the concept that both Aristotle and Aquinas use in describing the status 
of the common good (Aquinas also uses “greater” in this context), I hereafter focus on the 
formulation “the whole is prior to its part.”  
According to Aristotle, the whole is prior to its part as a complete reality. Like the 
term whole, the term prior also has several different senses.42 Aristotle analyzes the 
priority of whole over part in terms of potentiality and actuality:  
According as potency or complete reality is taken into account, different things 
are prior, for some things are prior in respect of potency, others in respect of 
complete reality, e.g. in potency the half line is prior to the whole line, and the 
part to the whole … but in complete reality these are posterior; for it is only when 
the whole has been dissolved that they will exist in complete reality.43  
 
The part is posterior to the whole in actuality because it receives its actuality from the 
whole: if there were no line, there could be no half-line. But in potency, the part is prior 
to the whole. Take two lines of equal length, Y and Z. These may be considered as two 
actual lines, but they may also be considered as potential half-lines of line X (where X = 
Y + Z). One might say that the potential line X only exists by virtue of the potency in 
lines Y and Z to be half lines. Thus, the potential whole receives its actuality from the 
potential halves.  
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When the part is separated from the whole, it has an actual existence apart from 
the whole, but in a different sense. It is no longer part of the whole, but something else. 
When the half-line is separated from the line with length X, it is no longer a half-line, but 
a line of length X/2. With reference to the parts of a living whole, one commentator 
explains: “It is possible for Aristotle to claim that the material parts of a living whole 
cannot ‘be’ (in the sense of having substantial form) without the whole and, hence, that 
they are posterior in this sense of actuality. But when the whole is dissolved, they are 
actualized as material parts (a different sense of being).”44 So the hand has no substantial 
form without the animal body of which it is a member. If the hand is severed, it acquires 
an actual existence apart from the animal, but no longer as an animal’s hand, but as a 
lump of decaying flesh. 
 Commenting on the same passage in the Metaphysics, Aquinas says that “from 
the viewpoint of actuality [the parts] are said to be subsequent, since they become actual 
only by the dissolution of some whole. For when a whole is dissolved into its parts, the 
parts then begin to exist actually.”45 The part does not exist as a complete reality until 
actually separated from the whole; thus, the existence of the part presupposes the 
existence of the whole.  
 In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas also considers the priority of whole over part 
in terms of causality. There is a sense in which the part is the cause of the whole, since 
the whole depends on the parts as on a material cause, for if any part is missing, it is 
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incomplete (and therefore not whole).46 However, the whole is the formal cause of its 
parts. The parts are as matter to the form, which is the whole, and as “matter is for the 
sake of the form, and not the form for the matter,”47 the parts are for the sake of the 
whole. There is also a sense in which the whole is the final cause of its parts. The whole 
is “that for the sake of which” the part is what it is. The whole is the common end of all 
the parts48 and the end of each part as part. So the part is for the good of the whole, and 
must be suited to the whole, rather than the whole to the part; in other words, the good of 
the part is ordered to the good of the whole: 
But the good and the better are not considered in the same way, in the whole and 
in the parts. For, in the whole, the good is integrity, which is the result of the 
order and composition of its parts. Consequently, it is better for there to be an 
inequality among the parts of the whole, without which the order and perfection 
of the whole cannot be, than for all its parts to be equal, even if each of them were 
to exist on the level of the most important part. However, if the parts are 
considered in themselves, each part of a lower grade would be better if it were on 
the level of the higher part. This is exemplified in the human body: in fact, the 
foot would be a more worthy part if it possessed the beauty and power of the eye, 
but the whole body would be more imperfect if it lacked the functioning of the 
foot.49 
 
What would be good for the part considered in itself, may not be best for the whole, and 
since the part is for the sake of the whole, it would be unreasonable to prefer the good of 
the part at the expense of the good of the whole. For example, it would be unreasonable 
for a starving person to refuse to eat food that he dislikes, sacrificing the good of his 
entire self for the good of his palate. The good of the whole, which is the final cause in 
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relation to the part, “is integrity, which is the result of the order and composition of its 
parts.” This order and composition in the whole is also the formal cause of the parts. And 
the whole, by virtue of its integrity, is prior as a complete reality to its parts, which in 
themselves are imperfect and incomplete. 
The order of part to whole is most evident when we consider a per se whole, such 
as a human being. But the priority of whole over part does not apply only to per se 
wholes. A whole, as whole, has priority as a complete reality over its part. So, a house, 
which is an accidental whole, is prior to its walls, floors, and roof. The house is the 
formal cause of the walls, since the form of the house existed in the mind of the builder 
before the walls were built. The house is also prior to its parts as final cause, since the 
house is the reason for walls, floors, and roof.  
If the political community is a whole, and its members are parts of that whole, 
then the political community is prior to its members. That a political society is in some 
way one is evident from the fact that it is called “the state” or “the city.” If the disparate 
elements included in the name were not in some way united, we could make no sense of 
the name. More specifically, according to both Aristotle and Aquinas, the state is a 
whole. Thomas comments in the Treatise on Justice, “It is evident that all who are 
included in a community stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole.”50 Yet 
as we have seen, the term “whole” has many senses. It is Aquinas who specifies the kind 
of whole meant by the political society, when he says that the state has a unity of order. 
He makes this distinction in the introduction to his Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics.  
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Aristotle begins his Ethics by considering the nature of moral philosophy, and 
Aquinas begins his commentary in the same way, making some general remarks in the 
Proemium on the different kinds of order found in things and considered by the different 
sciences and arts. Each art and science is distinguished by a different end.51 Moral 
philosophy considers the order in human operations. Since human operations may be 
operations of the individual, the family, or the civil society, moral philosophy is divided 
into three parts: individual (monastica), domestic (oeconomica), and political (politica).52 
The end of moral philosophy is an operation, rather than a product; and as the operations 
differ, so do the ends of each branch of moral philosophy. It is in this context that the 
relation between whole and part arises. If one science considers a certain whole, does the 
same science also consider the parts of that whole? It depends on the kind of whole, 
Thomas answers. For a whole that is one per se, in which “there is no operation of the 
part that does not belong to the whole,” the part and the whole are treated by the same 
science.53 Thus it belongs to botany not only to treat the whole plant, but leaves, roots, 
stem, etc.  
On the other hand, in a whole that has only the unity of order, the parts “can have 
an operation that is not the operation of the whole,” and in this case, the same science or 
art does not consider the parts and the whole.54 Thomas offers the example of the army. 
Since an army has only the unity of an order, its parts have operations that are not 
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operations of the whole.55 The soldier as soldier is a part of the army, but the soldier does 
many things that he does not do as a member of the army: he marries a woman, he raises 
children, he reads Aristotle’s Ethics, etc. None of these is an act of the army. They are 
acts of the soldier, not as soldier, but as man, father, student, etc. On the other hand, the 
whole army has an operation that can be ascribed to the whole, but not to each of the 
parts individually. We say of the whole army (or of the commander, its principal part) 
that it advances on the enemy, but this is not properly said of each individual soldier.  
It must be known moreover that the whole which the political group or the family 
constitutes has only the unity of an order (ordinis unitas), for it is not something 
absolutely one (simpliciter unum). A part of this whole, therefore, can have an 
operation that is not the operation of the whole, as a soldier in an army has an 
activity that does not belong to the whole army. However, the whole does have an 
operation that is not proper to its parts but to the whole—for example, the assault 
of the entire army.56  
 
The political community, then, is not one in the sense that substance is one, but like an 
army, it has a unity of order. Therefore it is a whole, not a substantial whole, but an 
accidental whole. And just as the substantial form is the nature of a substantial whole, the 
accidental form which unifies the accidental whole is the nature of that whole. “We say 
that the nature of each thing is what belongs to it when its coming-to-be is complete,” 
whether the thing is a horse or a house.57  
And since human reason can dispose both the things that human beings use and 
human beings themselves, who are governed by reason, it proceeds in both cases 
from simple things to composite things. Regarding things that human beings use, 
for example, human beings build ships out of timber, and houses out of stones and 
wood. And regarding human beings themselves, for example, human reason 
directs a number of human beings to form a particular association. And since 
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there are indeed different grades and orders of these associations, the ultimate 
association is the political community directed to things self-sufficient for human 
life.58 
 
Yet if the political community has only the unity of an order, and not substantial unity, 
perhaps it is somewhat deceptive to compare it to a living body, as Thomas does, when 
he says for example:  
Since a member is part of the whole human body, it is for the sake of the whole, 
as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence a member of the human body is to be 
disposed of according as it is expedient for the body…. [And] the whole of man is 
directed as to his end to the whole of the community of which he is a part.59 
 
We must be clear that Thomas does not maintain that the state is an organic entity, or a 
substance of any kind. First, if the state were a substance, its parts could not be 
substances, for that which subsists cannot exist in another.60 But individual persons are 
substances, and therefore the political community (or any association of persons) is not a 
substance. Second, if the state were a substance, it would mean that no part of the state 
could have an action that was not an action of the whole state, which is clearly not the 
case. Philosopher Mary Keys comments, the parts of the state “are not organically united 
in a ‘body politic,’ as demonstrated by the simple fact that each citizen can perform 
actions that are proper to him or her, and that are not similarly attributable to the whole 
political community of which he or she forms part.”61 Thomas also says that many 
actions performed by citizens are not attributable to the community as a whole (are not 
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actions of citizens as citizens).62 Therefore, the political society is not a substantial whole 
or an organic entity, but a whole unified by a certain order.  
If the political community is an accidental unity, while individual persons are 
substances, it seems Thomas must hold individuals to be superior to the community of 
which they are parts, since substance is superior to accident. Yet while “substance is 
more excellent simply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is more 
excellent than substance in so far as it perfects substance in some accidental mode of 
being.”63 The human being is more excellent simply than the political community, which 
is an accidental unity, but relative to the human social capacity, the political community 
is more excellent. In other words, the political community is more excellent insofar as it 
perfects human beings in their social capacity. The excellence of the community is based 
on its ability to perfect the individual man, which it does as the object of his love. The 
individual is perfected in loving the community’s good above his private good. 
Aristotle also recognizes the limits on the unity of political society, though not as 
clearly as Thomas. Aristotle criticizes Socrates for wanting to create too much unity in 
the state by having everything in common. He has many practical reservations about this 
policy, but more fundamentally, he says that it rests on a mistaken idea about unity.64 A 
state does not aim at unity without limits, but at unity out of a plurality, with elements 
different in kind. Both the family and the individual are more one than the state, and it 
would be unwise to try to impose these kinds of unity on the state, even if it were 
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possible. If the state were one in all respects, it would cease to be a state.65 Diversity is 
good for the state because it contributes to self-sufficiency.66 
To return to our question: if Thomas did not treat the state as a per se whole, why 
did he so often compare it to a living organism? If it appeared only in his commentaries 
on Aristotle, one could argue that he did not fully endorse it, but in fact, this comparison 
also occurs in the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentiles. He clearly thought 
it a helpful comparison, and he does not seem to share the modern fear of an all-
encompassing totalitarian state.67 Positively, Thomas uses the comparison as a vivid 
illustration of the integrity of the whole, and the orientation of each part to the good of 
the whole. Since the political community is a whole made up of human persons, a 
comparison based on artifacts (such as the checkers game) is at least as defective. At the 
same time, there are obvious differences between a political community and a living 
organism, as noted above.  
In the end, however, the living body comparison does not carry the weight of 
proof in Thomas’s discussions of the political community. His examples from medicine 
do not prove that the common good is prior to the individual good. Both the priority of 
the living body and the priority of the state rely on the principle that the whole is greater 
than the part, which Thomas understands to be an indemonstrable principle. One 
understands it simply by reflecting on what it means to be whole and part. However, this 
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reflection draws on experience. The idea that the whole is greater than the part is known 
first from experience of material wholes, such as living bodies. Upon further reflection, it 
is applied to immaterial wholes, and the priority of the whole is understood in reflecting 
on these immaterial wholes as they are actually experienced.  
The comparison with the living body is important, but it is not necessary to 
Thomas’s doctrine of the common good. His comparison to an army might be less 
controversial, though it too is imperfect. The advantage of the army analogy is that both 
army and state are wholes composed of persons, wholes with the unity of an order. The 
advantage of the bodily analogy is that it emphasizes the naturalness of political society, 
which Aquinas, like Aristotle, wanted to affirm. Political society is natural in that it is the 
effect and end of a natural social tendency in man. For Aquinas, political authority and 
society are natural, not only to fallen man, but to human nature in any condition, 
something that is not true of military organizations. In the end, both the bodily analogy 
and the army analogy are only likenesses. The political whole must also be considered on 
its own, according to what unifies it specifically, and that which unifies it is not the same 
as that which unifies either an army or a human being. As Yves Simon comments, 
Likening society to an organism may be useful as long as we remain in control of 
 our analogies and understand that society is not one after the fashion of an organic 
 body. Its individual members are not organs or cells but primary subjects of 
 human existence.68  
 
I began this chapter on St. Thomas’s view of the common good by considering his 
understanding of wholes and parts, and the political society as a whole. A whole is 
something that has unity of form. A whole may be one per se or one according to a 
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certain order. Every whole, as whole, is prior to its part as a complete reality, and is 
related to its parts as formal cause. The political community is an integral whole, but not 
a per se whole. The political community is an accidental whole, unified by a certain 
order. As a whole, the political community is prior to its parts. But it is not prior in an 
absolute sense. Here we must recall Aquinas’s saying that “things not of the same genus 
are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera.”69 But the 
state, an accidental unity, and the human being, a substantial unity, are not in the same 
genus and therefore not, as such, commensurable. In order to compare the community 
and the individual, one must compare them in a common genus: the genus of final cause. 
The end is the final cause in practical matters, we can compare the ends of two different 
practical pursuits on the level of causality. One cause is prior to another if it extends to 
more effects. The good of the community extends to more effects because many agents 
have it as their good, whereas the private or particular good is the good of one agent only. 
  
C The Common Good  
 
Thomas maintains that the community is prior to the individual, on the level of 
ends or goods. His justification of CP depends on this priority. But what is the good of 
the community, and how is it prior to the individual’s good? Thomas did not write a 
treatise on the common good; we cannot find even a single question devoted exclusively 
to this topic. Nonetheless, the phrase bonum commune occurs frequently in his works, as 
does the idea of “the preeminence of the common good.” The twentieth century Thomist 
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I. Th. Eschmann compiled a glossary of 204 citations of “the principle of the 
preeminence of the common good” in the Thomistic corpus.70  
The principle that the common good is to be preferred to the private good (bonum 
commune praeferatur bono privato), or the principle of the priority or preeminence of the 
common good, is not original to Aquinas. Eschmann in fact says that “in every case the 
statement of our principle in St. Thomas is in the form of a quotation whether or not the 
author presents it expressly as such”; and with two exceptions, the authority quoted is 
Aristotle.71 However, Eschmann argues, what Thomas presents is not primarily an 
Aristotelian doctrine, but a scholastic axiom, derived from Roman and patristic sources; 
“generally speaking the Aristotelian authority is an addition to a pre-established doctrine 
whose main lines and significations had been fixed quite apart from Aristotelian 
philosophy.”72  
  While Eschmann is right to point out the scholastic precedents for the principle of 
the preeminence of the common good, it is difficult to put aside the continual references 
to Aristotle in this context as playing a merely “decorative” role.73 As important as it is to 
understand the historical context in which an author wrote, it is at least equally important 
to take an author at his word, unless there is serious reason for doing otherwise. If 
Thomas claims to explain his teaching using Aristotelian principles, we ought to accept 
that this is indeed what he is doing, whether successfully or not. His debt to patristic and 
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Roman authors need not contradict this; Thomas may have received this principle 
through the scholastic tradition, but he found its philosophical justification in Aristotle.  
It must be noted that Eschmann was part of a somewhat contentious debate in the 
middle of the twentieth century about the nature of the common good in Saint Thomas. 
Another twentieth-century Thomist, Charles de De Koninck, had written a treatise On the 
Primacy of the Common Good Against the Personalists, in which he made a carefully 
documented case for the Thomistic doctrine of the primacy of the common good over the 
good of the individual. In presenting this doctrine as a refutation of “the personalists,” he 
provoked the ire of those sympathetic to the thought of Jacques Maritain. Maritain 
seemed to be the target of De Koninck’s critique, though his name was nowhere 
mentioned. Eschmann responded to De Koninck with an antagonistic piece entitled “In 
Defense of Maritain.” Eschmann’s defense of Maritain was flawed, and not fully 
representative of Maritain. De Koninck’s response to Eschmann was thorough and well-
documented, but did nothing to ameliorate the angry tone of the exchange.74  
A more measured response to De Koninck came from another renowned Thomist, 
Yves Simon, who reviewed On the Primacy of the Common Good for the Review of 
Politics. Simon writes that De Koninck does an admirable job in summing up the 
Thomistic doctrine of the common good, but he does not develop it in any great depth. 
Moreover, his critique of the personalists attacks a straw man, and fails to make a helpful 
contribution. He concludes: 
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Insofar as De Koninck’s essay vindicates the primacy of the common good and 
carries out the criticism of definite positions, it is entirely praiseworthy. Insofar as 
it seems to be aimed at books that the writer never read, at doctrines that he does 
not expound, and men whose names he does not mention, the essay against the 
personalists, is a purely private affair, which concerns exclusively De Koninck, 
and is of no concern whatsoever to the reader.75 
 
The reaction to De Koninck’s work tells us that Thomas’s teaching on the common good 
faces many obstacles to acceptance. The compatibility of this doctrine with any sort of 
personalism is a question I will not attempt to answer.76 Rather, I will focus on Thomas’s 
teaching as it lays the groundwork for his teaching on capital punishment. In Chapter IV, 
I will address some objections to this view of the common good. 
 
C.1. Proper Good 
 
Thomas does not simply define common good for us, but instead he distinguishes 
common goods from proper goods.77 Proper good has several senses: 
Now, the good that is proper (bonum suum) to a thing may be received in many 
ways. One way depends on what is appropriate (proprium) to the essential 
character of the individual. It is thus that an animal seeks his good (bonum suum), 
when he desires the food whereby he may be kept in existence. A second way 
depends on what is appropriate to the species. It is in this way that an animal 
desires his proper good (proprium bonum), inasmuch as he desires the procreation 
of offspring and the nourishment of the same, or the performance of any other 
work that is for the preservation or protection of individuals belonging to his 
species. A third way depends on the essential character of his genus. It is in this 
way that an equivocal agent seeks its proper good (proprium bonum) by an act of 
causation, as in the case of the heavens. And a fourth way depends on the 
analogical likeness of things produced, in relation to their source. And it is in this 
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way that God, Who is beyond genus, gives existing being to all, because of His 
own goodness (propter suum bonum).78 
 
Our concern is with the first two senses mentioned by Thomas. Proper good in the first 
sense cannot be a common good, for it is the good belonging to the individual as 
individual. For example, the good of health is proper to the individual in this sense. In the 
second sense, however, the proper good is a common good, since the preservation of the 
species is both a good for this individual and for other individuals. It is proper in being 
the good of this individual, and common in being the good of several individuals. Most 
broadly, a proper good is any good that a thing naturally seeks, which includes, but is not 
limited to, its particular good. 
De Koninck points out that the proper good is opposed not to common good, but 
to the good of another individual, or the “alien good,” a thesis that was argued by the 
seventeenth-century Thomistic commentator John of St. Thomas. The common good is 
opposed to a foreign or alien good (bonum alienum). A foreign good is one that is proper 
to another individual as an individual.79 Thus the health of Jones is a foreign good from 
the persepctive of Smith.  
  But how is that the individual his proper good when he acts so as to preserve the 
species or protect other members of the species? The key to understanding this is the 
concept of natural desire or natural inclination. This way of speaking about nature is 
foreign to the modern ear, although less so if we substitute “instinct” for natural desire. 
For Aquinas and Aristotle, nature is purposeful: even things having no knowledge, in 
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acting in regular, predictable ways, move toward (desire) an end. That is, there is a reason 
for their acting in certain ways (even if the thing itself cannot give the reason).80 While 
Darwinian science rejects the idea of purpose, it has reasonably been argued that 
evolution and natural teleology are not incompatible, so long as one does not tie 
evolution to certain philosophical notions, such as the notion that chance can act as a 
cause.81 I simply note this debate here; in what follows I will focus on how Aquinas and 
Aristotle understand the idea of natural desire.  
 How is it that an animal is said to “desire” (appetere) his proper good, either his 
particular proper good or some other proper good, and what is meant by calling certain 
desires or inclinations natural? The concept of natural desire is a description of the way 
natural things tend to behave. The basis for Aquinas’s idea of natural desire is the 
Aristotelian doctrine that nature acts for an end. The following is Aquinas’s restatement 
of Aristotle’s first argument in Physics II for this thesis: 
Everything which happens either happens by chance or for the sake of an end. 
Now those things which happen outside the intention of an end are said to happen 
by chance. But it is impossible for those things which happen in every instance or 
in most instances to happen by chance. Therefore, those things which happen in 
every instance or in most instances happen for the sake of an end. 
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Now whatever happens according to nature happens either in every instance 
or in most instances, as even they [his opponents] admitted. Therefore, whatever 
happens by nature happens for the sake of something.82 
I pointed out above that for Aristotle and Thomas, desire is not limited to rational desire. 
Each natural thing desires, or is inclined toward, its own being and perfection.83 A natural 
desire is not the result of choice, but is in the thing on account of its nature, whether that 
nature is rational or not. This is important for Aquinas’s understanding of proper good (in 
all its senses). The proper good of a thing is that which it naturally desires, which it 
cannot help but desire: “For a natural thing has a natural inclination … with respect to its 
proper good (proprium bonum), to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest 
therein.”84 For example, an animal cannot help but desire to live, and desire those things 
that are necessary for life, like food. It cannot help but desire the survival of its species, 
and those things that are necessary for this end, like procreation.  
 If the claim that each natural thing has an inclination to its own proper good is 
based on observation, could this claim be falsified by contrary observations? For 
example, if a sick animal refuses the food necessary to its survival, does this disprove the 
claim that animals are naturally inclined (desire) to preserve their own life? This would 
seem to imply that whether an animal is inclined to act so as to preserve or destroy its 
own life is a matter of chance. “But when an event takes place always or for the most 
part,” says Aristotle, “it is not incidental or by chance. In natural products the sequence is 
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invariable, if there is no impediment.”85 Contrary instances do not disprove the theory of 
natural desire, if these occur infrquently and are attributable to some impediment, such an 
illness.  
 The application of the idea of natural desire to matters of physical survival is one 
thing; its application to the preservation of the common good is more controversial. 
Thomas uses the idea of the animal’s desire for the good of the species as a link 
connecting the obvious natural desire for food with the more abstract and less obvious 
desire for the common good. According to Thomas, an animal desires not only his own 
individual survival, but the survival of its species, as a proper good. Like the animal’s 
particular good, the good of the species is a material good. But unlike the particular good, 
the good of the species is a common good. That the species continues to survive is not the 
good of one individual member, but a good common to all members of the species. An 
animal serves the good of the species when, for example, it feeds its young. This act of 
feeding does not benefit the parent as a particular individual, but since it is part of the 
species, in acting for the common good of the species, it acts for a good which is its own 
(proper) good.86  
 There is no doubt that reproduction and care for offspring are necessary to the 
survival of animal species. Yet many would interpret such actions in a different way. For 
example, the inclination to reproduce might be explained as the satisfaction of a physical 
urge. The care for offspring is somewhat more difficult to explain on a purely material 
                                                 
85
 Physics II.8.199b23-24. 
86
 Thomas also refers to different kinds of human goods in S.C.G. III, c. 80: “For in human affairs there is a 
common good which is, in fact, the good of a state or a people … There is also a type of human good which 
does not lie in the community, but pertains to one person as such … Still another human good is pertinent 
to each person individually (singulariter).” 
  132
basis, for it does not seem to satisfy any immediate urge, but it could nonetheless be 
attributed to animal “instinct,” without further meaning. But while these suggestions are 
true as far as they go, they are not explanations. They do not give any purpose for the 
urge or the instinct. Things that are purposeless are not for the sake of something, and yet 
reproduction and care of offspring certainly seem to be for the sake of the survival of the 
species. Proper goods are the ends, or purposes, which natural desires serve; they are the 
the objects of natural inclinations. 
 More controversial even than the ideas of natural desires and proper goods is the 
claim that there is an order among proper goods. For just as the desire for proper goods is 
not a matter of choice, the order among proper goods is not a matter of choice, but comes 
from the nature of a thing. In other words, it is natural for something to prefer its proper 
good to the good of another. Not only does the individual have a natural love for the good 
of the species, Aquinas claims, but “each individual naturally loves the good of the 
species more than its own individual good (bonum suum singulare).”87 This love is true 
of rational and non-rational species, must be qualified when applied to free agents, as I 
will show below. If Thomas had written a treatise on the common good, he might have 
supplied examples from nature to illustrate the thesis that the individual loves the good of 
the species more than its own good. However, since he has not left us such a treatise, we 
must look for our own illustrations. We might consider, for example, the behavior of 
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emperor penguins.88 After the female penguin has laid its egg, the male will take charge 
of the egg, keeping it warm for months, while the female searches for food. After the egg 
has hatched, the male will use its sparse food reserves to nourish the chick. If the 
inclination to feed his young were not stronger than the inclination to feed himself, the 
male penguin would not behave in this way. It would be far more beneficial for him, 
more in keeping with his particular good, to go off in search of food for himself, and 
leave the chick to die, instead of rsiking starvation by remaining with the chick. 
 To say that the individual loves the good of the species above its own individual 
good is not to say that the individual loves the species more than itself, as if the species 
were something that existed on its own, apart from its members. Thomas, following 
Aristotle, rejects the Platonic idea of species existing as separate forms.89 The intellect 
understands particulars through the intelligible species, but these species do not have 
existence outside of the intellect. So the species cannot be the object of love in a real 
sense. The species ‘man’ is the concept by which one understands an individual man, but 
the species man is not the object of love. That the individual loves the good of the 
species, on the other hand, does not imply that the species exists as a separate form. 
Rather, what Aquinas means by saying the individual loves the good of the species is that 
the individual is inclined to do things that will preserve the species. And what he means 
by saying that the individual loves the good of the species more than its own good is that 
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the individual’s natural inclination to preserve the species is a stronger inclination than 
his natural inclination to self-preservation.  
But when it comes to rational animals, we are faced with individuals who can 
choose whether or not to follow their natural inclinations. If Aquinas is right, however, 
the fact that animals do tend to act for the good of the species is not a chance thing, but 
the result of an order in natural inclinations. Aquinas uses this idea of order to explain 
why individuals (at least in many cases) do prefer the good of the species over their 
particular good (a descriptive claim), and also why it is good for individuals to prefer the 
common good (a normative claim), because the good of the species is a greater good than 
the good of the particular. Man is no different in this sense from other animals; he 
naturally loves the good of the species above his own private good: “Now just as the 
preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good, so, too, is the 
preservation of the nature of the human species a very great good.”90 It is because of the 
importance of this good that Thomas accounts abuses of human sexuality (which are for 
the good of the preservation of the human species) more grievous than the abuses of food 
and drink (which are for the good of individual preservation).91  
We have seen that for Thomas proper good can mean the good that belongs to an 
individual as individual, but it can also mean any good that is an end for the individual. In 
the first sense, a proper good is distinguished from a common good. In the second sense, 
a proper good may also be common. The common good is not the individual’s exclusive 
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good, but it is nonetheless desired by an individual as his good. In this sense, the proper 
good is not opposed to the common good, but to the individual good of another (foreign 
good). The notion that the good of the community is a good proper to members of the 
community is founded on the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of natural inclinations. 
Natural things desire (tend towards) what is perfective of their natures. This also is true of 
man, but as rational, man need not follow his natural inclinations. One of these natural 
inclinations for man is to seek the good of the species and more particularly the good of 
the political community. Man, in fact, naturally prefers these goods to his own individual 
good, though he by no means always follows this inclination. Because natural 
inclinations are good in this view, one can say both that man does prefer the common 
good (i.e. by his nature) and that man ought to prefer the common good (in order to be 
perfected in that nature). In order to understand what it means to prefer the common 
good, we need a better understanding of what Thomas means by common good.  
 
C.2. Common Good 
 
Like proper good, common good does not have just one meaning in the Thomistic 
corpus. In his article, “The Equivocal Status of Bonum Commune,” Gregory Froelich 
considers three ways that Thomas uses the expression bonum commune. Froelich’s 
careful division of common goods adds clarity to the often confused debate about the 
common good in Thomistic thought.  
The first sense of bonum commune mentioned by Froelich is the good common in 
predication. This kind of good is common in the way that genus and species are common. 
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The species “man” is predicated of many things, but there is no reality that corresponds to 
human nature, as common: “The unity or community of the human nature, however, is 
not a reality, but is only in the consideration of the mind.”92 In the same way, there is no 
reality corresponding to a good common by predication. For example, there is no separate 
health or knowledge or temperance; there is only health or knowledge or temperance in 
this particular man.  
 The second way in which a good can be common is by way of causality, when 
one end is the cause of many: 
But there is a way a good can be common and in the same respect belong to the 
 individual…. Something can be called common either on the basis of predication 
 or on the basis of causality. This second way belongs to a cause which while 
 remaining numerically one extends to many effects. The sun, for example, is the 
 common source of light and warmth for numerous things. Unlike something 
 common by predication, it is common precisely as it is individual.93 
 
The good common in causation is not in opposition to the particular good because “it is 
both a common and a particular good.”94 It is common because it is the good of many 
particulars. In the family, Aquinas says, children constitute such a good: “children are a 
common good of both husband and wife whose union exists for the sake of children.”95 
Froelich comments on this passage: 
No child is the exclusive possession of either the mother or father, nor does the 
responsibility of his welfare fall to only one of them…. The child then is a  
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common good opposed to the parents’ private good but not to their individual 
good. They each can say ‘This is my child’ and ‘This is our child’ without 
contradiction.96  
 
The parent cannot say, on the other hand, ‘This child is mine alone,’ which would be to 
claim a common good as a private good.97 
Goods common in causation may be either extrinsic or intrinsic ends. An extrinsic 
end “exists separately from what seeks it,” and an intrinsic end “exists within that whose 
end it is.”98 The child in the previous example is an extrinsic end. Form, on the other 
hand, is an intrinsic end; it is part of the thing whose good it is, and it is the goal of 
generation and alteration. This is true of substantial forms (such as human nature), but 
also of accidental forms (such as physician): both serve as ends, as causes of action. The 
good of order, or “the form of a complex whole, is an intrinsic common good.”99  
Froelich notes a third sense of bonum commune in the works of St. Thomas, 
which most often occurs as bona communia. For example, in distinguishing between 
distributive and commutative justice, Thomas says that the order directed by the former 
“distributes common goods proportionately.”100 These common goods (honors, money, 
etc.), which provide the matter for distributive justice, are common before distribution 
because they belong to no one in particular. After distribution, however, they are private 
goods.101 These goods are not ends in themselves, but they are not common in predication 
either; they are common by convention or law (rather than necessarily common) and are 
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means to an end. Therefore, Froelich calls them “common means” and “common goods 
of utility.”102 
Froelich explains that the political common good must be a good of the second 
kind, a good common in causation:  
The common good is the good of the whole community. But since the political 
 community is an ordered whole, not an organic whole or a disordered pile, its 
 good consists in the preservation and tranquility of order … The political order, 
 then is a good for each citizen belonging to it. It is an intrinsic common good.103  
 
Froelich refers us to the Treatise on Law in defense of this claim. An objection in q. 90, a. 
2 states that law cannot be directed to the common good, since “law directs man in his 
actions. But human actions are concerned with particular matters.”104 In his response, 
Thomas agrees that actions have to do with particulars, but adds, “those particular matters 
are referable to the common good, not as to a common genus or species, but as to a 
common final cause, according as the common good is said to be the common end.”105  
 Understanding the political common good as a good common by causation also 
helps explain why Thomas insists that this good is formally (and not just numerically) 
different from the particular good of the individual: 
The common good of the realm and the particular good of the individual differ not 
only in respect of the many and the few, but also under a formal aspect. For the 
aspect of the common good differs from the aspect of the individual good, even as 
the aspect of whole differs from that of part. Wherefore the Philosopher says 
(Politics I.1) that “they are wrong who maintain that the State and the home and 
the like differ only as many and few and not specifically.”106 
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Thus, Thomas does not hold what is sometimes called the “aggregative” view of the 
common good.107 The aggregative view of the common good is the idea that the common 
good of a society is the sum of the individual goods of the persons who make it up (the 
private good of A + the private good of B, etc.). In the aggregative view, there is no 
difference in kind between the common and the private good, but only a difference in 
number.  
 Thomas clearly rejects this view, which is incompatible with his understanding of 
the common good as a good desired by individuals precisely as a common good. In the 
aggregative view, the good desired by each individual is a private good, and even the 
common good is desired, not for its own sake, but because it includes the individual’s 
private good: A desires the common good because it includes A’s good. The aggregative 
view supposes that if ‘A’s good’ is a reason for A’s acting, then ‘A’s good + B’s good + 
C’s good’ will be an even stronger reason for A’s acting. This view does not explain why 
the sum of private goods would be a stronger reason for A’s acting than would A’s 
private good alone. The addition of the private good of another—which by the very fact 
that it is the other’s good, is not his good—does not make the common good any more 
desirable than A’s good alone.108  
The common good in the aggregative view is like the good common in 
predication; it does not exist as an object of desire, but only as an abstraction. This 
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abstraction is not a common cause, a common object of desire, a common end.109 But 
individuals in the community do desire the political common good as an end. It is not 
necessary that all or even most individuals actually seek the common good as an end; as 
long as some do so, we must affirm that the political common good is a common cause. 
To say that the political common good is a common cause is to say that it exists in reality, 
but not that it is a separate reality with substantial existence. For Thomas, the political 
common good exists as an accident and not a substance. Yet because it exists in reality, 
and not only in predication, it can be desired by individuals, and in fact, it can be desired 
by individuals more than their particular goods, as we shall see. 
 In this section, we have seen that for Thomas a good may be common in three 
ways: in predication, in causality, or common by convention. The political common good 
is a good common in causation; it is a single good that is an end or final cause for many. 
Because the political common good is an end for each member of the political 
community, it is a proper good of each of these individuals. A proper good in this sense is 
a good that an individual desires on account of his nature; it is the end of a natural 
inclination. If the political common good were simply an aggregation of individual 
goods, it would be a good common in predication and not in causality. But a good 
common in predication is not desired as an end. Since the political common good is 
desired by individuals as an end, it must be a common cause, and not only a good 
common in predication. We must now investigate more closely the specific nature of the 
political common good.  
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D The Political Common Good  
 
Since every sort of knowledge and decision pursues some good, what is the good 
that we say political science seeks? What, [in other words,] is the highest of all 
the goods achievable in action? 
As far as the name goes, most people virtually agree; for both the many and 
the cultivated call it happiness, and they suppose that living well and doing well 
are the same as being happy. (Aristotle Ethics I.4.1095a14-19) 
 
The political common good, Thomas has said, is the end of a natural human inclination. It 
is not a good common by predication, as human goods like the virtues are common, but a 
common cause of action for individual citizens in society. But what is it that individuals 
seek when they seek the political common good? 
 
D.1. Happiness and the Political Common Good 
At times, both Aristotle and Aquinas seem to say that the political common good 
is happiness. Both identify happiness as the highest good for man, and indeed for any 
intellectual nature.110 All men desire happiness as their last end, but they do not agree 
about what this highest good is, for some think it consists in wealth, others in pleasure, 
and others in virtue. But the most complete good, which most deserves the name 
happiness, is the good “which the man with well disposed affections desires for his last 
end.”111 The man with “well disposed affections” (affections guided by reason) desires 
the end that is most complete, most enduring, and in every way best. Thus he rejects such 
goods as wealth, honor, glory, power, and bodily pleasures, as falling short of his highest 
                                                 
110
 “For happiness is the proper good of every intellectual nature.” S.C.G. I, c. 100. See also S.C.G. III, c. 
26. 
111
 S.T. I-II, q. 1, a. 7. 
  142
good.112 Happiness must be an activity of the highest human faculty, which is the 
intellect, and therefore “the life in accord with understanding” will be the best and 
happiest life.113 For the well-disposed man, then, happiness lies primarily in the operation 
of the speculative intellect, i.e., in contemplation.114 Secondarily, happiness (the 
happiness obtainable in this life, at least) lies in moral virtue, or the “operation of the 
practical intellect directing human actions and passions.”115 Happiness, as Aristotle puts 
it, is an “activity of the soul in accord with virtue.”116 
Like Aristotle, Aquinas says that happiness consists in an operation of the 
speculative intellect. But for him, the ultimate object of the speculative intellect is the 
divine essence, and happiness consists in the vision of this essence.117 This highest 
activity, possible only through supernatural help, is an even greater happiness than the 
life of understanding; though at the same time, it fulfills completely the desire to 
understand.118 Complete happiness can be obtained only in heaven:  
For this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by 
man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man’s happiness in this life (Ethics 
I.10), says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: “We call 
men happy, but only as men.” But God has promised us perfect happiness, when 
we shall be “as the angels . . . in heaven” (Matthew 22:30).119 
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This difference between Aristotle and Aquinas about the possibility of perfect, 
uninterrupted, and eternal happiness is not trivial, but if the political common good is 
happiness, it is temporal happiness and not eternal happiness. Therefore, we must 
consider whether the political common good in Thomas’s view could be temporal 
happiness. 
In the passage cited at the beginning of this section, Aristotle suggests that the 
highest good achievable in action; that is, the political common good, is happiness. Again 
in Politics VII, Aristotle seems to presume that the goal of political science is happiness. 
There he says that one who would determine the best kind of government should first 
know “the most eligible life,” that is, the happiest life.120 Further on, he asks whether the 
happiness of the individual is the same as the happiness of the state, and answers himself: 
Here again there can be no doubt—no one denies that they are the same. For those 
who hold that the well-being of the individual consists in his wealth, also think 
that riches make the happiness of the whole state, and those who value most 
highly the life of a tyrant deem that city the happiest which rules over the greatest 
number; while they who approve an individual for his virtue say that the more 
virtuous a city is, the happier it is.121  
 
Thomas also says quite clearly in one place, “Happiness is a certain common good.”122  
Yet happiness itself cannot be the common good, according to what we have said 
in the previous section. Happiness cannot be the end of political science in the sense of a 
final cause, because happiness is always the happiness of some individual. Like the 
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virtues, happiness is a good common in predication and not common in causality. It does 
not exist in general, but only in a particular person. Therefore, we can say that happiness 
is the common good of the human species, but this means that each human individual 
desires his own happiness as an end, not that all human individuals desire a common 
happiness (unless we speak of the object of that happiness as God, who is both the good 
of each individual and of the whole, and who is neither a general not a particular good, 
but goodness itself).123 
In his commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, Thomas explains why Aristotle rejects 
the idea of a common notion of the good (i.e., a universal, separated good) as that which 
makes man happy: 
After the Philosopher has explained that there is no common idea of good, now he 
shows that even if there were, it would not follow that happiness would have to be 
sought according to it.… If there were one good univocally predicated of all, or 
even if a separated good did exist in itself, it would obviously not be a thing 
produced or possessed by man. Now it is precisely such a thing we are seeking. 
We are looking for the happiness that is the end of human acts. The end, however, 
of man is either some thing he does or some external thing.… Now it is clear that 
the common or separated good cannot be the operation itself of man, nor is it 
something produced by man.124 
 
The good in general does not exist, and even if it did, it could not be an end of human 
acts, for it is neither something that man does nor something that he makes, and the end 
of a human action is either an activity or a product. As we saw above, Aristotle and 
Thomas maintain that happiness is an activity, specifically the activity of the intellect in 
knowing the highest object. Insofar as happiness is common, it is common in predication 
only, for intellectual activity can only exist in the individual who is thinking (again, we 
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are speaking here of temporal happiness). When, therefore, Thomas says that happiness is 
a common good, he means that each person individually desires happiness: “Happiness is 
the end of the human species: as all men would naturally desire it. Therefore happiness is 
a certain common good which can come to be in all men.”125 
Earlier I put aside the question of eternal happiness and asked whether for 
Thomas the political common good might be a kind of temporal happiness. I argued that 
this is not compatible with his rejection of separated good. It was necessary to ask the 
question this way in order to rule out this possibility; yet it makes an artificial distinction. 
For Thomas, we cannot say that there are two ends for man, one eternal and one 
temporal. Man has one end, a supernatural end. Considered as the object of happiness—
that which makes man happy—rather than the activity of happiness, Thomas does say 
that happiness is a good common in causality. This object, of course, is God, who is the 
common cause of human happiness. God is the common good of all in the way of 
causality and not in the way of predication. Thomas’s consideration of the political 
common good always presupposes the higher good in which man’s happiness consists. 
Yet political activity has its own specific object or intrinsic end, which is neither the 
object of happiness (God) nor the activity of happiness (contemplation).  
Neither does the political common good consist in virtue. This is apparent in 
Thomas’s reply to the first objection of q. 92, a. 1. The objection says that it is possible 
for someone to act well regarding the common good, but to act poorly in other respects. 
                                                 
125
 “Felicitas autem est finis humanae speciei: cum omnes homines ipsam naturaliter desiderent. Felicitas 
igitur est quoddam commune bonum possibile provenire omnibus hominibus, nisi accidat aliquibus 
impedimentum quo sint orbati.” S.C.G. III, c. 39, n. 2. 
  146
We might think, for example, of a skilled military commander who is also an adulterer. If 
virtue is the common good, we must say that the commander does not serve the common 
good at all. In his response to the objection, Thomas says that since each man is part of 
the political community, he cannot be good unless he is “well proportioned” (bene 
proportionatus) to the common good; 
nor can the whole be well established (bene consistere), unless its parts be 
proportionate to it. Consequently the common good of the state cannot flourish, 
unless the citizens be virtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern. But it 
is enough for the good of the community, that the other citizens be so far virtuous 
that they obey the commands of their rulers.126  
 
No one can be happy without virtue, but the common good does not depend on a society 
in which all the members are virtuous. The common good can flourish even if citizens 
lack virtue, though not if they are vicious. In obeying the commands of their rulers, 
citizens give what is due to each other and to the rulers. Thus, they act in accord with 
justice, even if they do so with difficulty and not out of a firm disposition. This is 
sufficient for the common good. 
So the political common good is not happiness or virtue itself, but rather a kind of 
order. In the Summa Contra Gentiles, he refers to the “freedom from external disorders, 
to which the whole program of government in civil life is directed.”127 Elsewhere, he says 
that “the peace of the state is good in itself,” even if some make bad use of it.128 Civil 
peace is one of the conditions for living well, and for Thomas, peace does not only mean 
the absence of conflict. It denotes a two-fold order: the order of part to part, which is 
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directed by commutative justice, and the order of whole to parts, which is directed by 
distributive justice.129  
 In another place, Thomas describes the political common good as justice: “the 
judge has care of the common good, which is justice.”130 Although he uses the same word 
for justice (iustitia) as he does when treating the cardinal virtue, there is a difference. 
Justice “is only in one man towards another.”131 A moral virtue is a particular good and 
not a common good, as we saw above. Justice as the end of political science is not the 
virtue itself, which exists only in individuals. But we can speak of just things and just 
relations as well as just persons, and “a thing is said to be just, as having the rectitude of 
justice, when it is the term of an act of justice, without taking into account the way in 
which it is done by the agent.”132 For example, it is an act of justice for me to express 
gratitude to my parents. The thanks itself is the term of my act of gratitude, and can be 
called just. My relation to my parents, constituted by many such acts, can also be called 
just—a just familial order. The just civil order is constituted by many just acts between 
citizens. It is a civil community in which individuals give and are given their due. Peace, 
mentioned above, does not seem to be a separate end, but a quality of that just order.  
If a just civil order is the intrinsic end of the political community, it also has an 
extrinsic end. We have already seen this distinction in the example of an army, where 
Thomas distinguishes between the intrinsic end or good of the army, which is its order, 
and its extrinsic end, which is the commander, and the victory willed by the 
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commander.133 In a question in the Prima Pars on the end of the government of the world 
(i.e., all creation), Thomas uses the distinction to answer the following objection: 
Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and peace which is 
the “tranquillity of order,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world 
is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the 
world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the 
government of the world is not an extrinsic good.134   
 
He replies that the intrinsic order of the world is truly its end; “this however, is not its 
ultimate end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army 
is ordered to the general, as stated in Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10.” The extrinsic end of the 
universe is God.  
Thomas reasons in the same way about the ends of political society. The extrinsic 
end of the army is found in the victory willed by the commander, and the extrinsic end of 
the universe is found in the will of its divine ruler. The intrinsic end of the political 
society is the civil order, but its extrinsic end is the happiness of each of the subjects, 
which is the right object of the ruler or rulers.135  
Consequently the law should consider principally the order which is for happiness 
(lex maxime respiciat ordinem qui est in beatitudinem). Moreover, since every 
part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part 
of the perfect community, the law should consider principally the order which is 
for common happiness (lex proprie respiciat ordinem ad felicitatem 
communem).136 
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Law has as its end not happiness itself, but an ordo that is conducive to happiness (the 
happiness of the members). And the happiness of the members is ultimately the same as 
the extrinsic end of the whole universe, God.  
A few questions later, Thomas says that “the proper effect of law is to lead its 
subjects to their proper virtue.”137 It is significant that he calls virtue the proper effect of 
law, rather than the final cause. Law is the cause of virtue, a particular good, only in an 
indirect way. The proper end of law is the common good. Yet “Law is necessary to make 
men virtuous,” and the good lawgiver wants to make men virtuous.138 Good law is a 
condition for the formation of virtue, and virtue is a condition for happiness.139 Therefore, 
it is a proper effect of law that men be made virtuous, which is a condition for their 
happiness, but neither virtue nor happiness are the intrinsic end of law.  
Given, then, that the good intrinsic to the political community, a just order, is 
directed toward human happiness, it seems that the civil order is a means to the happiness 
of individuals. In this case, the individual good would take precedence over the common 
good. Yet Thomas clearly thinks that the political common good has precedence over the 
goods of individuals. How can the good of an accidental unity like society be a greater 
good than the good of a substance, an individual human person?  
To this, Thomas says that while substance is simply more excellent than accident, 
“yet relatively some particular accident is more excellent than substance in so far as it 
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perfects substance in some accidental mode of being.”140 The human person, a substance, 
is more excellent simply than the political community, an accidental unity. But relative to 
man’s relation to his fellow man, the community is more excellent. When the individual 
man prefers the community’s good to his own, he is perfected in relation to others: in 
other words, he is perfected in his capacity as a social being, or perfected with regard to 
the virtue of justice. Thus the excellence of the community and its good is based on its 
ability to perfect the individual man. And in loving what perfects him, a man loves his 
own perfection, his own good, as well. Thus, the individual’s perfection in virtue is 
subordinate to the common good, but it is through seeking the common good that he is 
perfected in virtue. 
Moreover, man’s happiness is a supernatural end which surpasses even the 
greatest of human goods, as Thomas points out in the question on virginity in the Summa. 
In the fourth article of this question, Thomas examines several objections to the thesis 
that virginity is a more excellent good than marriage. The third objection points out that 
“the common good takes precedence of the private good,” and that marriage is directed to 
the common good.141 As a social institution, marriage serves the political common good. 
It creates a structure in which men and women form stable unions, bear children, and care 
for them. Persons who marry serve the common good by adding to the membership of the 
community and providing for these new members who are unable to provide for 
themselves. Virginity, on the other hand, serves the individual good, in that it frees a 
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person to devote himself to the things of God. Therefore, it seems that marriage is a more 
excellent good than virginity. 
In his response to this objection, Thomas begins by affirming but qualifying its 
first premise: “The common good takes precedence of the private good, if it be of the 
same genus, but it may be that the private good is better generically. It is thus that the 
virginity that is consecrated to God is preferable to carnal fruitfulness.”142 Within any 
genus of goods, the common good is better than the private good. But goods belonging to 
different genera are not commensurable. Therefore, the principle does not apply. So even 
though marriage is directed to the common good, virginity is greater, in that it is directed 
to a divine good, which surpasses the genus of human goods.  
 Man’s supernatural good does not belong to the genus of human goods. Thomas 
maintains that within the genus of human goods, the political common good is the 
highest. In commenting on the same passage of the Ethics cited by his objector in the 
question on virginity, Thomas says that “even though the good be the same for one man 
and for the whole state, it seems much better and more perfect to attain, that is, to procure 
and preserve the good of the whole state than the good of any one man.”143 Within any 
genus of goods, the good of the whole is preferable to the good of the individual part. In 
the genus of human goods, the greatest whole is the political community, for this 
community contains all other human communities. Therefore, in the genus of human 
goods, the highest good is the political common good: 
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Then he [Aristotle] shows that the good to which the political community is 
directed is the supreme (principalissimum) human good, by the following 
argument. If every association is directed to a good, the supreme (maxime) 
association necessarily most seeks the supreme (principalissimum) human good. 
For the relative importance of means necessarily depends on the relative 
importance of ends. And what he adds, that the political community includes all 
the other associations, makes clear which association is supreme. 
For an association is a whole, and wholes are ordered so that one that includes 
another is superior. For example, the wall of a house is a whole, but the house is a 
superior whole, since the wall is included in the house. And the association that 
includes other associations is likewise superior. But the political community 
clearly includes all other associations, since households and villages are included 
in the political community, and so the political association is the supreme 
association. Therefore, the political community seeks the supreme human good, 
since it aims at the common good, which is superior to, and more god-like than, 
the good of an individual, as Aristotle says at the beginning of the Ethics.144 
 
To make a comparison between two goods, the goods must be in the same genus, but 
human and divine goods belong to different genera, as Thomas argued in defense of the 
superiority of virginity. If we are talking about the political common good, which is a 
human good, we can only compare it to other human goods. But, according to Thomas, 
“it is impossible for any created good to constitute man’s happiness,” and therefore 
happiness is not constituted by a human good, but by God himself.145 Therefore 
happiness, as the final end for which man acts, is incommensurable with the political 
common good.146 
Of course, the idea of the beatific vision takes Aquinas beyond the Aristotelian 
view of the common good. Is there a non-theological solution to the question of which 
good is higher: the political common good or happiness? In some places, Aristotle 
affirms that the political common good is the highest human good, but in others, he 
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affirms that the highest human good is happiness.147 At times, he seems to identify the 
political common good with happiness, but given his understanding of happiness, this 
could only mean a good common by predication, as I have shown above. If the political 
common good is a true end (common in causality), it is not happiness, but as Aristotle 
says in the Politics, justice.148 Yet if the political common good is the highest human 
good, then the highest human good is not happiness, contra Ethics I. It seems that the 
only way to resolve this problem is by accepting, as Thomas does, that happiness does 
not consist in a human but a divine good. Aristotle comes close to doing this when he 
compares contemplation to divine activity in Ethics X: “And so the human activity that is 
most akin to the gods’ activity will, more than any others, have the character of 
happiness.”149 Yet for Aristotle contemplation is only metaphorically a divine good, and 
so the tension between the political common good and the individual good of 
contemplation is ultimately unresolved. 
We have seen that the political common good is not happiness. Happiness, 
Aristotle says, is an activity of the soul, namely contemplation. Its object is divine. 
Thomas is able to add to this understanding by saying that the happiness of man, this 
contemplative activity, is not only a godlike end, but is in fact divine. Human happiness 
is a contemplation of God which is also a union with him. Because this good is 
supernatural, it surpasses all human goods, including the political common good. Thomas 
maintains, however, that the political common good is a true good, and the highest of 
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human goods. The intrinsic good of the political community the tranquillitas ordinis, the 
just civil order, which while it is not identical with happiness, is conducive to it. The 
extrinsic good of the political community is the happiness of each of the members of the 
community, which is found in God. 
 
D.2. Love of the Political Common Good 
 
In the passage cited at the beginning of this chapter, Yves Simon observes that 
there exists a wide consensus that it is right to demand personal sacrifice from some 
members of society for the common good. When we praise the fireman and the soldier 
for their actions in defense of the community, we praise their desire to pursue the good of 
the community, whether a town or an entire nation, at risk to their own bodily life. Nor do 
we consider that in so acting, they behave unnaturally. We might call their actions 
extraordinary, but not disordered. Moreover, it is common for firemen and policemen and 
soldiers, when asked to comment on their own heroism, to respond that they were merely 
doing what any decent fireman or policeman or soldier would do in the situation. From a 
Thomistic standpoint, this attitude suggests that it is in some sense natural to prefer the 
common good when a grave situation calls for a sacrifice of one’s private good. It also 
suggests that it is natural to prefer the common good to the good of another individual.  
But we must return to this idea of a natural inclination or natural desire to 
preserve the good of the community, since it requires some explanation. In the Thomistic 
framework, to say that something is good is to say that it is desirable. It is not part of my 
thesis to analyze or defend this view of the good, which I assume as a foundation for my 
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reflections. Insofar as any thing is desired, it is desired as a good. In this sense, all things 
that men desire are desirable. But only some things will answer man’s natural needs, and 
such things are desirable in a narrower sense. We will focus on the narrower sense, since 
it is in this sense that Thomas says the individual naturally desires the common good 
more than his own particular good.  
 Thomas argues that it is both natural and praiseworthy for individuals to prefer 
the common good of society to their own individual goods.150 Man naturally loves 
himself. While men tend to love themselves in a disordered way, self-love is not in itself 
disordered, and is in fact “the form and root” of other loves (thus we are told to love our 
neighbor as ourselves).151 Love for oneself, however, does not mean loving oneself as the 
object of love, but having a sort of friendship for oneself, by willing one’s own good. In 
this way, one desires and does good things for oneself and takes pleasure in one’s own 
company.152 This love is the basis for other loves, for “what is one with a thing, is that 
thing itself: consequently every thing loves what is one with itself.” 153 In this way, a man 
loves with a “natural love” his parents, brothers, children, and all who are one with him 
“in the principle of natural generation.”154 And to those with whom he is one by a “non-
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natural union,” he loves with a “non-natural” love; “thus a man loves his fellow 
townsman with a social love, while he loves a blood relation with natural affection.”155 
This is at first surprising from someone who so often compares the state to the human 
body, and who defends Aristotle’s position on the naturalness of the state. What does 
Aquinas mean by saying that the citizens are not one by a natural union? We can answer 
this question by recalling how he understands the state to be natural. He does not 
understand it to be a natural entity; this would be to take the bodily analogy too literally. 
Rather, the state is natural as the end of man’s natural social tendency.  
 It is natural for man to love all who are one with him; this follows from his 
natural love for himself, which by extension applies to all who are in some way one with 
him. Some are one with him naturally (by generation) and some are one with him socially 
(by rational order). It is natural for man to love his fellow citizens because they are one 
with him, but he is not one with them by nature, and so it is called a “social love.”  
 Loving other members of the community is not the same as loving the common 
good. A man loves another individual insofar as the other is one with himself, but he 
loves the common good insofar as he is part of the community: 
Each part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own 
particular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the principal inclination 
of each part is towards common action conducive to the good of the whole. It may 
also be seen in civic virtues whereby sometimes the citizens suffer damage even 
to their own property and persons for the sake of the common good.156 
 
What evidence is there that the part does indeed prefer the good of the whole to its own 
good? Thomas himself does not give us many illustrations. In a number of places, he 
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compares the act of self-sacrifice for the civic common good to the act by which a man 
sacrifices a lesser part of his body to protect a greater, for example “when someone 
exposes his hand to a sword to defend his head on which his whole body’s health 
depends.”157 This example seems to indicate that he is thinking primarily of the operation 
of parts of per se wholes. The hand, the foot, the heart, the stomach, all operate in a way 
that serves the whole, whether by voluntary or involuntary operation (e.g. by obtaining 
food or by digesting it). In accidental wholes, we should expect the operation of the part 
for the good of the whole to differ, since the wholes themselves differ so greatly. 
 When someone exposes his hand to protect his head, the hand’s action is based on 
“a kind of natural inclination” by which a part “works for the good of the whole, even to 
its own danger and detriment.”158 Similarly, “according to this natural inclination and 
according to political virtue, the good citizen faces the danger of death for the common 
good.159 Though the two acts are similar, Thomas stops short of saying that it is strictly 
natural for man to sacrifice his life for the community. His act accords with “a kind of 
natural inclination”—the inclination of the part to work for the good of the whole—but it 
is also a matter of political virtue.  
The character of self-sacrifice for the political common good is clearly expressed 
in a question on whether angels (and also men) naturally love God better than 
themselves. Thomas argues that angels naturally love God, the universal common good, 
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more than their private goods. This preference is found in all natural things that belong to 
something else: 
Now, in natural things, everything which, as such, naturally belongs to another, is 
principally, and more strongly inclined to that other to which it belongs, than 
towards itself. Such a natural tendency is evidenced from things which are moved 
according to nature: because “according as a thing is moved naturally, it has an 
inborn aptitude to be thus moved,” as stated in Phys. II. For we observe that the 
part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the whole; as, for instance, the 
hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole body’s safety.160 
 
Here again we find the comparison between the hand’s protection of the head and the 
individual’s protection of the community. But while one exposes one’s hand to danger 
“without deliberation,” risking one’s life for the common good is a deliberate act:   
 And since reason copies nature, we find the same inclination among the social 
 virtues; for it behooves the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of 
 death for the public weal of the state; and if man were a natural part of the city, 
 then such inclination would be natural to him.161 
 
Thomas does not deny that man is part of the city or that he has an inclination to self-
sacrifice. But if man were “a natural part of the city,” in the way that the hand is a natural 
part of the body, then the inclination to sacrifice his private good would not require 
deliberation. Since, however, the political society is not a natural unity, but a unity of 
order, man is not a natural part of the city, and he must deliberate about whether to 
sacrifice his private good for that of the community. It is, however, necessary for the 
perfection of his will that he will the common good, and refer whatever particular goods 
he wills to that common good: “a man’s will is not right in willing a particular good, 
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unless he refer it to the common good as an end: since even the natural appetite of each 
part is ordained to the common good of the whole.”162 A man may pay his debts so that 
he will not be thrown in prison; he wills a particular good without referring it to the 
common good. A man may also pay his debts because he wills justice and the good of the 
community. The latter is more perfect because he refers the particular good (not being 
thrown into prison) to the common good. 
When Aquinas says that it is natural for man to prefer the common good, he does 
not mean it is automatic. Thus he makes this qualification: a man naturally loves the 
common good, considered formally, more than his own good. Materially, he may will a 
singular good above the common good. The reason for this is that “a thing may be 
considered in various ways by the reason, so as to appear good from one point of view, 
and not good from another point of view…. Thus a judge has a good will, in willing a 
thief to be put to death, because this is just: while the will of another—e.g., the thief’s 
wife or son, who wishes him not to be put to death, inasmuch as killing is a natural evil, 
is also good.”163 In the example, the thief’s wife can still be said to love the common 
good considered formally (she does not desire the dissolution of society), but materially 
she does not, because she does not will the means that the judge has determined to be 
necessary for the common good. Instead, “the thief’s wife has to consider the private 
good of the family, and from this point of view she wishes her husband, the thief, not to 
be put to death.”164  
                                                 
162
 S.T. I-II, q. 19, a. 10. 
163
 S.T. I-II, q. 19, a. 10. 
164
 Ibid. See Yves Simon, “Common Good and Common Action.” 
  160
 As part of the city, therefore, man has an inclination to prefer the community’s 
good to his own, but this inclination must be perfected by the social virtues. It is 
according to practical reason (prudence) for man to prefer the common good of the 
political community because this is perfective of him. How does love of the common 
good perfect the individual man? In answer to this, it will be helpful to look at Aristotle’s 
analysis of self-love in the Ethics (IX.8). Self-love, he says, is rightly condemned in the 
sense of desiring a disproportionate measure of wealth, honor, and physical pleasure for 
oneself. The material good of the individual is often opposed to the common good. 
However, if someone loves himself by desiring to acquire virtue for himself, no one 
would condemn this man as a lover of self.165 Or, as Aquinas comments, “if some wise 
man should call him self-loving, he will not say this in censure.”166 The goods of virtue 
are in reality better than the goods that most men desire, such as money and honor. 
Therefore, if one “should wish to abound in goods of reason, i.e., virtuous actions,” that 
person will be loving himself more than one who seeks to amass great wealth and 
honors.167 Insofar as acting virtuously means preferring the common good to one’s own 
good, a man who prefers the common good will in fact be loving himself more than one 
who ignores the common good and seeks only his private good. But acting virtuously 
does mean acting for the common good. Aristotle goes on to say in the same chapter: 
When everyone strains to achieve what is fine and concentrates on the finest 
actions, everything that is right will be done for the common good, and each 
person individually will receive the greatest of goods, since that is the character of 
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virtue. And so the good person must be a self-lover, since he will both help 
himself and benefit others by doing fine actions.168  
 
Virtuous actions serve at the same time the good of the individual agent and the common 
good, when the good of the individual is understood as a life according to reason and 
virtue. Thus the same actions perfect the individual and serve the common good. 
Aristotle goes on to consider the case where the common good calls for the 
sacrifice of one’s own private good. He says of money, honors, and offices that the 
virtuous man “will sacrifice them all for his friends,” and in doing so will obtain the 
better good (virtue) for himself.169 This disposition extends to the most complete of 
sacrifices, for “the excellent person labors for his friends and for his native country, and 
will die for them if he must.”170 In doing so, he chooses what is best for himself. Even if 
he dies, he seems to choose “a single fine and great action over many small actions.”171 In 
dying for country or friend, man loves himself more than another and seeks his own good 
more than the good of another.172  
Thomas says more about why this is so, emphasizing not only the virtuousness, 
but the naturalness, of loving the common good:  
He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in consequence his own good, for two 
reasons. First, because the individual good is impossible without the common 
good of the family, state, or kingdom. Hence Valerius Maximus says (Fact. et 
dict. memor. IV.6) of the ancient Romans that “they would rather be poor in a rich 
empire than rich in a poor empire.” Secondly, because, since man is a part of the 
home and state, he must needs consider what is good for him by being prudent 
about the good of the many. For the good disposition of parts depends on their 
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relation to the whole; thus Augustine says (Confess. III.8) that “any part which 
does not harmonize with its whole, is offensive.”173 
 
In loving the political common good, the individual loves not the good of another (bonum 
alienum), but a good that is proper to him, since he is after all a part of the community 
which is the object of his love. In loving the community’s good, therefore, he loves his 
own good as well: 
Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so too that which pertains to the 
whole, pertains somewhat to the part also: so that when the goods of the 
community are distributed among a number of individuals each one receives that 
which, in a way, is his own.174 
 
For example, the policeman who risks his life and safety is one of the beneficiaries of the 
security which his police work provides. Thus in protecting the community, he is at the 
same time protecting himself.  
If it were unnatural to love the common good above one’s own life, it could not 
be praiseworthy, since “whatever is contrary to the natural order is vicious.”175 If the 
common good were not naturally desired above the particular good, then to desire it as if 
it were would be to have a disordered desire. To praise actions prompted by this desire 
would be to praise disordered acts, and if virtues such as bravery required one to love the 
common good more, it would follow that virtue required us to act against nature. “But 
nothing natural is perverse; therefore it is impossible for any natural inclination of love to 
be perverse.”176 If it were not natural for man to seek the common good, it could not be 
virtuous. Virtue does not destroy or supplant, but perfects natural inclinations.  
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While in loving the common good of society, the individual loves himself in the 
correct way, this does not make the good he loves a private or particular good. There is a 
difference between loving the political common good as one’s own good (i.e., a proper 
good) and loving it as if it were a private good: 
Loving the good of some city in order to posses and to own it does not make a 
good citizen; that is how a tyrant loves the good of a city, in order to control it. In 
such a case, in fact, he loves himself more than the city, for he covets this good 
for himself rather than for the city. To love the good of a city in order to preserve 
and defend it is to love it in a real sense, and this makes someone a good citizen, 
in that some people are prepared to subject themselves to the risk of death in order  
to preserve or increase the city’s good, and to ignore their own personal good.177  
 
The tyrant loves the common good as his own private good. A good ruler or a good 
citizen also loves the common good as his good, but not as his private good. He is willing 
to sacrifice his private good for the common good, because he loves it more than his 
private good.  
While the common good of society is not opposed to the particular goods of 
individual persons, this does not rule out all conflicts between common and private 
goods, as we saw in the example of the thief’s wife. In his account of the love man has 
for the common good of political society, Thomas takes a middle road between two 
extremes: the identification of the common and the particular good, and the opposition of 
the common and the particular good.178 There are two ways of identifying the common 
and the particular good. If two goods are to be identified, then in essence one of the 
goods has to disappear. The first option is to reduce particular goods to the common 
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good: by virtue of being a part of political society, the good of the individual is the good 
of the state. The second option is to reduce the common good to the good of individuals: 
the common good is simply a sum of individual goods. In contrast to these two 
reductions, Thomas maintains that the two goods are distinct, but not opposed. The 
particular good of one person is distinct from the common good of the society. It is 
possible for someone to act in a way that serves his particular good and that does not 
serve the common good. But the individual person cannot achieve his particular good 
without serving the common good. And the common good cannot be achieved without 
the good of individual persons. 
The different goods proper to man are not opposed in themselves, but they may be 
opposed in particular instances, because of the limitations that are part of human life. The 
proper good of man as citizen, i.e., the political common good, may be opposed in a 
particular instance to his proper good considered in another respect, as when a man 
leaves behind his family and work and other interests for the sake of defending the 
community in time of war. If there were no hierarchy among goods, the choice of one 
human good over another would be arbitrary. But for Thomas, as we have seen, there is 
an order to these goods, such that it is both natural and virtuous to prefer the common 
good.  
At the same time, such a preference may entail great individual sacrifice. A 
person may never actually enjoy the good for which he sacrificed his private good. This 
is most clearly the case when a man gives his life for the good of the community. By the 
very act in which he serves the good of the community of which he is part, he ceases to 
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be part of that community. How does Thomas resolve this problem? First, he tells us that 
it is impossible for a person to be virtuous unless he loves the common good above his 
private good.179 If, in an extreme case, virtue demands that one sacrifice one’s life, the 
virtuous man will prefer to die than to act against virtue. This does not, however, resolve 
the difficulty. It only shows that in certain cases, the difficulty must arise. A true 
resolution requires reference to eternal life. Twentieth-century Thomist Jacques Maritain 
expresses this point clearly: 
When man gives his life for the community’s sake, he accomplishes, through an 
act of such great virtue, the moral perfection by which the person asserts his 
supreme independence as regards the world. By losing himself temporally for the 
city’s sake, the person sacrifices himself in the truest and most complete fashion, 
and yet does not lose the stakes; the city serves him even then, for the soul of man 
is not mortal, and there is an eternal life.180 
 
The solution described by Maritain requires faith in life beyond death, and we might also 
add, faith in a final judgment. In light of this faith, a sacrificial act of virtue is not only 
good for the community; it is good in the end for the person who makes the sacrifice. 
However, this is more than can be known through philosophy, so it seems that a purely 
philosophical understanding of the priority of the common good has this limitation, that 
in some situations, it is unable to reconcile the private good of individuals with the 
common good.181 In many circumstances, there is no conflict between a man’s desire of 
the common good and of his own good.  
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So far we have been considering Thomas’s defense of loving the common good 
more than one’s own private good, and the sacrifice of one’s own good for that of the 
community. How does he justify loving the common good more than another’s private 
good, and sacrificing another’s good for the community? He makes the same claim about 
the priority of the common good in this case, the common good is more intrinsically 
desirable than the private good, whether one’s own or another’s. On the other hand, while 
the private person may make personal sacrifices for the common good, he may not 
sacrifice another for the common good: “It is lawful for any private individual to do 
anything for the common good, provided it harm nobody: but if it be harmful to some 
other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the judgment of the person to whom it 
pertains to decide what is to be taken from the parts for the welfare of the whole.”182 The 
private person may not even inflict bodily harm on himself for the common good, at least 
not by his own authority. A murderer is not justified in committing suicide, or a thief in 
cutting off his own hand.183 One might consider a case in which a private person is 
commanded to inflict a punishment on himself, such as Socrates being sentenced to drink 
hemlock. In this case, however, the private person is not acting as a private person. He 
acts by authority of the state; it just happens that the public office of executioner resides 
in the person who is to be punished.  
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While punishment deprives the offender of a material good, it does not (cannot) 
deprive him of his spiritual good. Punishment may take away some of the things that can 
be used in a virtuous way, but it does not take away virtue itself. We have seen that love 
of the common good is necessary to human perfection, and that the man who prefers the 
common good to his own good is at the same time loving himself more perfectly than the 
one who prefers his private good to the common good. Unlike the man who sacrifices 
himself for the common good, the civil offender is pursuing neither the good of the 
community nor his own true good. By his crime, the wrongdoer has violated not only the 
common good, but also his own good. The judge, Thomas says, punishes “not out of 
hatred for the sinners, but out of the love of charity, by reason of which he prefers the 
public good to the life of the individual.”184 
By refusing to submit to the order that constitutes the community, he has put 
himself outside of the community. The punishment externally removes him from the 
community: whether temporarily by imprisonment, or permanently by exile, death, or life 
sentence. At the same time, since the political community is not a natural whole but a 
whole of order, the individual who has separated himself from the community may 
always be reunited to it, as long as he lives. Since it is good for the whole that all its parts 
be present, it is in the interest of the whole that separated parts be reconciled with the 
whole. If, however, this appears unlikely, and the person who has separated himself from 
the community poses a threat to other members, Aquinas maintains that the superior good 
of the community is the guiding end: 
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The goodness of any part is considered in comparison with the whole; hence 
Augustine says (Conf. III) that “unseemly is the part that harmonizes not with the 
whole.” Since then every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that a man be 
good, unless he be well proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole be 
well consistent unless its parts be proportionate to it.185 
 
It must be noted that, in contrast to some interpretations (see Chapter IV.C), the political 
common good is not threatened by the very existence of the evildoer, but by actual or 
imminent injustice. Those who have charge of the community as a whole have a 
responsibility to protect that community, to protect all its innocent members, which is 
greater than their responsibility to protect the life of the individual evildoer. If in some 
cases, it is not possible to preserve both the life of the criminal and the lives of innocent 
persons, civil authority rightly chooses the latter.  
 In this section, we have seen that the common good is naturally more desirable 
than the private good of the individual, where private good is understood as the material 
and incommunicable good of the individual. Since the good of the whole is by nature 
greater than the good of the part, it is natural for the individual to prefer the common 
good. When an individual desires the common good, however, he desires something that 
is really his good, but that is also a good for others. He has a natural inclination to prefer 
the common good, for the very reason that he perceives this good as greater than his own 
good.  
 
E Conclusion 
 
                                                 
185
 S.T. I-II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 3. 
  169
Thomas’s justification of capital punishment depends on his understanding of the 
common good of political society, which I have explicated in this chapter. The main 
tenets of this view are the following:  
1. A political society is an integral and accidental whole, composed of individual 
persons as parts. 
2. The political common good is prior to the private good of the individual 
member. 
3. The political common good is a proper human good.  
4. The political common good is a just and peaceful order. 
5. It is natural and virtuous to prefer the political common good to one’s 
individual good. 
 
That the political community is a whole was shown in the following way: Whatever has 
unity of form is an integral whole. The political community has unity of form (its 
government is the form that unites it). Therefore, the political community is an integral 
whole, and its parts are the individuals who belong to it.  
Thomas further distinguishes the political community as an accidental whole. An 
accidental whole is unified by an order imposed by reason. The political community is 
unified by a particular form of government, which is an order imposed by reason. 
Therefore, it is an accidental whole. This avoids the error of those who would make the 
state an organic entity or a substance. For Thomas, the political community is not a 
substantial whole, but an accidental whole. 
The whole is greater than its part. This is a truth understood as soon as the 
meaning of the terms is known, according to Thomas. This “greater” can be explained 
more precisely as a kind of priority. The whole is prior to its parts as a complete reality 
and formal cause, since the form of the parts depends on the form of the whole. This 
principle is true of all wholes, but it is true of different kinds of wholes in different ways. 
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An organic whole is absolutely prior to its parts. The parts of an organic whole are 
dependant on the whole for their existence and operation; apart from the whole, they do 
not exist or act. An accidental whole is also prior to its parts, but relatively. Its parts exist 
and have operations apart from the whole. It is not in terms of their being, therefore, that 
the parts are posterior to the accidental whole, but in terms of their order to a certain end.  
Within any genus, the common good is prior to the particular good. The genus of 
human goods includes both the private goods of individuals and their common good as a 
political whole. Within the genus of temporal human goods, the common good of 
political society is prior to the good of the individual member of political society. Yet 
since the good of the whole cannot be achieved without the good of the parts, it follows 
that the political common good cannot be achieved without the good of the individual 
citizen.  
Thomas also maintains that the individual members cannot achieve their own 
good without seeking the common good, i.e., that the political common good is one of 
man’s proper goods. Since the common good is part of man’s natural perfection, it is 
natural for him to desire it. In fact, Thomas says, it is natural for him to desire this good 
more than his individual good, recognizing its superiority. However, this natural 
inclination, like all inclinations, is subject to excess and deficiency, and must be perfected 
by moral virtue. Virtuous love of the common good means loving the good of the 
community more than one’s own individual good (when these goods are in the same 
genus). 
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What is most characteristic of Thomas’s view of the common good (though not 
original) is the harmony between the good of the whole and the good of the parts. On the 
one hand, he consistently affirms the priority of the good of the whole, even to the point 
of cutting off an offender from this whole by death. On the other hand, he insists that 
individuals’ well-being is essential to the good of the whole. There are two kinds of threat 
to this harmony between whole and part. First, there is the man who voluntarily sacrifices 
his life to protect and defend the community. In so doing, he is pursuing a good that is 
objectively greater than his private good. In pursuing the good of the community, he is 
also pursuing his own good as part of the community. Yet this man represents a kind of 
contradiction, because in the very act of defending the community, he ceases to belong to 
it. Only a theological explanation (the continuation of life beyond death and the 
expectation of a final judgment, when all good is rewarded and all evil punished) finally 
resolves the conflict between the common good and the individual good. Those who 
preferred the good of the community to their own good enjoy the fullness of life in a 
perfect community, the society of the blessed.  
The other kind of threat to the harmony between whole and part is when a 
particular part becomes a threat to the whole. Capital punishment is the forced removal of 
a member of a community for the good of the whole community. Again, the common 
good is greater than the private good of the member, but here the sacrifice is not 
voluntary on the part of that member. Yet if it is better to prefer the common good to 
one’s own private good, it is also better to prefer the common good to another’s private 
good. To kill a member of the community is to harm the whole community. This is only 
  172
justified when there is no other way to save the whole. The power to inflict harm on the 
community, for the good of the community, rests with the whole community or with 
those who represent the whole community. The power to kill evildoers rests then with 
public authority and not with private persons. When the public authority inflicts harm 
(either death or some lesser form of harm) on a member of the community, he does so for 
the good of the community, in order to restore the just order which is the essence of that 
community. 
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Chapter IV: Philosophical Objections to the Thomistic Account of Capital Punishment 
 
In this chapter, I will address some important philosophical objections to 
Thomas’s account of capital punishment, which he did not himself address or which he 
addressed only implicitly. I will not address every objection, but only those Thomas 
would have to acknowledge as reasonable objections to his position. Some objections to a 
position Other objections are really incommensurable with the theory they object to, 
because they begin with entirely different premises. There is no common principle to 
which the two parties can refer. So, for example, there would be no rational way to 
answer an objection based on a denial that it is good to give to others their due.1 The first 
three objections have do with the consistency of Aquinas’s account. They do not take 
issue with the general premises, but with the applications of those premises. The second 
three objections go deeper, in that they object to one of the premises, but only by 
reference to other premises which Aquinas held (and held more firmly than the 
objectionable premise).  
The first objection is that Thomas’s justification of CP in the case of heresy 
contradicts his general justification of CP: 
Objection 1)  An offense should be punished by the order against which it acted. 
Since heresy is an offense against the divine order and not the order of justice (the 
civil order), it should be punished by the divine and not the civil order. 
 
The second objection is that Thomas’s justification of CP does not fulfill his criterion of 
utility in punishing: 
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Objection 2) Good (human) punishment is useful to the common good. CP is not 
useful to the common good (or is less useful than other punishments), and 
therefore CP is not good punishment. 
 
The third objection is that his account fails to preserve the criterion of equity: 
Objection 3)  Punishments that are necessary to preserve equity are part of any 
good society. CP is necessary to preserve equity, and so CP is part of any good 
society. 
 
We have seen how important Thomas’s theory of the common good is to his theory of 
capital punishment. If the former is incoherent, then his justification of CP is doubtful. 
Objections Four and Five are criticisms of Thomas’s theory of the common good, 
particularly of the priority he assigns to this good over the good of individuals. The fourth 
objection questions the notion of individual persons as parts of a whole:  
Objection 4)  The human person is not a part of society, but only a part can be 
disposed of for the good of the whole, and therefore the person cannot be 
disposed of for the good of the whole society.  
 
The fifth objection questions his view of the common good of political society as a 
greater or prior good to the good of individual citizens: 
Objection 5)  The political common good is merely an instrumental good, which 
is directed toward the good of individuals. An instrumental good cannot be a 
greater good than the good toward which it is directed, and so the common good 
is not greater than the individual good.  
 
Probably the most far-reaching objection to Thomas’s account, however, is the rejection 
of his justification of the act of killing as punishment: 
Objection 6)  Capital punishment is clearly an act of intentional killing. But 
intentionally killing a human being is always wrong. Therefore, CP is wrong. 
 
If this objection succeeds, Thomas’s whole understanding of the ethics of killing must be 
revised, if not discarded. This may also have implications of his justification for other 
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forms of punishment such as maiming and imprisonment, which he perceives as 
intentional harm inflicted on another, which is injustice when done by a private person 
and justice when done by a public authority as punishment for evil. 
 
A First Objection: Thomas is Inconsistent in Condoning CP for Heresy 
 
Thomas argues that an evildoer should only be executed when he presents a 
serious threat to the common good; that is, to the political common good, which is a just 
social order. Therefore, one might also object to his defense of CP on the basis of his 
justification for punishing heretics with death: an offense should be punished by the order 
against which it acted. Since heresy is an offense against the divine order and not the 
order of justice (the civil order), it should be punished by the divine and not the civil 
order. Even though this objection has to do with offenses against faith, it is mainly a 
charge of internal inconsistency in Thomas’s thought, and therefore a philosophical 
objection. 
As we have seen, Thomas says that human law should not repress every act of 
vice, “but only the more grievous vices … and chiefly those that are to the hurt of 
others.”2 On the other hand, he defends civil society’s right to use the death penalty as a 
punishment for heretics: 
On their [the heretics] own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to 
be separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed from 
the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the faith which 
quickens the soul, than to forge money, which supports the temporal life. 
Wherefore if forgers of money and other evil-doers are forthwith condemned to 
death by the secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as 
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they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to 
death .3  
 
The 13th century saw a growth of heretical movements, which were a cause of 
anxiety for ecclesiastic and secular authorities.4 As heretical groups like the Cathars grew 
in number and in power, the popes responded with increased severity. Innocent III 
launched the Albigensian Crusade, in which 7000 people were killed in one action at 
Bèziers. Pope Gregory IX incorporated into canon law the legitimacy of burning at the 
stake as a punishment for heresy. Under Gregory’s reign, the Dominican Robert le 
Bougre burned as many as 183 Cathars at a time in France. Pope Innocent IV issued a 
bull that charged the secular state with the duty of eliminating heresy as its chief duty.5 
Some have concluded that Aquinas must have been so influenced by this situation, and 
especially by the Church approval of punishing heretics with death, that he could have 
come to no other conclusion about the legitimacy of CP in such cases:  
This was the ominous setting in which Thomas Aquinas had to do his theorizing 
about the death penalty, and that fact cannot safely be set aside in reading him … 
By mid-century a sea change had occurred, and the use of capital punishment for 
heresy was no longer a subject open to academic debate.6  
 
Of course, one might accept Thomas’s principles justifying the death penalty in general, 
but reject his application of them to heresy. The difficulty with this approach, however, is 
that it leaves one in the uncomfortable position of maintaining that the principles 
justifying the death penalty were grossly misapplied by the very person who best 
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articulated these principles. One might well be led to conclude from this that the 
principles are themselves faulty. It remains to be seen, however, whether we ought to 
judge Thomas’s justification of the death penalty for heresy as a gross misapplication.  
 
Response to the First Objection 
 
Charles Journet, the twentieth-century cardinal and theologian who was 
influential in composing the Vatican II document On the Church in the Modern World, 
provides an answer to this objection. In his Church of the Word Incarnate, Journet 
addresses the question of heresy and the death penalty.7 His primary concern in this work 
is to explain how the holiness of the Church is compatible with a Church policy of 
turning heretics over to the state for execution. In defending the holiness of the Church, 
Journet explains the unique character of the political order in the Middle Ages, and how 
heresy was a particularly dangerous attack on this order. In other words, although heresy 
is not an offense against the civil order in modern democracies, it was in mediaeval 
Christendom. Thus given the legitimacy of the death penalty in general, it is reasonable to 
apply it to crimes of heresy.  
Journet explains the mediaeval response to heresy as a function of its 
“consecrational” regime. A consecrational Christian regime is a political unity made up 
of visible members of the Church, in which “Christian values permeate the whole 
political order; the notion of Christianity, of visible membership of the Church, enters 
                                                 
7
 Journet, The Church of the Word Incarnate: An Essay in Speculative Theology, 281-283. 
  178
into the very definition of the citizen.”8 The Christian consecrational regime is a kingdom 
made up of members of the Church, but more than that, it is a regime in which 
Christianity forms an integral part of the political order. The mediaeval civil order is 
founded on Christian principles.9 Spiritual values make up part of the temporal common 
good: “to the degree to which the constitution of the medieval society recognized the 
faith as a value intrinsic to its common good, it is clear that the Church could require the 
faith to be defended with all the machinery used by cities in defense of their common 
good.”10 In this kind of society, there remains a distinction between spiritual and 
temporal power, but, as the superior power, the spiritual power also acts as part of the 
political realm.11   
 Journet’s argument does not imply that the consecrational regime is the best 
political arrangement; this is certainly not the view that appears in Gaudium et spes. Yet 
Thomas’s reasoning about CP was reasoning about a relative determination of natural 
law, and therefore had to work with the actual constraints of his political and social 
context. In the mediaeval consecrational regime, though non-Christians were not citizens, 
they had legal status, and could legitimately exercise authority over Christians.12 The 
heretic or schismatic was a different matter: “Those who, having first been Christians, 
afterwards broke with the Church, as heretics or schismatics, constituted a much greater 
danger—they shook the very bases of the new society and appeared as enemies of the 
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public safety.”13 So the punishment of heresy was not only a matter of orthodoxy, but of 
civil order. Heresy was a public crime, since it promoted religious disunity, and religious 
unity was the foundational bond of society.14 Not only was it a public crime, but it was 
one of the most egregious: 
If … the death penalty is provided for the highest crimes against the temporal 
good of society, it is clear that the secular arm could punish the heretic with death, 
and that the Church, at need, could remind it of its duty; and more readily on this 
point than on others, since what heresy destroys is the faith, the supreme political 
value in a consecrational regime.15 
 
Heresy in the Middle Ages would be comparable the crime of a Benedict Arnold or a 
Julius Rosenberg. It undermined the very existence of the political community. 
 Journet helps explain the political significance of heresy in this kind of regime in 
a general way. In practice, we must admit that the matter was more complicated. The real 
concern for civil authority in the thirteenth century was not so much heresy in itself, but 
the social and political effects of heretical movements: assassinations, violent mobs, 
fortified cities held by heretical leaders, semi-military Catholic groups formed to combat 
the heretical sects. Emperor Frederick II made heresy punishable by death in civil law, 
and later Pope Gregory IX sanctioned this punishment in canon law (it was, of course, the 
role of the Church to determine whether a person’s statements were heretical, not to 
execute heretics).16 A number of papal inquisitors were murdered by heretic groups 
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during this time; Thomas certainly would have known of the most famous of these, his 
fellow countryman and fellow Dominican Peter of Verona (d. 1252).  
 Whether their reasons were primarily doctrinal or political, some heretics were a 
civil threat, and no doubt, many were not. If we apply to heresy the rule that CP should 
be used only when nothing else can be done for the common good, it will be apparent that 
not all heretics ought to be executed, but only those who but only those who were violent 
or instigators of violence. CP is a civil penalty, and its aim is a civil one: to protect the 
basic order without which no human society can exist. Because the authority that held 
mediaeval society together was an authority sanctioned and guided (at least in theory) by 
the Christian Church, those who rejected the Church’s authority on doctrine often 
rejected the civil authority as well. This civil threat is what CP was supposed to address. 
A regime like that under which Thomas lived is no longer possible or desirable. 
The question of using the death penalty for crimes of heresy was a specific application to 
the thirteenth century civil order. Laws determining such penalties were of human 
making, with the authority only of human reason. Human law, as we saw above, is 
mutable by nature, and this is good. In speculative matters, “… it seems natural to human 
reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect.”17  
So also in practical matters: for those who first endeavored to discover something 
useful for the human community, not being able by themselves to take everything 
into consideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient in many ways; 
and these were changed by subsequent lawgivers who made institutions that 
might prove less frequently deficient in respect of the common weal.18 
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The fact that, after much difficulty, human reason arrived at something better, does not 
mean that the former order was simply evil, just imperfect. Thomas’s defense of CP for 
heresy is not a departure from his own reasoning about the limits of human law and the 
use of CP only in the presence of a serious threat to the political common good. In 13th 
century Europe, heresy was a serious threat to the political common good, since it 
“directly endangered the fundamental political constitution of society.”19 Therefore, 
under Aquinas’s theory, it was reasonable to punish heretics with death. On the other 
hand, this specific application is bound to the nature of mediaeval political order, which 
has been superseded by another, and better, order. 
 
B Second Objection: Capital Punishment is Not a Useful Punishment 
 
According to Thomas, utility is one of the things we must consider in determining 
punishments; we must ask whether this particular penalty actually contributes to the 
common good. This objection may be referred to as the utilitarian objection to CP, and in 
fact the father of Utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, raised just such an objection about CP: 
“At the same time, this punishment, it is evident, is in an eminent degree unfrugal; which 
forms one among many objections there are against the use of it, in any but very 
extraordinary cases.” 20 Contemporary criminologist Roger Hood explains why CP might 
be called “unfrugal”: 
A more utilitarian or practical argument is that there is no convincing evidence 
that the rate of murder (or any other crime threatened with the death penalty) is 
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consistently lower when the death penalty is on the statute book and enforced by 
executions. When all the circumstances surrounding the way in which capital 
punishment is used in democratic states and under the rule of law are taken into 
account, it has not proved to be a more effective deterrent than the alternative 
sanction of life or long-term imprisonment … It is therefore a useless burden on 
the administration of a rational system of criminal justice.21 
 
We could frame this objection in Thomistic terms by saying that CP is not useful to the 
common good because it does not promote good civil order any more than the 
alternatives. Since Thomas makes utility one of the considerations in determining 
punishments, this objection presents a genuine challenge. Considering this objection will 
also provide the opportunity to distinguish Thomas’s doctrine of punishment from that of 
the Utilitarian. 
 
Response to the Second Objection 
Bentham’s idea of the utility of punishment differs in important ways from 
Thomas’s. For Bentham, utility is the essence of punishment, and indeed of all law: 
The general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in common, is to 
augment the total happiness of the community; and therefore, in the first place, to 
exclude, as far as may be every thing that tends to subtract from that happiness: in 
other words, to exclude mischief.  
But all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil. Upon the 
principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in 
as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.22  
 
Bentham does not distinguish between the evils of fault and punishment. Both faults and 
punishments augment evils; and the primary principle of ethics for Bentham is to act so 
as to increase happiness (benefit, pleasure, good) and decrease unhappiness (mischief, 
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pain, evil).23 Therefore punishment is only justified if it promises to prevent more evil 
than it causes. Moreover, since utility is the form of law for Bentham (that is, a law is a 
law insofar as it obeys the principle of utility), there is nothing to prevent a law which 
sanctions punishing the innocent, where this is useful to the happiness of others.  
For Thomas, on the other hand, the utility or medicinal quality is a quality of 
punishment, and not its essence. In punishing an offense, Thomas says, “The second 
point to be considered [after equity] is utility. For punishments are inflicted as medicines, 
that men being deterred thereby may desist from sin.”24 Like Bentham, Thomas is 
concerned with preventing evil, but this for him this is secondary, for only the present 
evil of fault justifies the penalty. Utility is necessary but not sufficient to justify temporal 
punishments. Punishment is owed to sin, and is essentially concerned with addressing a 
present evil which has been introduced by an offense:  
And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins, commits an 
offense against an order: wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same 
order, which repression is punishment.25  
 
[S]in incurs a debt of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect 
remains so long as the cause remains. Wherefore so long as the disturbance of the 
order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also.26  
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The prevention of potential evils may give an additional reason for choosing or forgoing 
a certain punishment, but this presumes that the punishment is already justified by the 
actual evil committed. Given that fact of guilt, the utility of the punishment must also be 
considered. For temporal punishment, according to Thomas, is not justified solely by its 
retributive object. Retribution establishes the act as punishment, but temporal punishment 
must be further justified by its medicinal ends.  
However, if the utilitarian objection is taken to presuppose guilt, the objection 
may be granted. If it is a matter of choosing between CP and another punishment, and it 
seems that CP will be less useful than the alternative to the political common good, then 
it should be forgone. As illustration of this point, consider the following reply, which 
Thomas makes in a question on whether spiritual goods should be forgone on account of 
scandal: 
In the infliction of punishment it is not the punishment itself that is the end in 
view, but its medicinal properties in checking sin; wherefore punishment partakes 
of the nature of justice, in so far as it checks sin. But if it is evident that the 
infliction of punishment will result in more numerous and more grievous sins 
being committed, the infliction of punishment will no longer be a part of justice. It 
is in this sense that Augustine is speaking, when, to wit, the excommunication of 
a few threatens to bring about the danger of a schism, for in that case it would be 
contrary to the truth of justice to pronounce excommunication.27  
 
The punishment of excommunication (being deprived of the sacraments), is an equitable 
punishment for crimes against sacred things or persons: “the fitting punishment of one 
guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred thing, is excommunication, 
whereby sacred things are withheld from him.”28 Nonetheless, if excommunicating the 
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offender(s) would produce schism, then it ought to be forgone. This is a question of 
ecclesiastical punishment rather than civil punishment, but the principle is the same, 
because both are temporal, human punishments: if the strictly equitable punishment 
would increase rather than decrease evil, then the equitable punishment ought to be 
forgone.29  
This differs from Bentham’s view in that punishment is forgone for the sake of 
justice, rather than for the sake of happiness (which Bentham equates with pleasure and 
benefit). Justice is the reason for punishing in the first place. If, however, a punishment 
might increase sins, “the infliction of punishment will no longer be a part of justice.” In 
such cases, not punishing is serving the end which punishment itself serves. In the 
passage on excommunication, it is a question of forgoing punishment in a particular 
instance, not of forgoing a certain type of punishment as a general policy.  
The case of forgoing a certain type of punishment is actually easier to make, in 
that it is not a question of forgoing punishment altogether, but of choosing one 
punishment over another. If in a certain society, some alternative to CP, such as long-
term imprisonment, seems more useful to the common good, then, other things being 
equal, Thomas’s theory would favor using the alternative. His understanding of the 
person as a part of society, which justifies CP in some cases, also implies that CP should 
only be used when necessary to preserve the good of the whole, for “[a] member should 
not be removed for the sake of the bodily health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing 
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can be done to further the good of the whole.”30 Ordinarily, the good of a whole is not 
served by cutting off its parts. Only when a part is so corrupted that it is more likely to 
harm the whole than anything else, should it be cut off. The reason that CP, like 
amputation, is a last resort, is because it is normally for the good of the whole that none 
of its parts be lost. Such drastic measures are reasonable only if nothing else can be done 
for the good of the whole. So human justice, in imitation of divine justice, “puts to death 
those who are dangerous to others, while it allows time for repentance to those who sin 
without grievously harming others.”31 One might even argue that life imprisonment, as a 
sort of quarantine, achieves the same end of cutting the offender off from the community, 
while giving him time for repentance as well. Given the existence of such an alternative, 
the burden seems to lie on those who would retain the punishment, to prove that CP 
actually is necessary to the common good.  
In answer to the objection based on utility, we have seen that questions of the 
“frugality” of deterrent effect of a punishment are part of the choice of a particular 
temporal punishment. However, this judgment presumes that punishment is already 
justified by the presence of guilt. Utility is a necessary but not a sufficient justification for 
temporal punishment. 
 
C Third Objection: CP is a Necessary Determination of Natural Law 
 
The next objection has to do with the consistency of my interpretation of Thomas 
on capital punishment, specifically on whether this is a necessary punishment. In his 
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article “Evangelium Vitae, St. Thomas Aquinas, and the Death Penalty,” Stephen Long 
suggests that CP is a determination that follows so closely from the natural law 
concerning punishment that it is necessary for achieving proportional equality. He 
implies that the death penalty has the force of natural law, and not merely of human law, 
and therefore that the only equitable punishment for some crimes is death. A rightly 
ordered society would have to punish the most grievous crimes with death. According to 
Long, this is not an objection to Thomas’s teaching on CP, but the authentic 
interpretation of this teaching.  
Long reads St. Thomas as not only saying that CP is licit, but that it is essential to 
a just social order (presuming the presence of serious crimes such as murder). He has two 
arguments for this conclusion, which I will consider separately. First, Long considers the 
determination of punishments from the natural law. He comments:  
On first glance this seems to suggest that only the general need for punishments, 
but no particular punishment, is derived from natural law. So construed the death 
penalty (or any penalty) may appear wholly a matter of convention. Yet that 
something is a determination of the natural law does not cause it to cease to 
participate the natural law … Nor is it reasonable to suggest that ‘any punishment 
will do.’ One can scarcely take solace in supposing that since particular 
punishments have no force but that of human law, therefore any punishment 
whatsoever can be levied.32 
 
It is not true that because punishments are determinations of natural law, they are 
arbitrary; rather, Long says, they must conform to proportional equality.33  
To read Thomas as saying that all particular punishments are arbitrary is to 
misread him. Rather, he is making the point that determinations of punishment 
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partake of the force of natural law only by partaking generically of the form of 
lawful punishments.34  
 
Long implies that for Thomas either specific punishments are arbitrary, or they share in 
the force of natural law. But Thomas does not think particular punishments are arbitrary. 
Therefore he must hold that particular punishments “partake of the force of natural law.” 
They partake of this force only generically, which distinguishes them from precepts 
derived by way of conclusion from the natural law.  
Long goes on to say that determinations of natural law are not all “equally remote 
from the form they particularize.”35 That is, some determinations follow more closely 
from natural law than others. In support of this claim, Long refers to the analogy Thomas 
uses to describe determinations of the natural law, the analogy of the craftsman.36 A 
craftsman applies a form to a particular matter, just as the judge applies the form of 
punishment to a particular crime. In each case, the form provides only general requisites: 
to build a two-story house, or to punish a murderer. But the matter itself may impose a 
kind of necessity: “For instance, if one is building a multilevel house with a given 
material, and the material can bear only so much stress, then no more than this given 
amount can be placed upon beams made of that material. Ergo the particular form 
achieved will be characterized by this necessity.”37 Long continues: 
What I am here suggesting is that the relation of the determinatio of just 
punishment to the natural law bears a necessity analogous to the necessity 
exhibited by proper accidents in relation to essence…. Thus determinations of the 
natural law may at times flow necessarily from the combination of a general form 
with some particular matter … Hence we may say that the form of justice—which 
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is of the natural law—may generate, in relation to particular grave matter, some 
degree of necessity in the particular form of justice that is dispensed by way of 
penalty. In other words, the general prerequisites of justice may be most fittingly 
particularized in relation to a given matter by a certain type of penalty.38 
 
While the proper accident is not contained in the essence to which it belongs, it is 
“necessarily generated” by that essence. Similarly, Long argues, “the determination is not 
simply contained in the natural law … Yet … it is necessarily generated by its principle 
cause,” though “only in conjunction with some particular matter.”39 When the precept of 
natural law, “punishment is due to sin,” comes into contact with a particular sin of 
murder, the need for a the punishment of death is necessarily generated. If Long’s 
analysis of determinations of natural law is correct, the death penalty is a determination 
that follows so closely from the natural law concerning punishment, that proportional 
equality cannot be achieved without its use. 
Long’s second argument for the necessity of CP in Thomas is based on the role of 
punishment in protecting the common good (what I have called punishment’s utility). In 
q. 64, a. 2, Thomas defends the use of CP, as we have seen: 
Now every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every 
part is naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the 
health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being 
decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and 
advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual person is compared to the 
whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and 
infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and 
advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good, since a 
little leaven corrupteth the whole lump (1 Cor. 5:6).40  
 
Long comments on this passage: 
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Note that Thomas does not limit the reason for putting criminals to death to their 
immediate physical danger to others; rather, he clearly speaks of the nature of the 
criminal. Hence, the illustration is of a member that demands excision because it 
is ‘decayed or infectious’—that is, severe enough corruption (‘decay’) is in its 
own right harmful to society, apart from any issue of ‘clear and present danger’ in 
the physical order.41 
 
Long acknowledges that for Thomas the corruption must be severe in order to justify CP: 
not just any crime should be punished with death. Yet he does not think read Thomas as 
saying that the only proper recipient of the penalty is one who presents an immediate 
physical threat to the community. Thomas himself specifies who may be executed in his 
Reply to Objection 2 of the same question: human justice, in imitation of divine justice, 
“puts to death those who are dangerous (perniciosus) to others, while it allows time for 
repentance to those who sin without grievously harming others.”42 Long comments: 
Note that the “grievous harm” pertains to conduct: that is, if someone grievously 
harms another, he deserves to be put to death precisely in imitation of the divine 
justice (as opposed to the sentence of those ‘who sin without grievously harming 
others’). Again, although such justice “puts to death those who are dangerous to 
others this dangerousness is a function of evil rather than a mere technical matter 
of social quarantine. These words are akin to the manner in which one might 
describe someone as a “dangerous man” even though he were immobilized or 
imprisoned, because of his vicious character and traits.43 
 
In other words, Long says, some criminals by their very existence present a serious threat 
to the common good. The harm they threaten is a spiritual harm, and punishment has a 
spiritual force that counteracts this harm: the “manifestation and vindication of a divine 
norm of justice.”44 
 
                                                 
41
 Long, 532. 
42
 S.T. II-II, q. 64, a. 2, ad 2. 
43
 Long, 532-33. 
44
 Long, 521. 
  191
Response to the Third Objection 
Long uses Thomas’s analogy of the craftsman to explain the idea of determination 
of a form to a particular matter. Rather than explicitly applying this analogy to 
punishments, however, Long somewhat abruptly switches to the analogy of proper 
accidents and substance, which Thomas does not use in this context. This is significant, 
because the craftsman analogy and the proper accidents analogy convey two different 
ideas of how determinations are derived from the natural law.  
Thomas compares the first mode of derivation from the natural law to the way 
conclusions are demonstrated from principles in the sciences. The second mode, he says, 
“is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus 
the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some particular shape.”45 
So, for example, if a builder wants to make a two-story house, he knows that the first 
story will not be able to hold more than a certain weight. On the other hand, he knows 
that if the second story is too light, it will be insufficient for warmth, easily damaged by 
storms, etc. So he determines that the total weight of the second story cannot be more 
than Y or less than X. But within those limits, there is more than one way for the 
craftsman to achieve his end. His decision will be guided, but not necessitated, by the 
cost and availability of materials, the desired style, and other factors.  
Artistic knowledge is not arbitrary because the artist applies his knowledge of 
general forms to a specific task. If it were arbitrary, it would not be knowledge. Yet 
artistic knowledge is not necessary knowledge, because it deals with singulars. The artist 
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does not apply a universal law to a particular case, as the mathematician does; rather he 
determines a general law to a particular matter. The number of singulars is infinite and 
so, therefore, is the number of products which the artist theoretically could make. But 
from experience, he knows what happens in most cases, and this knowledge allows him 
to determine the general form to the particular matter. Similarly, in the case of ethical 
knowledge (prudence), which is also about actions, the one who has experience of the 
right kind can determine the general form to particular matter.46 The  point of the 
comparison is that the second mode of derivation is more like the knowledge of the 
artisan than the knowledge of the scientist. It particularizes a law with regard to singulars. 
Its judgment is neither arbitrary nor necessary; it is an exercise of prudence. For Thomas, 
the fact that specific punishments follow established conventions is no obstacle to 
prudence. For he understands convention or custom as the manifestation of reason in 
deed.47 Conventional punishments then should be a help to prudence, because they are 
the product of collective reasoning about various determinations of the natural law. 
Let us apply the craftsman analogy to an instance of determining punishment. 
Take the judge who has to sentence a man convicted of stealing sheep. In determining a 
sentence, he is guided by the general form (that crimes should be punished 
proportionately) and the particular matter (the crime). We can see that the punishment 
could be too great (death) or too small (a verbal reprimand). But between the extremes, 
there may be a range of punishments which the judge could validly use, from which he 
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can choose in order to fit the circumstances.48 His choice within that range, even though 
it is not determined by necessity, is not arbitrary: it will be determined by legal 
precedents for similar cases (i.e., by custom), and by various circumstances (the age and 
situation of the offender, whether the crime was premeditated, etc.) 
While the craftsman analogy produces the idea of limits between which a valid 
punishment may be found, the proper accident analogy produces the idea of a particular 
punishment following necessarily from a particular crime. Long does not claim that the 
proper accident analogy is implied by any text of Aquinas, but says that “it is consistent 
for St. Thomas to have thought that certain determinationes of penalty are naturally most 
befitting or even required.”49 But in fact, it is not consistent for St. Thomas to have 
thought that certain determinations of penalty are required by natural law.50 
Long wants to say that specific punishments may be required (i.e., necessary), 
even though they do not have the force of natural law. But it is just in this requirement or 
necessity that the force of natural law consists. Thomas says explicitly that things derived 
from the natural law as conclusions from premises “have some force from the natural 
law,” but that things derived from the natural law by way of determination “have no other 
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force than that of human law.”51 Long affirms this when he says that punishments partake 
of the force of nature only generically. In other words, specific punishments do not carry 
the force of natural law. But if something is required by natural law, it has the force of 
natural law. Specific punishments are determinations of natural law, and so do not have 
the force of natural law. Therefore, specific punishments are not required by natural law.  
Even if capital punishment is not in theory required by natural law, it could be 
that it is always useful to the common good that certain kinds of criminals to be punished 
with death. Long suggests this when he argues that the danger that some criminals 
present to society is not primarily the danger that they will do, or encourage others to do, 
but in their continued existence as a member of community. Under such a view, law 
ought to punish not only bad acts, but bad habits. Furthermore, if the convicted murderer 
is a danger to the community, not so much because of anything he can do, but because of 
what he is, then the man filled with murderous thoughts is equally dangerous to the 
community, and “unworthy of continued existence,”52 even if he never kills. The only 
reason for not punishing the latter is the practical impossibility of identifying him; the 
threat he poses is just as deadly to the common good. 
However, there is no evidence that Thomas means by safeguarding the common 
good anything but protecting others from immediate physical danger. He does not say 
that the common good is destroyed by the mere existence of evil men, as it would be if 
virtue itself were the common good. If the common good is equated with virtue, then vice 
itself corrupts the common good. For Thomas, however, the common good is oriented to 
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the virtue and happiness of the members of the community, but virtue and happiness are 
individual goods and not common goods. Therefore, the common good, which is what the 
death penalty is ordained to protect, cannot be equated with virtue.  
In the few cases where Thomas specifies the content of the political common 
good, he does so in terms such as “freedom from external disorders” and “justice and 
peace.”53 In other words, he does equate the common good with public order, or the 
external peace of the community, contra Long. Thomas’s words indicate that it is “on 
account of some sin”—in other words because of the offense—that the evildoer is 
“dangerous and infectious to the community.” If the dangerousness of the criminal was 
equivalent to his evilness, then Thomas’s distinction becomes meaningless. For he wants 
to give time for repentance to those who are not dangerous, but they would not need 
repentance if they were not evil. Therefore, some who do evil are dangerous to others and 
some are not. The danger is not a function of evil, as Long maintains, but of evil that 
tends to inflict harm on others:  
All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal death, as regards future retribution, 
which is in accordance with the truth of the divine judgment. But the punishments 
of this life are more of a medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death 
is inflicted on those sins alone which conduce to the grave undoing of others.54 
 
Thomas’s view of the common good does not lead to the conclusion that the mere 
existence of the evildoer is what threatens the community. If the evildoer’s existence is a 
threat, it is because of the harm which he can still do while he lives. This is the more 
likely way to read Thomas’s comments, rather than envisioning a situation in which an 
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evildoer presented no threat of actual harm. Of course, evil habits tend to produce evil 
acts, and the members of the community will not be happy if they are full of evil habits, 
but actions are what harm the common good of peace and justice.55  
For Thomas, it is only lawful to execute a guilty person “in order to safeguard the 
common good.”56 The good of the community is the decisive thing, the only end that 
justifies killing a man. In response to the question of killing the innocent, Thomas says: 
An individual man may be considered in two ways: first, in himself; secondly, in 
relation to something else. If we consider a man in himself, it is unlawful to kill 
any man, since in every man though he be sinful, we ought to love the nature which 
God has made, and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as stated 
above, the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to the common good, 
which is corrupted by sin. On the other hand the life of righteous men preserves 
and forwards the common good, since they are the chief part of the community. 
Therefore it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent.57 
 
From this reply it is clear that it is not the nature of the criminal that legitimizes killing 
him. On the contrary, on behalf of his nature, we ought to preserve and not destroy him. 
What justifies judicial killing is not hatred of the criminal but love of the common good, 
which is a greater good than the good of one person, as Thomas frequently affirms.58  
It has been necessary to reply to this objection in some detail, in order to see its 
source in a mistaken interpretation of Thomas in two important areas: the mode of 
deriving specific precepts from natural law by way of determination, and the content of 
the political common good. Thomas says that things derived from the natural law by way 
of determination “have no other force than that of human law”; and if something is 
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required by natural law, it has the force of natural law; so it follows that things derived 
from the natural law by way of determination are not required by natural law. Regarding 
Thomas’s view of the common good, execution of an evildoer is justified when necessary 
to the common good, a just and peaceful civil order. An evildoer is a threat to the 
common good when he is an immediate danger to civil order. Thus, in Thomas’s view, 
the fact of a grave evil does not in itself necessitate capital punishment. 
In this section, we have looked at three objections to the consistency of Thomas’s 
account. Some claim that he applies CP too broadly according to this own standards 
when he justifies it for crimes like heresy. But I have argued that in the Middle Ages, 
heresy was not only a religious error, but a source of political and social instability. 
Therefore, if Thomas defends CP for crimes such as murder and treason, it was also 
reasonable for him to defend it for crimes of heresy.  
The second objection was that Thomas is inconsistent in maintaining that 
punishment must be useful to the common good and at the same time approving CP, 
which is not useful to the common good. In response, I argued that for Thomas utility is a 
necessary condition in determining temporal punishment, it is not a sufficient condition. 
His defining criteria is guilt; that is, punishment is punishment insofar as it is a response 
to actual guilt (the retributive meaning of punishment). Utility then must be considered: 
given that punishment is justified, which punishment will be most conducive the common 
good? If taken in this sense, then the objection may be granted. If CP is truly less useful 
to the common good than other serious punishments, then it ought not to be used.  
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Finally, some say that according to Thomas’s theory of punishment, capital 
punishment has a sort of necessity about it, that when the natural law precept to punish 
evildoers comes into contact with certain grave evils, the precept to execute necessarily 
follows. I have argued that Thomas consistently maintains that specific punishments have 
only the force of human law. Punishments are specific determinations of natural law that 
are subject to changing conditions of the common good and changing customs. 
Therefore, it is consistent to maintain that Thomas was correct in his justification of CP 
and to maintain that CP now ought not to be used. 
There is another whole category of consistency objections which I have not 
addressed here because they are properly theological. Some of these appeared in 
Thomas’s own replies in S.T. II-II, q. 64, a. 2. In general, these objections maintain that 
his account runs contrary to certain revealed truths. I consider these objections in the 
Appendix. 
 
D Fourth Objection: The Human Person is not a Part 
 
The fourth and fifth objections are based on the rejection of Thomas’s view of the 
political common good. The fourth objection maintains that the human person is not part 
of society, but only a part can be disposed of for the good of the whole, and therefore the 
person cannot be disposed of for the good of the whole. Thomas, like Aristotle, applies 
the logic of whole and part to the person and the political community. In the ancient and 
mediaeval worlds, this was an uncontroversial move, but many modern thinkers have 
found this application deeply troubling. Germain Grisez comments, 
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We might grant that the good of a citizen precisely as citizen is subordinate to the 
common good of society, but the role of citizen is only one dimension of the one’s 
whole personality, and the whole person cannot be rightly viewed as mere part of 
the social whole.  That is precisely why we reject totalitarianism and maintain that 
all persons have some fundamental rights that the society may not take away … 
Aquinas surely was aware of this point, but he did not pay sufficient attention 
to its implications for the argument he proposed in defense of capital  
punishment … 
Aquinas, in following Aristotle, adopts the analogy between individual 
persons in relation to the common good and bodily parts in relation to the good of 
the whole organism. If the analogy held, society would surely be justified in 
acting to protect the common good by methods that would be immoral if used by 
individuals to protect themselves. However, if no human society is complete, if 
civil society is merely one form of community with limited concerns, then it is by 
no means clear that men associated in states may rightly kill wrongdoers to 
protect the common good if such killing would be morally forbidden to 
individuals.59 
 
The objection is put more forcefully by the contemporary Spanish Dominican Niceto 
Blázquez. James Megivern summarizes Blázquez’s position in The Death Penalty: An 
Historical and Theological Survey:  
Blázquez has a number of criticisms of the passages on the death penalty in the 
Summa. In general, Thomas proceeds here more as an Aristotelian philosopher, 
drawing cold rationalistic conclusions from a notion of natural law, than as a 
Christian theologian, dealing directly with the pastoral goals of the gospel. 
Especially in his medical analogy, justifying the killing of malefactors as 
gangrenous members that threaten the welfare of the whole body, the argument 
bristles with difficulties of equivocation. Whole and part do not mean the same 
thing in a social body as in a physical body. “A person is not related to a society 
as to his ultimate end as an arm is to the body.  So it is not reasonable to deduce 
that a person can be killed in function of the society to which he belongs, since 
the specific goal of every human person transcends the community.”60 
 
Blázquez accuses Thomas of equivocating when he compares the member of society to 
the member of a living body. The bodily member has no transcendent goal; it is entirely 
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ordered to the body of which it is a part. The member has no existence without the body, 
but the body may exist without the member. Thus, it is reasonable to prefer the good of 
the body to the good of the member and to cut off the part if it will preserve the whole. If 
the human person were a part of the community in the same way that the bodily member 
is part of the living body, then perhaps he could be killed for the good of the community. 
But the human person has a goal transcending the whole political order, as Thomas 
himself admits. He is not entirely ordered to the political community. Therefore it is not 
reasonable to kill him for the good of this community.  
 
Response to the Fourth Objection 
Grisez and Blázquez are not the only contemporary thinkers who have found 
Thomas’s “medical analogy” to be a stumbling block. This objection is sometimes 
connected to a reaction against Thomas’s comparison of the evildoer to an irrational 
beast. We saw how Thomas used this comparison in his reply to an objection in q. 64 (see 
Chapter II.A.2). The evildoer is like a beast in that he is ordered to the political common 
good by an external principle (as the beast is ordered to human goods by an external 
principle), instead of ordering himself to that common good. Understood thus, the 
comparison is not as offensive as at first sight, but it remains an unfortunate one, too 
easily misunderstood and abused.  
There are two things we must consider in response to this objection. First, is 
Thomas equivocating when he uses the terms whole and part with reference to the 
political community and to the living body? Second, is the comparison between CP and 
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amputation an accurate one? Grisez thinks that “if the analogy held, society would surely 
be justified in acting to protect the common good by methods that would be immoral if 
used by individuals to protect themselves,” and Blázquez implies the same.61  
Blázquez and Megivern accuse Thomas of equivocating, of using the word “part” 
as if it meant the same thing when used of a person and a foot. This is not a case of pure 
equivocation, however, but of analogy. Thomas never claims that whole and part mean 
the same thing when applied to a social group and to a living body. On the contrary, he 
distinguishes between different kinds of wholes. He explicitly rejects an “organic” view 
of society when he explains that the political community, like the family, is a unity of 
order, and not something absolutely or substantially one.62 Yet he also thinks that 
different wholes have something in common, precisely as wholes; namely, a whole has 
unity of form. If whole is an analogous term, so is part. The parts are parts in different 
ways, depending on whether they belong to an accidental or a substantial whole.  
Thomas agrees with the assertion that the role of citizen does not complete the 
human person. Yet the person cannot be divided so that one part of him belongs to the 
state, one part to the family, etc. Therefore, when we talk about man as citizen, we are not 
talking about a part of man, but the whole man as part of the political community. So 
man—the whole man—is part of the political community, but not in the same way that 
the hand is part of the human body. The latter is a substantial whole, whose part has no 
operation apart from that whole. The former is an accidental whole, whose part does have 
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an operation apart from that whole: the operation by which man is directed to his ultimate 
goal. So it does not follow from the fact that “the role of citizen is only one dimension of 
the one’s whole personality,” that “the whole person cannot be rightly viewed as mere 
part of the social whole.”63 This would follow only if “dimension” meant the same as 
“part.” But the dimension in question—man’s political dimension—is not a part, but a 
relation. In relation to the political community, man is a part. Thus, Aquinas can maintain 
that the person is part of the social whole, but not by virtue of everything he is and has, 
because he is called to an end that infinitely surpasses the entire created order: “Man is 
not ordained to the body politic, according to all that he is and has.”64  
Even if we relieve Thomas of the charge of equivocation, and admit that the 
individual person is part of a political society, does the comparison between CP and 
amputation work? We should be clear about how Thomas uses the medical analogy. In 
fact, it would be clearer if we did not refer to this as an analogy. Part and whole are 
analogous terms; amputation and capital punishment are two applications of the priority 
of whole to part. If Aquinas were reasoning from part-whole relationship in the human 
body to the part-whole relationship in human societies, this would be problematic, since 
they are obviously very different kinds of wholes. Instead, he applies the general 
speculative principle (the whole is greater than its part) to the political community as a 
whole. The medical metaphors are supposed to make this clearer by giving us a more 
immediate, more physical example of the whole-part relationship.  
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We can speculate about why he chose medicine as a source of metaphors for 
politics. Clearly, he had Aristotle’s example, but there is more to be said for it. Medicine 
and politics are both arts, requiring the exercise of practical reason. We cannot expect the 
same sort of certainty in these fields as we would in geometry and logic. Both arts have 
man as their material, but medicine is concerned with the body, while politics is 
concerned with the whole man. Medicine seeks the bodily good of man; politics seeks the 
complete good of man. While the practitioner of either art has rules to guide him, he must 
also be guided by the particular matter he is working with. These similarities allow 
Thomas to use examples from medicine to help make his points about politics. The 
medical examples are better-known, since most men have experienced bodily health and 
sickness and are in a way experts on their own bodily needs, while fewer have true 
political knowledge.65  
The medical analogies, however, are not meant to carry the argument. Thomas 
points to perceived similarities in order to bring out the principles that lie behind the 
similarities. In the case of vengeance, he says that the punishments inflicted by society 
are like medicines, in that they tend to promote the health of the body politic. Vengeance 
that does not actually serve a good end such as the ones mentioned above is like medicine 
that does not make the body healthy, or that treats a minor ill at great cost to the body. A 
good doctor will not prescribe medicine for every ill. If it is a minor complaint, it may be 
borne equitably and disappear on its own. Or if the cure is so severe that it would 
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endanger the life or well-being of the patient, it may be better to live with the illness. In 
the same way, a just man will not demand vengeance for every wrong, nor will he 
demand vengeance when it would endanger the good members of society.66 
Moreover, a doctor will sometimes prescribe a medicine not to cure but to prevent 
a sickness. Now punishment properly speaking is only inflicted for sin, and this is 
vengeance. But as there are preventive medicines, so there are medicinal punishments 
that, though they do not fall under the strict definition of punishment, do inflict some 
harm for the sake of preventing evil.67 Good medicine does not inflict a greater harm to 
prevent a lesser one (blinding the eye to save the heel), but it may inflict a lesser harm to 
prevent a greater (removing a benign tumor lest it become cancerous, for example).68 In 
this way, deprivation of lesser things (specifically, in material goods, the lowest category 
of good) does not require a wrong done or a need for vengeance, insofar as it promotes a 
greater (spiritual) good. This applies most properly to divine punishment, since God 
knows what is conducive to the good of each individual.  
Abuse of the individual by the state is a valid concern, especially given recent 
history, but this does not seem to have been a major concern to Thomas or his 
contemporaries. On the other hand, we might wonder whether his theory lends itself to 
the kind of distortion that Grisez fears, whether a part too easily becomes a mere part, 
something insignificant and dispensable. In the mid-twentieth century, Jacques Maritain 
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attempted to reconcile Thomas’s view of the common good with modern sensitivities by 
distinguishing between individuality and personality: 
In brief, while the person as such is a totality, the individual as such is a part; 
while the person, as person or as totality, demands that the common good of 
temporal society should flow back to him, and while through his ordination to the 
transcendent whole, he even surpasses the temporal society, the same person, as 
an individual or as part, is inferior to the social whole, and must serve the 
common cause as a member of the whole.69  
 
In another work, Maritain criticizes totalitarian political philosophies, which take a 
materialistic view of reality. These theories “seek to incorporate man in all his being into 
a social whole composed of a multitude of material individualities.”70 But Maritain also 
criticizes theories that deny that man is a part of the political whole:  
Yet we must not say that the aim of society is the individual good (or the mere 
collection of individual goods) of each person who constitutes it! This formula 
would dissolve society as such for the benefit of its parts, and would lead to the 
‘anarchy of atoms’…. 
The end of society is its common good, the good of the body politic. But if one 
fails to grasp the fact that the good of the body politic is a common good of 
human persons—as the social body itself is a whole made up of human persons—
this formula may lead in its turn to other errors of the collectivist or totalitarian 
type. The common good of society is neither a simple collection of private goods, 
nor a good belonging to a whole which (as in the case of the species in relation to 
its individual members) draws the parts to itself, as it they were pure means to 
serve itself alone. The common good is the good human life of the multitude, of a 
multitude of persons; it is their communion in the good life; it is therefore 
common to the whole and to the parts, on whom it follows back and who must all 
benefit from it.71 
 
Maritain thus attempts to preserve the priority of the political common good, while 
allaying modern fears of a totalitarian state. The distinction between man as individual 
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and man as person, though not one used by Thomas, is one way of explaining how man is 
part of political society, without reducing him to a “mere part.”  
The objection against the description of man as part of the political community 
does not hold up to sustained analysis. The objection overlooks Thomas’s analogous use 
of the terms part and whole. He never says that man is a part of the political community 
in the same way that the hand is part of the human body. Man is part of the political 
community by belonging to the political order, an order created by reason. The human 
person (a substantial whole) is part of this community (an accidental whole), but not 
according to all that he is and has. Man’s final goal surpasses the political order, but does 
not erase it. 
 
E Fifth Objection: The Political Common Good is a Merely Instrumental Good 
The second sort of difficulty that modern thinkers often have with Thomas’s view 
of the common good is his insistence that the political common good is a true good 
(bonum honestum): neither a collection of individual goods nor simply a means to the 
good of the individual. Like other pre-modern thinkers, Thomas supposes that the 
purpose of government is to make men good, to promote happiness through inculcating 
virtue: “Legislators make men virtuous by habituating them to virtuous works by means 
of statutes, rewards, and punishment.”72  
Modern political thought, on the other hand, tends to see the political common 
good as an instrumental good. That is, the good that political life seeks is a means to the 
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good of individuals. The role of government is to provide the conditions in which men 
can pursue their individual good. Since the political good is a means to individual goods, 
legislators cannot—and should not try—to make men good. Virtue is a matter for 
individuals to pursue; the state does best by not getting in the way of individuals’ pursuit 
of virtue. Thus, the objection says that political common good is merely an instrumental 
good, which is directed toward the good of individuals. An instrumental good cannot be a 
greater good than its end, and so the common good is not greater than the individual 
good. 
 
Response to the Fifth Objection 
In response to the objection that the political common good can be no more than 
an instrumental good, we must first observe that there are two kinds of “instrumentalist” 
views of the common good. One kind (I will call it the liberal view) assumes no content 
to the human good and leaves it entirely to individuals to determine (or create?) the good 
they will pursue. The only limits are in how the individual will pursue his chosen end: he 
may not do so in a way that prevents other individuals from pursuing their ends. Public 
authority remains agnostic about human nature itself, and about what end or ends, if any, 
are appropriate to man. Some take the liberal instrumentalist view of the common good 
as the only reasonable approach to the common good. Others see it as a necessary 
compromise in a pluralistic community. In a community made up of persons with 
fundamentally diverse views of the human good, there can be no consensus about how to 
promote this good. The best we can hope for, in this view, is that the government of such 
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a society will remove barriers to individuals or group pursuit of their goods (or prevent 
them from arising). This is achieved through entering into a contract or agreement, in 
which each member agrees to restrict his own activities in pursuit of his private good, in 
order to guarantee that others will likewise restrict their activities, so that one person’s 
pursuit of his good will not impinge on others’ pursuit of their goods.  
The second kind of instrumentalism (I will call it the ontological view) 
presupposes that there is a common human nature and that this nature is fulfilled only in 
certain ways. Representative of this view is the twentieth century Thomist I. Th. 
Eschmann: “The common good has a relative and limited pre-eminence in via utilitatis, 
because it is essentially a bonum utile, the highest bonum utile, but nothing more.”73 This 
is also the view that seems to be affirmed in Gaudium et spes (n. 26), the Vatican II 
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, which describes the common good as 
“the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual 
members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment.” 
The role of the political order, in this view, is to produce conditions in which the 
end, human fulfillment, can be achieved. These conditions may include both the creation 
of opportunities by things like roads and systems for transporting water and energy, as 
well as constraints on behavior through force. Not only are some ends ruled out in this 
view, but some means are also ruled out as incompatible with the end. In this view, good 
government presupposes some knowledge (not perfect knowledge) of human nature and 
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the human good. A partial view of the human good is sufficient to foster the conditions in 
which that good can be achieved.  
The liberal instrumentalist view is fundamentally at odds with Aquinas’s view of 
human action. For Aquinas, human activity (all activity, in fact) presupposes an end. And 
common activity seems to presuppose a common end. If, as Aquinas says, human activity 
is specified by its object, which is the end willed as the reason for willing the means. 
Common human activity—if we mean more than just the fact that two agents happen to 
be doing the same thing—requires a common end. A common end is a common cause of 
action. That is, the agents share the same end, which provides the reason for willing the 
means. From this perspective, it is difficult to make sense of the idea of a group of 
individuals united in a common activity, which has no one end, where each individual 
acts for his own end.  
In fact, the idea of an ends-neutral view of the common good is inconsistent. The 
liberal instrumentalist view claims not to rely on any determinate end of man, yet it rules 
out the pursuit of ends that cannot be achieved without such means as murder, theft, and 
slavery (for instance, the goal of becoming a dictator). If the exclusion of these ends is 
not simply arbitrary, it must be that even the liberal view presupposes something about 
human well-being: for instance, that it includes bodily integrity, the ability to 
communicate freely with others, some amount of self-determination in choice of work, 
spouse, residence, etc. Put another way, without some knowledge of what the human 
good is (or at least some knowledge of what it is not), one cannot determine what 
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conditions will allow men to pursue their individual goods. Conditions necessarily limit 
possibilities, and they limit them in view of some end. 
The ontological instrumentalist view, on the other hand, rules out some ends and 
means on the basis of a limited knowledge of the human good. This view does not claim 
to be neutral about the human good. Yet it differs from Thomas’s view in its rejection of 
the claim that the aim of politics is to make men good. The aim is rather to create the 
conditions in which men can become good. Yet when we look at what Thomas means by 
making men good, the distinction between these views begins to collapse.  
When Thomas says, “legislators make men virtuous,”74 he does not mean that the 
legislator is the efficient cause of virtue in those subject to the law. Virtue is an internal 
disposition in the agent, from which virtuous acts proceed. Rather, “Legislators make 
men virtuous by habituating them to virtuous works by means of statutes, rewards, and 
punishments. Such ought to be the aim of every legislator—in fact he who does not 
succeed in this fails in lawmaking.”75 The legislator can exhort men to virtue, and he can 
use force to induce them to perform certain acts in accord with virtue. By repeating such 
acts, the legislator hopes that subjects will become accustomed to doing what is noble 
and avoiding what is base. Virtue arises from the repetition of voluntary, virtuous acts; 
when virtuous acts do become habitual and pleasant, moral virtue has been achieved.  
Good laws, then, provide the occasion for virtuous acts; they make it easier for 
men to become good, by making virtue appealing and vice repulsive. They support and 
add to paternal force, as Aristotle says. To make virtue easier is to make it easier for men 
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to achieve their good. But this is just to create the conditions in which men can achieve 
their good, which is what the ontological instrumentalist view maintains. There may be 
significant differences between the pre-modern view and the instrumentalist view about 
what those conditions are, but both views seem to aim at “making men good” by 
producing conditions in which men can attain virtue. A good community is one that 
makes its citizens good, where “makes” is understood as makes the conditions in which 
they can more easily become good, especially good in their relationships with others (i.e., 
just). A good community would make it easier for parents to nourish and educate their 
children, by offering sufficient wages and reasonable working hours. It would make it 
easier for spouses to be faithful to their marriage, by the regulation of pornography, 
prostitution, and divorce (perhaps even contraceptives). It would make it easier for all to 
seek the truth by supporting the work of universities and libraries, and easier to worship 
God by allowing laborers time off on holy days. None of these efforts will guarantee 
virtue, but only make it more possible. 
 For Thomas, virtue itself cannot properly be the end of law. The end of law is the 
common good. Virtue is a good common in predication only, and not common in 
causation (see Chapter III). The political common good is a good common in causation; 
otherwise, it would make no sense to say that anyone seeks it. This good is not virtue 
itself, but the just and peaceful civil order, which is necessary for the formation and 
exercise of virtue. Legislators and rulers aim at virtue, in that they aim at one of the 
necessary conditions for virtue (they also need to possess virtue, in order to create the 
conditions for its growth).  
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One of the most obvious ways that civil law fosters virtue is by punishing vice. 
Human law should not repress every vice, Thomas tells us, “but only the more grievous 
vices … and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which 
human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such 
like.”76 Nor should human law prescribe every act of virtue, “but only in regard to those 
that are ordainable to the common good … whereby the citizens are directed in the 
upholding of the common good of justice and peace.”77 Thus, government can only make 
men good in an indirect way, by creating the conditions of justice and peace. Virtue is 
more easily acquired in a society that is well-ordered and not at war with its neighbors. 
So it seems that for Thomas, the common good is in fact an instrumental good. Yet 
Thomas also maintains that the part is for the sake of the whole. If the common good is 
an instrumental good, how can it be greater than, prior to, even more “divine” than the 
individual’s good, which is undoubtedly a true good?78 
The answer is that the common good is both a true good and an instrumental good 
in Thomas’s view. Civil order is a true good, but it is also means to other goods, moral 
virtue and human happiness. The objection was that since the political common good is 
merely an instrumental good, it cannot be greater than the good at which it aims, which is 
the individual good. The common good is a true good, Thomas maintains, and as such it 
surpasses individual goods in the same genus: “The common good takes precedence of 
the private good, if it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good is better 
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generically.”79 The good that political society seeks is a temporal good—the highest 
temporal good, which takes precedence over the temporal goods of individuals. 
Considered as a means to virtue and happiness in individual, however, the political 
common good is an instrumental good. It is a means to a good of a different order, 
another genus altogether. For we cannot forget that the good of human happiness, for 
Thomas, is an eternal, divine good. 
 In summary, both kinds of objections to Thomas’s view of the common good are 
based on misrepresentations of that view. The whole-part objection attributes an 
“organicist” view of the state to Thomas, which he does not hold. It ignores his 
distinction between substantial and accidental wholes. Individual persons are part of that 
whole, Thomas says, but they also have an eternal destiny that surpasses the political 
common good. The second objection fails to understand the role of government in 
fostering virtue in Aquinas’s view. For him, there is no contradiction between 
maintaining that the political common good is a true good and maintaining that it is a 
means to individual human happiness.  
 
F Sixth Objection: Intentional Killing Is Always Evil 
 
In articulating this last and most far-reaching objection to Aquinas’s account, I 
draw on the work of Germain Grisez (sometimes joined by Russell Shaw or Joseph 
Boyle) and John Finnis. The main argument can be stated briefly. To kill a person 
intentionally is always to do evil. To execute a person is to kill a person intentionally. 
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Therefore to execute a person is to do evil. Since one must never do evil, even for the 
sake of a good end, CP is ruled out.  
Finnis and Grisez begin from a generally Thomistic starting point. Finnis, for 
example, describes his relationship to Aquinas’s thought, saying that his own work in 
moral theory “has employed principles which seemed to me to be substantially those 
employed by Aquinas …”80 But the “new natural law theory” of Finnis and Grisez differs 
in important ways from Aquinas, as Stephen Long comments: 
John Finnis—alongside his collaborator, and, in certain respects, doctrinal 
progenitor Germain Grisez—is known for propounding a philosophic account of 
the natural law. Hitherto his view have developed only in loose relation to the 
teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas. As Finnis notes, since 1965, “Grisez’s major 
writings have not claimed to be interpretations of Aquinas” so that St. Thomas’s 
work has served merely as “the point of departure for a freestanding philosophical 
treatment of ethical theory” upon which Grisez and Finnis have “collaborated 
extensively.” 
 
Finnis’s latest work—Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory—marks a 
departure from this “freestanding” theoretic work, and offers an interpretation of 
St. Thomas’s natural law doctrine congenial to the new natural law theory.81 
 
Grisez and Finnis acknowledge that their work differs in important ways from that of 
Thomas Aquinas. For instance, in the  book mentioned by Long (1998), Finnis says, 
There are some serious flaws in Aquinas’ thoughts about human society. A sound 
critique of them can rest on premisses he himself understood and articulated 
better, I think, than his philosophical masters Plato and Aristotle, and much better 
than Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the other makers of heirs of the Enlightenment.82 
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The defense of capital punishment is one of the flaws that Finnis sees in Aquinas’s 
teaching on human society. His comments and those of Grisez form an important 
objection to Aquinas’s account.  
Grisez first articulates the objection we are considering in his 1970 article 
“Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing,” where he argues that no one, 
whether a public authority or a private person, may lawfully intend the death of another 
person, for whatever reason.  
As for capital punishment, I think Thomas was right in holding that such killing is 
intentional.  The good effects, if any, are in other acts.  Since I do not accept the 
justifiability of intentional killing, I do not see how capital punishment can be 
justified.83 
 
This essay contains Grisez’s most thorough critique of Aquinas’s doctrine of CP, as a 
preliminary to the statement of his own position, which is that CP, since it is intentional 
killing, cannot be justified.84 Grisez reaffirms this position in some of his later writings:  
Capital punishment under modern circumstances clearly executes a proposal to 
kill someone as a means of punishment. However punishment is conceived—
whether as a restoration of the balance of justice or as deterrent—the death 
penalty cannot be carried out without killing in the strict sense. Hence this form of 
punishment is immoral. (1979)85 
 
Analysis of the action of capital punishment can only lead to the conclusion that a 
life is being taken precisely as a means to a remote good end: the deterrence of 
crime. (The same thing would apply to the argument that a particular person must 
be executed in order to prevent him from committing additional crimes in the 
future.) Since this is so, one must conclude that there is no ethical justification for 
capital punishment. (1980)86 
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Finnis also argues that CP involves the intent to kill, giving a more detailed treatment of 
Aquinas’s argument: 
To impose a sentence of capital punishment is, as Aquinas plainly says, to 
intend the death of the person executed. But sometimes he seems to be saying that 
a judge can impose a sentence of capital punishment without intending the 
convict’s death either as means or as end in any standard sense of ‘means’, ‘end’, 
or ‘intend’. Moreover, Aquinas’ general theory of punishment ([Finnis, Aquinas, 
section] VI.5) gives some support to this notion. To impose a penalty as a means 
of reforming or deterring the offender, or deterring potential offenders, or 
educating or encouraging the community, is necessarily to choose the restriction, 
pain, or loss (e.g. of life or limb) as a means to the desired end(s), i.e. as a 
proximate object within the whole proposal intended and adopted in choosing and 
executing the penalty. But when punishment is imposed precisely as retribution 
… it can seem plausible to say that what for the offender is a bad (the restriction, 
pain, or loss) is chosen by judge and executioner as a good—and not as a means 
to further good.…  
In punishment precisely as retribution, the restriction, pain, or other loss is 
chosen as the suppression of the offender’s will (which was indulged in the 
offense), and that suppression is not a mere means to some future good but rather 
is itself a good: the restoring of the order of justice disturbed in the offense. The 
choice to impose punishment is, then, ‘referred to’ the common good of justice, 
and as such is the choice of a good (and not of a bad as a means to that good).87 
 
In an earlier section, Finnis explains that for Thomas, “it is of the essence of punishments 
that they subject offenders to something contrary to their wills {contra voluntatum}.”88 
The offender is guilty of following his own will to excess, and therefore, in causing him 
to suffer something contrary to his will, “the order of just equality in relation to the 
offender is restored.”89 Therefore, in Thomas’s view, what the offender suffers is not a 
means to retribution, but itself constitutes the good of retribution. On the other hand, 
Thomas seems to deny that the end in punishing is the suffering of the offender. This 
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leads Finnis to say that Thomas “seems to be saying that a judge can impose a sentence 
of capital punishment without intending the convict’s death either as means or as end in 
any standard sense of ‘means’, ‘end’, or ‘intend’.”90 Yet Finnis nonetheless concludes: 
But at the end of the day, Aquinas himself rejects their [his arguments’] 
conclusion that imposing and carrying out capital punishment involves no intent 
to kill. At the very moment when he is most keenly focusing on the distinction 
between what is and is not included within intention in relation to actions foreseen 
to have a lethal outcome, he accepts that the executioner is ‘intending to kill 
{intendends hominem occidere}’[S.T. II-II, q. 64, a. 7] … [And] the question 
remains. Why is it justified to choose and intend to inflict death or other 
irreparable harm to the basic good of life and health, by way of punishment?91 
 
Grisez and Finnis’s objection rests on two premises: first, that all intentional killing is 
(morally) evil; second, that one may not do evil to achieve a good end. The first premise 
rests on the notion that there are certain absolute (exceptionless) moral norms.92 The 
exceptionless moral norms are negative norms that prohibit action against any of the 
basic human goods, such as human life, knowledge, of sociability. Under this theory, any 
“choice to destroy, damage, or impede” one of these basic human goods is an evil choice, 
a wrong.93 Killing destroys the good of human life. Therefore, the prohibition of killing is 
an exceptionless moral norm. This prohibition applies to intentional killing, say Finnis 
and Grisez, and CP is best described as intentional killing.94 Aquinas fails, Finnis argues, 
“to reply convincingly to the argument that capital punishment, since it involves the 
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intent to kill as a means, is ‘doing evil that good may come,’ i.e. the pursuit of a good end 
(the restoration of the order of justice) by inherently immoral means.”95  
The second premise, that one may not do evil to achieve a good end, is articulated 
in Grisez’s eighth “mode of responsibility” and in Finnis’s seventh “requirement of 
practical reasonableness.” Finnis’s seventh requirement of practical reasonableness is that 
“it is always unreasonable to choose directly against any basic value, whether in oneself 
or in one’s fellow human beings.”96 Similarly, Grisez’s eighth mode of responsibility 
“entirely rules out choices to kill”97:  
One should not be moved by a stronger desire for one instance of an intelligible 
good to act for it by choosing to destroy, damage, or impede some other instance 
of an intelligible good, whether that same one or another. This mode comes into 
play when one is tempted to do evil for the sake of good, adopt bad means to a 
good end.98 
 
In essence, Finnis and Grisez charge Aquinas with an internal inconsistency, since he 
maintains that one may not do evil that good may come, and yet he justifies doing evil 
(killing) in the case of CP.99  
 
Response to the Sixth Objection 
Finnis points out a puzzle in Aquinas’s thinking on CP: he says that the evil of 
punishment (in the case of CP, the death of the offender) is not the end that the one 
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punishing has in view.100 Nor is the death of the offender a means to some other end, if 
we are considering the punishment simply in its character of punishment. Yet it seems 
that if something is included neither in the end nor in the means, then it is not intended. 
But it seems absurd to say that in an execution, death is not intended. Therefore, Thomas 
seems to be saying that in CP, death is both intended and not intended.  
To resolve this puzzle, it will be helpful to review some distinctions articulated in 
Chapter II, in particular the distinctions between intention and volition, and between 
object and end. An end is that which is willed for its own sake. Willing in the strict sense, 
or volition, is an interior act of the will, whose term is the end. This movement of the will 
is toward the end simply, without regard to the means necessary to achieve that end.101 
Intention, on the other hand, is the act by which one wills the end as a reason for willing 
the means.102 The term of the act of intention is the object, which is distinguished from 
the end simply, in that it is the end-as-reason-for-willing-the-means.103  
Thomas, Finnis, and Grisez all affirm the premise that one may not do evil that 
good may come. They differ over the premise that all intentional killing is evil. Grisez 
and Finnis believe that this premise follows logically from Aquinas’s understanding of 
human acts. That is, death is an evil. One who wills evil has a bad will (moral badness). 
CP is willing the evil of death. Therefore, the one who punishes with death has a bad will. 
I argued in Chapter II that Thomas’s theory of human acts clearly distinguishes between 
the moral species of different kinds of killing. Precisely because of his understanding of 
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what specifies human acts, Thomas is able to argue that killing as punishment is a 
specifically different moral act than murder.  
To the person who suffers any evil, the destroying, damaging, or impeding of a 
good is an evil of punishment.104 Punishment is an evil, for the loss of a good is an evil 
for the one who suffers the loss.105 Fault, which is a lack in the operation of the will, is 
evil simply.106 The death penalty of course deprives the offender of the good of bodily 
life. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that Aquinas admits that CP is intentional 
killing,107 just as imprisonment is intentional confinement. CP is intentional killing in the 
sense that killing is included in the object.  
However, death itself is not the end of CP. Thomas maintains that it is not licit for 
any man to have the death of another man as his end simply. To will the death of another 
man, precisely as the death of this individual man, is sinful, he says.108 The moral species 
of an act, as we have seen, is determined by its object, what the agent intends. If the 
avenger intends chiefly to inflict pain on the offender, his act is morally bad. The 
avenger’s will should not “rest” (have its term) in the evil of the person being punished: 
Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the 
avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom 
he takes vengeance, and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: 
because to take pleasure in another’s evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to 
the charity whereby we are bound to love all men.… 
 
If, however, the avenger’s intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be 
obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned (for instance 
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that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others be not 
disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God honored), then vengeance may be 
lawful, provided other due circumstances be observed.109 
 
In just punishment, the avenger chiefly intends some good, and his act is good. This 
discussion of ends is about the remote ends of punishment (amendment, deterrence, etc.), 
and so it presupposes that the act of punishment is not already an act bad in its species.  
 In the object of CP, the death of the evildoer is a means, toward the end of 
redressing a disorder. This does not contradict the principle that one may not do evil that 
good may come. The principle is that one may not do evil (the evil of fault), not that one 
may not choose evil (the evil of punishment or natural evil). Choosing death (as a means) 
is not in itself doing evil. The phrase in itself is key: what it means is that simply 
choosing death is not sufficiently specified for us to make a moral judgment. We must 
know why and by whom and to whom and perhaps even how death was chosen. This is 
the analysis that Thomas does in q. 64 of the Secunda Secundae. If death is not only 
chosen but willed, that is, not only the means but the end, then the act is unlawful, as 
Thomas says in the above passage on vengeance.  
If we reject Thomas’s distinction between death as punishment and murder, we 
will have difficulty justifying other forms of punishment. Finnis asks, “Why is it justified 
to choose and intend to inflict death or other irreparable harm to the basic good of life 
and health, by way of punishment?”110 The significance of the adjective irreparable is 
unclear, since according to Finnis, any choice to destroy, damage, or impede a basic good 
is in itself an evil act (destroying may imply irreparable harm, but damaging and 
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impeding do not). It seems, for instance, that according to Finnis’s view of basic goods, 
starving a person for a few days would be evil, even if the person recovered his health 
afterwards. Perhaps Finnis focuses on irreparable harm because he wants to exclude 
punishments like death and maiming, but not other forms of punishment, like 
imprisonment.  
In the classical view articulated by Aquinas, all punishment deprives the rational 
subject of some good (if not actually destroying, then at least damaging or impeding that 
good). Finnis tries to get around this problem by distinguishing between a choice that 
entails the loss of a basic good, and a choice to destroy, damage, or impede a basic 
good.111 An example of the former would be the choice of martyrdom, in which the loss 
of bodily life is accepted in the pursuit of the basic good of religion. But punishment is a 
different case, since it involves not simply accepting the loss of a good, but actively 
depriving someone of a good.  
The death penalty is a particularly clear instance of depriving someone of a good, 
but the punishment of imprisonment suggests a similar problem for the New Natural Law 
theorists. The good of practical reasonableness is “the basic good of being able to bring 
one’s own intelligence to bear effectively (in practical reasoning that issues in action) on 
the problems of choosing one’s actions and lifestyle and shaping one’s own character.”112 
But one’s ability to choose his own actions and lifestyle is severely limited by being 
imprisoned. Therefore, to imprison someone is to act against the basic good of practical 
reasonableness—not destroying it, but certainly impeding it. Therefore, it would seem 
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that Finnis ought to hold that intentionally to imprison a man is intrinsically evil, just as 
intentionally to kill a man is intrinsically evil. Grisez faces the same problem. He says 
that “if no human society is complete, if civil society is merely one form of community 
with limited concerns, then it is by no means clear that men associated in states may 
rightly kill wrongdoers to protect the common good if such killing would be morally 
forbidden to individuals.”113 Neither is it clear then why the state may imprison 
wrongdoers, when this “would be morally forbidden to individuals.” But Grisez and 
Finnis presumably do not deny the rightness of imprisoning, fining, or in general 
punishing wrongdoers—only of inflicting death.  
When we look at how Thomas treats the question of imprisonment, we find that 
his position is entirely consistent with his treatment of the death penalty.  
In the goods of the body three things may be considered in due order. First, the 
substantial integrity of the body, and this is injured by death or maiming. 
Secondly, pleasure or rest of the senses, and to this striking or anything causing a 
sense of pain is opposed. Thirdly, the movement or use of the members, and this 
is hindered by binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention.  
 
Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man, unless it be done 
according to the order of justice, either in punishment, or as a measure of 
precaution against some evil.114  
 
Freedom of movement and use of one’s members is one of the bodily goods that belong 
to man because of his free will. Imprisoning an innocent man is therefore evil in itself. 
Imprisoning the guilty and imprisoning the innocent are different moral species, just as 
CP and murder are different moral species. Imprisoning a wrongdoer is not evil in itself, 
because, as Thomas replies to an objection, “A man who abuses the power entrusted to 
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him deserves to lose it, and therefore when a man by sinning abuses the free use of his 
members, he becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment.”115 But does this mean that “it 
would be lawful for anyone to put a man in prison,” as the third objection suggests? 
Thomas’s reply is that while  
[i]t is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a time from doing some unlawful 
deed there and then: as when a man prevents another from throwing himself over 
a precipice, or from striking another. But to him alone who has the right of 
disposing in general of the actions and of the life of another does it belong 
primarily to imprison or fetter, because by so doing he hinders him from doing 
not only evil but also good deeds.116 
 
This distinction is parallel to the distinction between self-defense and CP. In self-defense, 
the private person does not intend to kill the evildoer, but only to prevent him from 
killing. Similarly, the private person who restrains another from an immanent evil does 
not intend to imprison the man, but to prevent him doing an evil. If he intended to 
imprison the man (i.e., to punish him by confining him, rather than to prevent an evil act), 
then the private person would be acting unlawfully, just as the man who intended to kill 
in self-defense would act unlawfully. Only the public official has the power to imprison 
and to kill intentionally.  
The example of imprisonment shows that what is really at stake in this objection 
is not only the legitimacy of the death penalty, but the legitimacy of civil punishment in 
general. If we cannot use innocence and guilt to distinguish moral species of acts with the 
same physical description, then there is no basis for distinguishing punishment from other 
kinds of harming. Thomas avoids this absurdity by admitting that all punishment inflicts 
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an evil on someone, depriving him of some good. But the evil of punishment is not an 
evil act (a fault); moral goodness is determined by the object of the act: what the agent 
does, rather than what the patient suffers. The object of punishment is to redress a 
disorder produced by an offense. Intentionally causing an evil (punishment) is different 
that intentionally doing an evil (fault). While it is always wrong to do evil, it is not 
always wrong to cause evil. To punish an evildoer with death is intentionally to cause an 
evil as a means for the end of a just order.  
In summary, inflicting the punishment of death is not doing evil that good may 
come, any more than imprisoning a man is doing evil that good may come. It is true that 
for Thomas, death and imprisonment are both evils, but to inflict an evil is not the same 
as to do evil. It is possible to deny this distinction between evils of fault and evils of 
punishment, but it does not seem that Finnis, Grisez, and most others who make this 
objection, actually want to deny the distinction. Rather, it seems that they are unwilling to 
apply it to the evil of death because of its final character. 
 
G Conclusion 
 
 As I pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, these are not the only 
conceivable philosophical objections one might make to Thomas’s account of capital 
punishment. For instance, the objections I have considered take for granted the idea that 
punishment is due to evil, a central tenet of Thomas’s account, as we saw in Chapter I. In 
this view, punishment is a part of justice. Certainly there are other views of punishment. 
One evaluates punishment purely in terms of utility, as noted above. In this view, 
  226
punishment is a means to happiness, whether the happiness of the offender himself or of 
others. In this view, punishment loses its specific nature and even to continue to use the 
term is somewhat deceptive. It is not a matter of whether this or that act is a good 
punishment. Each act must be considered according to whether it contributes to 
happiness, whether we call it punishment or rehabilitation or education. In the 
Benthamite view of punishment, we see evidence that Thomas’s ethics is not a utilitarian 
ethics in spite of its emphasis on happiness. A more extensive comparison is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
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Chapter V: Conclusion and Application 
A Summary 
I have argued in this thesis that according to Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on 
punishment, the death penalty is a legitimate but not a necessary form of punishment. I 
began in Chapter I by examining Thomas’s view of punishment in general. The 
philosophical problem of punishment is how acts otherwise bad are good when used as 
punishments. Thomas resolves this puzzle in his characteristic way, by making some 
distinctions. Evil in general, he says, must be understood as the privation of a particular 
good. Evil exists in a rational nature in two ways: the privation of a good belonging to its 
nature (punishment) or the privation of a good belonging to its operation (fault). 
Punishment, the privation of some good belonging to the agent, is evil in a certain 
respect, while fault, which is a privation in the proper operation of the will, is evil simply. 
More precisely, Thomas defines punishment as an evil suffered by an agent, contrary to 
his will, on account of some fault. 
Yet this does not entirely solve the problem. Thomas admits that to deprive 
another of some good is to harm him, but to harm someone seems to be to do evil. How 
then is punishment not also fault? Here we looked at Thomas’s view of human action. 
Briefly, not all acts of harming are bad acts. The fact that a kind of harm is inflicted as 
punishment enters the specification of the act itself. Thus, when he says that “it is 
unlawful to do a person a harm, except by way of punishment in the cause of justice”1 he 
is not asserting a precept and then making an exception in the case of punishment. 
                                                 
1
 S.T. II-II, q. 65, a. 2. 
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Rather, he is distinguishing between two different kinds of acts (different moral species) 
which happen to look the same (same natural species).  
In order to see why acts of punishment are specifically different from acts with 
the same external description, I addressed Thomas’s positive account of punishment. 
Punishment is an act of the virtue of justice, specifically of vengeance, the virtue annexed 
to justice that moderates man’s natural inclination to seek revenge. It is part of 
rectificatory justice; it rectifies the inequality produced by the offense. Thomas describes 
this rectification in terms of order. Someone who has acted against a specific order, such 
as the civil order, is guilty of a kind of overreaching because he has taken more than his 
due. Punishment redresses this inequality by taking something from the offender. This 
process can also be explained in terms of order. Every evil act is a disordered act, and 
punishment attempts to restore the order which has been disrupted. Thus, Thomas 
describes the object of an act of punishment as the restoration of order through depriving 
the offender of some good.  
This is not a case of choosing an evil means for a good end. Punishment itself 
addresses disorder or rectifies inequality, without reference to any further end that might 
be achieved through punishment, such as deterrence. That acts of punishing are not only 
specifically different from other types of harming, but that they are in fact specifically 
good acts is not something that Thomas attempts to prove by a deductive argument. 
Rather, he refers us to a natural inclination. This is decisive for him because no natural 
inclination is an evil inclination. Given the natural human inclination to revenge wrongs, 
vengeance must be good. This point is easily obscured by frequent abuses of the 
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inclination, and sounds remarkably odd to the modern ear. Yet human societies make use 
of punishment as if it is just and good. Those who reject the idea of natural inclinations or 
reject the goodness of natural inclinations must find some other way to justify the 
practice of inflicting harm on those who have violated the civil order, or else give up the 
right to punish. 
It is accurate to say that Thomas has a retributive theory of punishment, but this 
statement needs qualification. The specifically penal quality (retribution) defines 
punishment as punishment. But acts of punishment may also serve remote ends, 
especially deterrence. In fact, civil punishments must serve remote ends. He calls human 
punishments medicinal punishments to distinguish them from eternal punishments, which 
are perfectly retributive. Human punishments are imperfectly retributive (if they were not 
retributive they would not be punishment), but they use retribution insofar as it is useful 
to the common good.   
Thomas’s actual treatment of CP is brief, as we saw in Chapter II. The major 
source for this teaching is S.T. II-II, q. 64, a. 2. Although he cites the Book of Exodus as 
an authority for his teaching, Thomas does not argue that the Mosaic judicial code still 
obtains. His primary argument for the legitimacy of CP is a philosophical rather than a 
theological argument. He argues in q. 64 that the political community has the power to 
inflict death on those evildoers who threaten its existence. This power is based on the 
relationship of individual to community as a relationship of part to whole. The individual 
man is a part of the political community. It is true of any whole that it is prior to and 
greater than its parts and that the parts are for the sake of the whole. This is an instance of 
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the more general principle that the imperfect is for the sake of the perfect. Thomas 
compares the political community to another kind of whole, a living body. He does not 
mean to imply that the state is an organism or a substance, something he explicitly denies 
elsewhere. Rather, he considers both cases to fall under the principle of the priority of the 
whole to its parts, a principle which is true of all wholes (substantial or accidental) and 
which is known through simple apprehension.  
Thomas justifies the use of CP in q. 64, but he also implies there that CP is a last 
resort, like amputating a limb, a measure to be undertaken only when no other course will 
serve the good of the whole. When necessary for the good of the community, it is within 
the community’s power to execute an evildoer. But this question does not tell us whether 
besides being legitimate, CP is also necessary. For this we needed to take a broader view 
of Thomas’s thought on law, especially on the derivation of human laws from natural 
law. Thomas maintains that some human laws are particular determinations of natural 
law, which have only the force of human law. Other human laws are derived from natural 
law as conclusions from premises, and these have the force of natural law. The natural 
law contains a precept that punishment is due to sin. Specific punishments are derivations 
from this precept in the first way: determinations that have the force of human law but 
not of natural law. Thus, punishments will vary from one time and place to another. 
Yet changing laws is not usually a good idea, in this view, because custom is a 
great aid in promoting respect for the law. Frequent changes corrupt custom, and thereby 
diminish respect for law in general, even if the changes are valid. Therefore, human laws 
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should  be changed when there is a significant good to be obtained or a significant evil to 
be avoided, but not otherwise.  
For Thomas, punishments are determined by considering equality and utility, as 
well as custom. The just judge (or lawmaker) takes into account these particulars as he 
determines how to punish a specific crime. He tries to achieve an equality between 
offense and punishment, in that the evildoer suffers an evil of like severity to the evil he 
inflicted on another. He seeks the good of the community, and looks for the punishment 
that will best serve that good. He also takes the state of custom into account, choosing 
among those punishments which are customarily inflicted in his society. For Thomas, the 
utility of the punishment sometimes takes precedence over the equity of the punishment. 
That is, the preferable punishment is sometimes one that is greater or lesser than what is 
strictly proportional to the offense.  
CP is an equitable punishment for crimes which deprive another of life (murder) 
or which threaten the lives of all by threatening the existence of the state (treason). It is 
useful for the common good only when nothing else can be done for the good of the 
community. Even evildoers are potentially contributors to the common good. If another 
punishment is available, one that will protect the community’s good in the present and 
leave open the possibility of the evildoer’s future contribution to the common good, such 
a punishment is better for the common good. In temporal punishments, we have seen, the 
utility or medicinal quality is always a goal. Human punishments use retribution to serve 
the common good, rather like a physician uses a potentially deadly instrument to treat 
wounds—with great caution. 
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Since in this view, determination of punishments is always done with reference to 
the common good, we had to consider the common good in Thomas’s thought and in 
particular, the nature of the political common good. In Chapter III, I explored Thomas’s 
conception of the political community as a whole. A whole, properly speaking, is 
something with unity of form. The form that unites a whole may be accidental or 
substantial. The political community is united by an accidental form: the political order 
(whether monarchial, aristocratic, or democratic) is the unifying form of this whole. 
Every whole is prior to its parts as a complete reality and in (formal and final) causality. 
The political community does not aim at perfect unity, but at the kind of unity proper to 
an accidental whole: the unity of order. 
Understanding the political community as an accidental whole helps us 
understand why Thomas cannot maintain an organic view of the state. But since 
substantial wholes are more obviously wholes and more truly one than accidental wholes, 
we more easily understand in such cases how the good of parts is subordinate to the good 
of the whole. So he uses the living body as an illustration of the relation of parts to the 
whole. Insofar as something is a part of a whole—whether substantial or accidental—its 
good is subordinate to the good of the whole. This is implied in the nature of the part-
whole relationship. But the parts are only subordinate to the whole insofar as they are 
parts. If the whole is an accidental whole and its parts are substances, then the parts also 
exist for themselves. This is the case with the political whole. Thus Thomas says that 
man is part of the state but not according to all that he is and has. 
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Since the good has the nature of an end, the good of the community is the end or 
final cause of the community. The good of the whole is prior to the good of the parts; the 
common good is prior as a cause because it extends to more effects. The political good is 
not an individual or private good, but it is not thereby a good that is foreign to the 
individual. In fact, the political common good is a proper good of the individual because 
it is a good that is perfective of him. In loving the common good above his own good, the 
individual is perfected as a human individual. For this reason, because love of the 
common good is perfective of man as a social being, Thomas says that it is natural for 
man to prefer the common good to his private good.  
This is not to say, however, that all men do prefer the common good to their own 
goods. The inclination to serve the common good, when found in a rational being, may be 
acted upon or not. While brute animals instinctually act so as to further the good of the 
species, man must be trained to do this, as he must be trained to act in regard to other 
natural inclinations, such as those regarding food. Those who have acquired the virtue of 
loving the common good are capable of sacrificing even their lives for this good.  
Yet we are concerned not primarily with those who willingly sacrifice themselves 
for the common good, but with those who present a threat to that good. While the law has 
human happiness as an extrinsic end, its intrinsic end is the order that constitutes the 
political common good. Laws are not made for the end of one or another individual’s 
good, but for this good that can be shared. When there is a conflict between an 
individual’s good and the common good, law acts for the common good. In an extreme 
case, the common good may be achievable in no other way than by the complete removal 
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of one of the members. This is only the case with an evildoer, since good persons benefit 
the common good, and only with an evildoer who threatens grave harm to the 
community, which can be alleviated in no other way. In such cases, the death penalty is a 
legitimate recourse.  
In this case, punishment does for the vicious man by force what a virtuous man 
would do for himself by a deliberate choice: it directs him to the common good. It is in 
this sense that the evildoer becomes like a beast. All living things have a nature, which is 
an internal principle of movement. But man acts as an external principle of movement, 
directing the lower animals to his purposes (food, clothing, carrying burdens, etc.).2 In 
this way, the lower animals serve the good of man, not ordering themselves to this end, 
but being ordered to it by an external agent. Similarly, Thomas says, the evildoer is 
ordered to an end by an external agent instead of ordering himself to that end; he “falls 
into the slavery of the beasts, so that he may be ordered to what is useful for others.”3 Yet 
he does not lose his human nature. Since beasts are by nature for the sake of man, a beast 
can be killed for the good of one man. But one man is not by nature for the sake of 
another man, so no private person may kill an evildoer, since “a man who has sinned is 
not by nature distinct from good men.”4 He may, however, be killed for the good of the 
community, which is to say, ordered toward the common good, which is really his proper 
good, though he does not voluntarily seek it.  
                                                 
2
 That the earth was made for man is revealed in Genesis, but is also accessible to reason, according to 
Thomas: since the imperfect is for the perfect, non-rational animals exist for rational animals.  
3
 S.T. II-II, q. 64, a. 2, ad 3. 
4
 S.T. II-II, q. 64, a. 3, ad 2. 
  235
In responding to objections to Thomas’s account of CP, I chose those objections 
which share some of his basic premises, but take issue with a certain point of the 
application of a principle. I argued that his defense of the death penalty for heresy was 
consistent with the nature of the mediaeval political order, in which heresy was a crime 
against the civil order, similar to treason. In response to the objection that CP is not 
useful, I argued that while Thomas does consider the utility of punishment for the 
common good, this consideration is only possible where punishment is already justified 
in response to an evil. Where there are equitable alternatives to CP, however, and where 
CP is not necessary to the common good, the alternatives are in fact preferable in his 
view. I also addressed the objection that in Thomas’s view CP would be necessary in 
order to achieve equity for certain crimes. I argued that this view is not compatible with 
Thomas’s view that things derived from the natural law by way of determination have 
only the force of human law. For Thomas, temporal punishments always seek a medicinal 
end. Nor does he say that the medicinal end is the manifestation of a transcendent norm 
of divine justice, as one interpreter has claimed. If Thomas had used such a phrase, he 
would more likely have used it of eternal punishment, and not of temporal punishment. 
I considered two objections to Thomas’s account of the common good, as it 
affects his theory of CP. The first finds fault with his portrayal of the person as a part of 
the civil whole. It is true that if the part-whole relationship does not obtain between man 
and the state, his defense of CP does not stand. Thomas takes it as evident that individual 
persons are parts of the civil whole. He then applies the priority of the whole to the part 
to this specific instance. Thomas clearly maintains, on the other hand, that man’s final 
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end is a supernatural end, which surpasses the whole political order. Being of a different 
genus, this end is incommensurable with the political common good, and cannot be 
subordinated to it. The temporal good of the individual is not suppressed in being 
subordinated to the political common good. Rather, the individual achieves his own 
temporal good most fully in preferring the political common good, and that common 
good in turn serves his eternal good.  
The second common good objection claims that the political common good 
cannot be prior to the good of individuals because it is instrumental to those goods. From 
the previous response, we can say that in one way this is true. The political common 
good, which is a temporal good, is a lesser good than the final good of one man. The 
political common good is a just civil order. This civil order is a means toward the 
happiness of individuals, because it provides the conditions in which men can seek their 
final end. But it does not follow that the political common good is purely instrumental. It  
is good in itself, though it is not the highest good.  
The final objection was that Thomas has no answer to the charge that inflicting 
the punishment of death is doing evil that good may come. But he does have an answer to 
this charge, which lies in the specific character of acts of punishing. For, he says, to 
suffer an evil is not the same as to do evil: this is the basic distinction between fault and 
punishment, on which his theory of punishment relies. In punishment, an evil is suffered, 
but an act of justice is done. An analysis of the act of punishing with death leads to the 
following conclusion: the agent does intend the death of the evildoer, but death is not the 
end of his volition. Acts of punishment are specifically different acts than acts of harming 
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that are externally the same. This difference is not only the basis for accepting CP, but for 
accepting all kinds of punishments and other public acts: fining is not stealing, 
imprisoning is not kidnapping.  
 
B Application of the Thomistic Theory of CP to a Contemporary Case 
Thomas’s own analysis remains at a very general level, since his aim is provide 
the principles according to which such an analysis can be made. It has not been my aim in 
this thesis to apply his principles to a specific social/political situation. Such an 
undertaking would be worthwhile, but could not be conducted before we were clear about 
those principles. In this last section, I would like to cite a recent example of someone 
applying the Thomistic principles (without calling them Thomistic) to a specific time and 
place. 
Philosopher Robert Spaemann, writing in 1970, makes some astute observations 
about the death penalty, in which he addresses the equity, utility, and the customary 
status of the penalty in West Germany.5 The post-war constitution in West Germany 
contained an article abolishing the death penalty.6 Spaemann notes that the abuse of the 
death penalty under the Third Reich was one of the motivating factors for this 
prohibition. At the time of the passing of this constitution (1949), minor Nazi war 
criminals were still being prosecuted, and some Germans thought these men ought to be 
pardoned rather than executed. This may have been at least part of the reason why Hans-
                                                 
5
 Robert Spaemann, “Todesstrafe” (1970), in Grenzen zur Ethischen Dimension des Handelns: 440-448. 
6
 Article 102: “Die Todesstrafe ist abgeschafft.” (The death penalty is abolished.) Grundgesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
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Christoph Seebohm, head of the conservative Deutschen Partei, proposed abolition of the 
death penalty. Not long after the abolition, attempts were made to bring back the death 
penalty, even by the same party which had brought the measure to vote.7 The debate over 
the death penalty evidently was not over in 1970, when Spaemann reflected on the 
reasons for and against reinstating capital punishment in West Germany.  
Spaemann begins by setting the terms of the debate. In questions of practical 
concern, he says, both sides must present reasons, but it is essential to know who has the 
burden of proof. Spaemann argues that the burden of proof lies with the one “who wants 
to change something from an existing state.”8 This seems to be another way of stating 
Aquinas’s presumption against the changing of laws. Any change in law, even a good 
change, tends to corrupt respect for law.9 Therefore, those who want to change a law 
must make a compelling case for some great good to be obtained or some great evil to be 
avoided. Of course, this presumes that the existing law is not inherently unjust (and 
therefore not a law at all, in Thomas’s view). Where the death penalty is not in use, those 
who wish to reinstate it must either show the inherent injustice of the existing law, or 
bear the burden of showing the good to be obtained by reinstating.  
On the other hand, Spaemann notes, advocates of CP claim that the burden of 
proof in fact lies with the abolitionists, since abolition represents a deviation from human 
tradition, man’s “spontaneous feelings of justice” (spontanen Gerechtigkeitsgefühls) and 
                                                 
7
 Spaemann, 440. 
8
 “… derjenige, der an einem bestehenden Zustand etwas ändern will, dies begrunden muß.” Spaemann, 
441. 
9
 S.T. I-II, q. 97, a. 2. 
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the majority conviction.10 If public opinion was the deciding factor, the case would have 
been clear, since in 1949, and for at least a decade after, polls showed that a majority 
supported the death penalty for murder.11 But while Spaemann affirms the importance of 
considering public sentiment, he also argues that the feelings of the people cease to be 
sound if they defy reason.12 As Thomas would say, custom has the force of law only 
insofar as it is good, and evil customs ought to be changed by law.13  
Spaemann describes the rational basis for public sentiment in favor of the death 
penalty, which bears on its equity as a punishment for crimes of murder. The first duty of 
civil society is the protection of the lives of its citizens, but we feel instinctively that the 
murderer by his act has forfeited his right to this protection, that on account of his crime, 
his life “stands at the disposal” of the state.14 Spaemann notes that this was exactly the 
case in mediaeval Germanic law, in which a murderer was banished from society, and no 
longer protected by that society from anyone who wanted to kill him. He was truly an 
outlaw: outside of the law and the protection enjoyed by those under the law; thus, he 
could be robbed or killed without penalty.15 The life of the murderer is at the disposal of 
the state.  
Yet to assert this is not to assert that the state is obliged to take the murderer’s 
life.16 This is where the utility of the death penalty comes in. Spaemann argues that 
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 Spaemann, 441. 
11
 Charles Lang, “The Paradoxes of a Death Penalty Stance” Washington Post, Saturday, June 4, 2005. 
12
 Spaemann, 441. 
13
 S.T. I-II, q. 97, a. 3, ad 1. 
14
 Spaemann, 443: “Sein leben steht zur Disposition.” 
15
 Spaemann mentions this characteristic of mediaeval Germanic law, but it was not exclusive to Germanic 
peoples. See Walsh, The Thirteenth: Greatest of Centuries, 373. 
16
 Spaemann, 443. 
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besides the guilt of the murderer, there must be other compelling reasons to execute him. 
In other words, the fact that one man has killed another, or committed some equally 
serious wrong, is a necessary but not sufficient reason for claiming that he ought to be 
punished with death. Therefore, Spaemann goes on to consider whether there is an 
“additional good ground” for using the penalty.17 He does this by considering whether the 
elements of deterrence, reformation/rehabilitation, or atonement could provide a reason—
in addition to the justification which he has already laid out, which is based on the idea 
that the murderer has forfeited his right to life—to use the death penalty.  
Spaemann describes two kinds of deterrence with reference to CP: 
Spezialprävention, the deterrence of this particular evildoer from further killing, etc., and 
Generalprävention, the deterrence of other potential evildoers from committing evil acts. 
The death penalty is obviously effective in achieving the first kind of deterrence, but 
Spaemann suggests that the same end can be accomplished with equal effectiveness by 
life imprisonment.18 As to the second kind of deterrence, Spaemann thinks that if CP 
truly deters people from murdering, and therefore saves innocent lives, this will be a good 
ground for its use. After all, the first duty of the state is to protect its citizens. However, 
Spaemann points to the lack of statistical evidence supporting a correlation between the 
presence of the death penalty in a state and the rate of capital crimes. He suggests that the 
criminal probably does not consider whether he will receive a life term or death for his 
crime, but rather whether he can escape penalty altogether. The best deterrent, therefore, 
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 “Um ihn zu töten, bedürfte es eines zusätzlichen guten Grundes. Gibt es einen solchen?” Spaemann, 443. 
18
 Spaemann, 444. 
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is not a more severe penalty, but a good police force.19 Some have argued that the death 
penalty is at least necessary as a deterrent for violent acts by those already serving prison 
sentences. “On the contrary,” Spaemann suggests, “the tedium of confinement may well 
incite [such crimes] …”20 An increased term of imprisonment, solitary confinement, and 
deprivation of privileges may be equally or more effective as deterrents. Spaemann does 
not offer evidence that would answer this question, but merely another reason for 
questioning the utility of CP in comparison to other penalties. Since he places the burden 
of proof on one who would change the current penal law, the proponent of CP would 
have to supply evidence of the penalty’s superior deterrence. 
The motive of reform (Besserung) can mean the reintegration of the criminal into 
society (re-socialization) and it can mean the inner change in the criminal (conversion). 
The former is obviously ruled out by CP, but the latter may be promoted by it. 
Confrontation with death may be the occasion for conversion, though it may also been 
the occasion for despair, as Spaemann notes. However, the conversion of the criminal 
cannot be the primary end of capital punishment:  
The reforming effect can only originate in a threat of death, which does not have 
reformation directly as an end. Death may be expected as a fateful doom or as a 
just punishment, the expectation of which can change the man. But conversion 
will be made impossible, if it is made the end of the threat of punishment. Killing 
as a pedagogical measure is perverse.21 
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 Spaemann, 444. 
20
 Spaemann, 445. 
21
 “Die läuternde Wirkung kann nur ausgehen von einer Todesdrohung, die nicht unmittelbar diese 
Läuterung zum Zeil hat. Der Tod mag als schicksalhaftes Verhängnis oder als gerechte Strafe erwartet 
warden, die Todeserwartung kann den Menschen wandeln. Die Wandlung aber wird unmöglich gemacht, 
wenn sie zum Zweck der Todesdrohung gemacht wird. Die Tötung als pädagogische Maßnahme ist 
pervers.” Spaemann, 445. 
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Thomas treats the conversion of the criminal in a similar way when he addresses the 
objection that since it is just to kill sinners, sinners need not be loved. The death penalty, 
Thomas says, should be motivated by charity, but charity for the common good. It may 
also have the affect of helping the sinner to convert, but the common good and not the 
individual good justifies it: 
When, however, they [our friends] fall into very great wickedness, and become 
incurable, we ought no longer to show them friendliness. It is for this reason that 
both Divine and human laws command such like sinners to be put to death, 
because there is greater likelihood of their harming others than of their mending 
their ways. Nevertheless the judge puts this into effect, not out of hatred for the 
sinners, but out of the love of charity, by reason of which he prefers the public 
good to the life of the individual. Moreover the death inflicted by the judge profits 
the sinner, if he be converted, unto the expiation of his crime; and, if he be not 
converted, it profits so as to put an end to the sin, because the sinner is thus 
deprived of the power to sin any more.22  
 
Spaemann also considers the idea of atonement (Sühne) or penance (Buße) as 
determining the utility of the death penalty. Atonement refers to the idea that through 
punishment, the evildoer can make amends for his crime. This is associated with the idea 
of retribution, but it implies something more. Retribution simply means that the evildoer 
suffers something in response to evil he committed. Atonement implies that the evildoer 
accepts his punishment as a way of rectifying his relationship to society.  
Spaemann makes three claims about the notion of atonement as applied to CP. 
First, it requires belief in an afterlife and eternal justice.  If the criminal does not survive 
his punishment, then it cannot have an expiatory effect for him.23 Second, atonement is a 
Christian idea, tied to the belief that eternal justice is achieved (satisfaction is made for 
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 S.T. II-II, q. 25, a. 6, ad 2. 
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 Spaemann, 447. 
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all) by the death of Christ. Thus, St. Thomas can say that temporal punishment is not 
based on the principle of penance but on that of public welfare or the common good (this 
is the one reference to Aquinas in Spaemann’s article). Third, atonement is not an invalid 
motive in temporal punishment, “if the extent of punishment is entirely dictated from the 
viewpoint of the common good.” That is, atonement should play no role in determining 
punishment. Whether the punishment will in fact serve as expiation will depend on the 
one undergoing the punishment. If he accepts it as such, then it is expiatory. The 
penitentiary system creates the conditions in which a criminal may seek expiation, but in 
the end it depends on the individual offender.  
Finally, Spaemann notes that the criminal is never completely bad.  This does not 
mean that we should excuse him of his guilt, but neither should we place all the guilt of 
society on him. In removing him from our midst, society finds an easy alibi, saying with 
Cain, am I my brother’s keeper? Spaemann calls us rather to accept the task of being our 
brothers’ keepers, though this requires the expenditure of money and effort. This task will 
allow society “itself to perform the expiation, which the murderer owes his victim.”24 
Spaemann provides us with an example of applying the Thomistic criteria of 
utility, equity, and custom to the death penalty in a modern context. This kind of 
application is just the kind of political prudence that Thomas thinks should be exercised 
in determining specific punishments from the natural law, and could also be applied to 
the practice of CP in the United States. The situation in the U.S. is considerably more 
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complicated, given the variations in penal law from state to state. I will offer only the 
most general comments here, to indicate how such an analysis would proceed. 
The determination of a specific punishment must be equitable, Thomas says; that 
is, the severity of the penalty should correspond to the severity of the offense. Could 
equity be preserved without the death penalty? In the S.C.G., Thomas mentions the death 
penalty along with “perpetual exile” (exilium perpetuum) as equally fitting punishments 
for someone who offends against the state.25 Exile is not a practicable option in the 
modern world, but life-imprisonment is. The latter requires more effort and expense on 
the part of society, but it has the same effect of cutting off the offender from society, 
without denying him the chance of reform. If perpetual exile is a punishment comparable 
to death, then life-imprisonment is as well.  
Punishment must be useful to the common good; that is, it must serve the 
medicinal ends of punishment: protecting the members of society from harm and 
deterring others from evil. Is the good of a just social order achievable only through use 
of the death penalty? It seems not, since many murderers can and are imprisoned for life, 
effectively protecting the community from harm.26 Given such an alternative, it is 
difficult to see how CP could be necessary to the common good.27  
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 S.C.G. III, c. 144, n. 4. 
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 It is sometimes argued that CP is a necessary deterrent for crimes of murder committed in prison. would 
have to determine whether CP is an effective deterrent in such cases, and whether there are other ways of 
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Specific punishments must also conform to human custom. If abolishing the death 
penalty would violate accepted custom, this would be a reason in favor of retaining it. If, 
on the other hand, what once was customary is no longer so, then law should reflect this 
change in custom. In most states, CP is used infrequently, even where violent crimes are 
frequent.28 This suggests that the death penalty is no longer customary. The continued 
controversy surrounding CP is another indicator that this particular practice is not fully 
accepted by custom. 
 Clearly, much more work would need to be done to come to any definite 
conclusion about the state of this penalty in the United States today. Much of this is the 
province of political science, which examines the empirical data. Aquinas’s general 
principles for determining punishments could serve as a guide in interpreting and in 
making use of the vast quantity of empirical data in the field of penal law and practice.   
 
C The Value of the Teaching 
I began this thesis by asking why we should draw on the views of a mediaeval 
theologian to address the contemporary problem of capital punishment. The value of 
doing so will appear more readily to the Catholic philosopher or theologian, yet I think 
the account has wider relevance, as I indicated in the Introduction. I want to conclude by 
reflecting of the value of Aquinas’s natural law theory of punishment, using an essay of 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s called “Natural Law as Subversive: The Case of Aquinas.” This is 
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 The U.S. Department of Justice notes in its Bureau of Justice Statistics that in 2005, there were 603,500 
arrests for violent crimes in the United States, including an estimated 16,692 homicides. That same year, 
there were 60 executions, and that number has decreased each following year (in 2008, 37 inmates were 
executed, the lowest number since 1994). U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
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not an essay about punishment, but what MacIntyre says there about Aquinas’s natural 
law theory is relevant to our subject.  
What MacIntyre draws out in this essay is an important implication of the 
naturalness of natural law. Since its precepts are accessible to anyone with reason, rulers 
do not have a monopoly on natural law, nor do lawyers or political scientists. The “plain 
person” then has a ground for disagreeing with a particular enactment of human law on 
the basis that it violates the natural law to which he has equal access. MacIntyre explains 
that for Aquinas, natural law is something known by all rational agents, and known by 
them as plain persons (or Aquinas would say, known by them as men). This is not to say 
that all rational agents have equal knowledge of all the precepts of natural law, but that 
knowledge of this kind is acquired by virtue of a capacity that all men share. Some more 
general precepts are presupposed by any practical inference, especially the most general 
precept that tells us to pursue good and avoid evil.29  
Aquinas himself was not a lawyer or a prince; he had no technical expertise in 
law, but only the more foundational expertise of a highly cultivated practical reason: 
“Aquinas’s reflections upon Roman law and canon law had thus led him in an opposite 
direction from that taken by the most influential teachers of law in the universities. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in his treatment of custom.”30 At the same time that 
Emperor Frederick II and King Louis IX were trying to stamp out local customs in favor 
of universal laws, Aquinas was arguing that “custom has the force of a law, abolishes 
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 MacIntyre, “Natural Law as Subversive,” 68. 
30
 MacIntyre, “Natural Law as Subversive,” 70. “Philosophers and theologians are themselves in respect of 
the natural law no more than unusually reflective plain persons, able to present their reflections to others 
for the rational verdict of those others.” Ibid., 77. 
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law, and is the interpreter of law.”31 As MacIntyre also points out, Aquinas’s view of 
custom was not the view that won out in thirteenth-century politics, but it offers a more 
reasonable alternative.  
We have already seen how custom is an essential determinant in human 
punishments for Aquinas. The precept that punishment is due to evil acts is a general 
practical principle, known by plain persons. The determination of specific punishments, 
however, is relative to place and time, as what is useful to the common good and what is 
customary differs. A good lawmaker will not institute punishments that are clearly 
detrimental to the common good, or that are unusual, exotic, strange. Custom can change, 
and it does so through the repeated acts of plain persons. Law influences custom, just as 
custom influences law. Religion is another influence on custom. The movement to 
abolish slavery in the United States, for example, was heavily influenced by preachers 
and ordinary Christians. This is a case of religion changing culture through its influence 
on the actions of individual persons. This seems to be what John Paul II does in 
Evangelium Vitae and in a host of addresses, speeches, and homilies in which he 
encourages the faithful to oppose the death penalty. This impression is enforced by his 
frequent references to the battle between the “Culture of Life” and the “Culture of 
Death.” Cardinal Bernardin’s “consistent ethic of life” approach also aims at fostering 
this Culture of Life.32 They do not offer an argument against CP in absolute terms, not are 
they particularly interested in reasoning about its deterrent effects. Rather, they stress the 
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 S.T. I-II, q. 97 a. 3. See MacIntyre, “Natural Law as Subversive,” 66, 71-72. 
32
 Cardinal Bernardin first publicly articulated a “Consistent Ethic of Life” in an address at Fordham 
University on Dec. 6, 1983. 
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value of all human life, and the power of witnessing to this value by rejecting CP. In a 
culture in which other forms of killing (abortion, euthanasia) are becoming customary, 
the Christian offers a powerful witness in respecting the lives of even the worst killers. In 
light of this Culture of Death, Thomas’s comparison of the evildoer to a beast is all the 
more unfortunate. Yet it ought not to obscure the value of his theory of punishment in 
general, which gives the philosophical resources for acknowledging changes in custom of 
the kind which John Paul so eloquently teaches. 
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Appendix: Theological Objections to the Thomistic Account of Capital Punishment 
Even though Aquinas’s justification of CP is primarily a philosophical one, it 
would be foreign to his methodology to exclude theological objections altogether. In this 
chapter, I answer theological objections to Aquinas’s view, which were not addressed 
directly in his own treatment of CP. Most importantly, I address the question of 
compatibility between Aquinas’s teaching and contemporary Church teaching on CP. I 
argue that without referring to Aquinas, the Catechism and E.V. presuppose a Thomistic 
justification of CP: they maintain the understanding that CP is a legitimate but not a 
necessary form of punishment. It is only by virtue of this understanding that they can 
claim that the death penalty should rarely be used in the present context. For this 
presupposes that the penalty is legitimate but not necessary, which is precisely what 
Thomas has argued. Yet the documents claim that non-lethal punishments are preferable, 
because bloodless penalties are “more in keeping with the concrete conditions of the 
common good and more in conformity with the dignity of the human person.”1 Thomas, 
too, was concerned with the conditions of the common good in determining specific 
punishments. He was also concerned with the disposition of those involved in punishing 
evildoers, which pertains to human dignity. 
I assume the truth of divine revelation as contained in Sacred Scripture and in the 
teaching of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church. On account of this assumption, it 
might be accurate to describe what I do in this chapter as moral theology, rather than 
moral philosophy. I have noted that Thomas’s own approach does not exclude theological 
                                                 
1
 Evangelium vitae 56. 
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objections. While he is clear about the distinction between reason and faith as two ways 
of coming to know truth, he does not strictly separate doing philosophy from doing 
theology. In treating a question such as the legitimacy of CP, he will present an objection 
drawn from Scripture next to an objection drawn from Aristotle. If in answering a 
particular question he finds that both reason and revelation offer an objection to a certain 
point, he responds to both. To ignore theological objections altogether would be to leave 
the question of coherence in Thomas’s account of CP unanswered. For he would be the 
first to admit that if his account is contradicted by revelation, it ought to be discarded, for 
“other sciences derive their certainty from the natural light of human reason, which can 
err; whereas this [sacra doctrina or theology proper] derives its certitude from the light of 
the divine knowledge, which cannot be misled.”2 
 
A Scriptural Objections 
We have seen that most of the objections Thomas himself considers are based on 
revelation. Those objections were representative of the scriptural objections we encounter 
today against CP. One objection he does not consider directly is whether CP is necessary 
to any human society, since there seems to be a divine mandate for the use of CP for 
murder in Genesis, where the Lord says to Noah: “For your lifeblood I will surely require 
a reckoning; of every beast I will require it and of man; of every man’s brother I will 
require the life of man. Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; 
for God made man in his own image” (9:5-7).  
                                                 
2
 S.T. I, q. 1, a. 5.  
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It is fairly easy to respond to this objection when we consider the mode by which 
punishments are derived from the natural law. Contemporary Scripture scholars also note 
that the structure and style of Genesis 9 is different from the structure of biblical laws.3 
Further, while the laws given through Moses were accompanied by the establishment of 
governing authority, this was not the case with the revelation to Noah. Penal laws are 
useless without an authority to execute them, but the covenant with Noah was not 
accompanied by any special authority to legislate and to punish. It seems more likely that 
God’s words to Noah, rather than commanding a certain punishment, sanctioned and set 
limits to the already established practice of blood-vengeance.4 
The more common theological objection is that CP is incompatible with the 
Gospel. In the Sermon on the Mount, for example, Jesus says to the crowds:  
You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ But I 
say to you, Do not resist one who is evil. But if any one strikes you on the right 
cheek, turn to him the other also … You have heard that it was said ‘You shall 
love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I say to you, Love your enemies, 
and pray for those who persecute you … (Mt 5:38-39, 43-44).  
 
It seems then that the Christian should not kill evildoers, both because killing is a form of 
resistance, and because one does not kill those whom one loves. Some argue that Aquinas 
is aware of the incompatibility of CP with the Sermon on the Mount, but that he 
                                                 
3
 Megivern, 15: “Modern scholars have pointed out that the text actually has a chiastic structure, typical of 
Hebrew wisdom literature. Recent translations, including the NAB, indicate that the verse is thus poetic in 
form, yet biblical laws were never written in poetic form.” In his analysis of Gen. 9 and Romans 13, 
Megivern makes some rather sweeping comments about the triumph of the historical-critical method of 
Scriptural exegesis. For example: “The biblical literalism that dominated the past has given way to methods 
that demand greater sophistication in using the Bible … There is nothing so fruitless as wrangling over the 
meaning of the Bible when the real object of debate should be the presuppositions brought to its 
interpretation.” (9) It is not necessary to agree with him in this respect, in order to agree with the specific 
point he makes about Gen 9:6. 
4
 “The ancient legal formula in verse 6 was probably originally intended to set limits to blood revenge.” 
Dianne Bergant and Robert J. Karris, eds., Collegeville Bible Commentary, 49. 
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maintains a double standard, in which “the demands of the New Law are limited to the 
clerical caste, leaving the laity to live by a lower standard, which includes engaging in 
necessary bloodshed.”5 
To answer the New Testament objections, we must return to the question on 
vengeance, where Thomas answers a more general objection of the same kind as the ones 
we are considering. The question arises in the context of vengeance rather than in the 
context of CP specifically, and this placement is not arbitrary. If Jesus’ sayings forbid the 
Christian from using CP, they also forbid the Christian from using lesser kinds of force. 
In fact, they seem to forbid vengeance altogether, since it involves resisting evildoers, 
rather than bearing patiently with them. It is interesting to note that in the question on 
vengeance, Thomas articulates the objection we are considering, using a passage not from 
the Sermon on the Mount, but from a gloss on the Song of Songs, showing that the idea 
of not resisting the wicked is found also in the Old Testament: “he that takes vengeance 
on a man does not bear with him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on 
Cant 2:2, ‘As the lily among the thorns,’ says: ‘He is not a good man that cannot bear 
with a wicked one.’ Therefore we should not take vengeance on the wicked.”6  
To this objection, Thomas responds that while it is good to bear with wrongs 
inflicted on oneself, it is not good to bear with wrongs inflicted on God or on one’s 
neighbor: “The good bear with the wicked by enduring patiently, and in due manner, the 
wrongs they themselves receive from them: but they do not bear with them so as to 
                                                 
5
 Megivern, 119. 
6
 S.T. II-II, q. 108, a. 1, arg. 2. 
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endure the wrongs they inflict on God and their neighbor.”7 Civil penalties are for the 
redressing of wrongs against one’s neighbor, which is why a representative of the whole 
community, and not the victim, is the one who punishes the offender. Vengeance, which 
is “the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned,” is therefore not prohibited by the 
injunction to bear with one who is evil.8 
In the same article, he considers the following objection:  
Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes revenge for wrongs 
inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is unlawful even for a judge to punish 
those who have wronged him: for Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v 
in Matth., falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom ] says: “Let us learn after Christ’s 
example to bear our own wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God’s 
wrongs, not even by listening to them.” Therefore vengeance seems to be 
unlawful.9 
 
Thomas responds that one may be required not only to avenge wrongs against others (as 
the response to objection 2 argued), but even to avenge a wrong committed against 
oneself, if that wrong “reflects on God and the Church.” His three examples indicate that 
he is thinking of those who in some way represent God: the prophet Elijah called down 
fire to consume King Ahaziah’s men (2 Kings 1), the prophet Elisha cursed the boys who 
mocked him (2 Kings 2), and “Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him into 
exile …”10 In each of these examples, the offended person had a duty to avenge the 
wrong, not because of the offense against his person, but because it was also an offense 
against God. Aquinas does not present an objection from the Sermon on the Mount in this 
article; instead he refers us to Augustine’s commentary: 
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 S.T. II-II, q. 108, a. 1, ad 2. 
8
 S.T. II-II, q. 108, a. 1. 
9
 S.T. II-II, q. 108, a. 1, arg. 4. 
10
 S.T. II-II, q. 108, a. 1, ad 4. 
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But in so far as the wrong inflicted on a man concerns his person, he should bear 
it patiently if this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to be 
understood as referring to preparedness of the mind, as Augustine states (De 
Serm. Dom. in Monte i).”11  
 
In his commentary, Augustine considers whether the Lord’s words in the Sermon on the 
Mount indicate that the Christian is forbidden from inflicting punishments (i.e., from 
taking vengeance). He concludes, 
A punishment that is designed for the purpose of correction is not hereby 
forbidden; for that very punishment is an exercise of mercy, and is not 
incompatible with the firm resolve by which we are ready to suffer even further 
injuries from a man whose amendment we desire.12 
 
Also commenting on the Sermon on the Mount, Dominican theologian Benedict Ashley 
writes, 
Jesus counseled that it is better for one not to resist attack out of love for one’s 
enemies (Mt 5:38-48), and practiced this counsel himself when he forbade Peter 
to defend him, saying, “Put your sword back into its sheath, for all who take the 
sword will perish by the sword” (Mt 26:52). Yet, as we have seen, St. Paul (Rm 
13:4b) and the First Epistle of Peter (2:14) prove that the early Church 
acknowledged not only the right but the obligation of the State to use force to 
maintain law and order … 13 
 
Because the Gospel does not exclude the use of force for legitimate civil aims, neither 
does it exclude the use of the death penalty for the same aims. As for loving one’s 
enemies, Aquinas distinguishes between the different intentions that may motivate an act 
of vengeance.  
Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the 
avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom 
he takes vengeance, and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: 
                                                 
11
 S.T. II-II, q. 108, a. 1, ad 4. 
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 Augustine, De Serm. Dom. in Monte (The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, trans. Denis J. 
Kavanagh (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1963), Book I, c. 20, n. 63. 
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 Benedict Ashley, Living the Truth in Love, 308. 
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because to take pleasure in another’s evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to 
the charity whereby we are bound to love all men.… 
If, however, the avenger’s intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be 
obtained by mean of the punishment of the person who has sinned (for instance 
that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others be not 
disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God honored), then vengeance may be 
lawful, provided other due circumstances be observed.14 
 
In the Disputed Question on Charity, Aquinas affirms the validity of vengeance by saying  
that is possible both to love and to punish, and in some cases the former requires the 
latter, for “The person to whom this duty attaches can lawfully punish and even kill 
wrongdoers while still loving them out of charity.”15 
Thomas responds to a similar difficulty in relation to the passion of anger. One 
might conclude from certain passages in the Gospel that anger is forbidden.16 Yet anger, 
or “the desire for revenge,” is not good or evil in itself, because revenge “may be desired 
both well and ill.”17 While anger that precedes reason and “withdraws reason from its 
rectitude …” is evil, anger that follows reason, that is “directed against vice and in 
accordance with reason …” is good.18  
As mentioned above, it is significant that these comments occur in the context of 
vengeance and anger in general, and not in the articles that deal with a particular penalty. 
For Jesus does not only command the believer not to kill his enemy or not to kill those 
who persecute him, which would rule out CP and warfare. He commands the believer to 
love his enemy and to do good to those who persecute him. These precepts do not pertain 
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 S.T. II-II, q. 108, a. 1. 
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 Disputed Questions on the Virtues, edited by E. M. Atkins and Thomas Williams, translated by E. M. 
Atkins (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), De Caritate, a. 8, ad 10. 
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 E.g., Mt 5:22: “But I say to you that every one who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment.” 
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 S.T. II-II, q. 158, a. 1. 
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 S.T. II-II, q. 158, a. 1, ad 2. 
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only to the most extreme forms of harm, but to all forms. If they rule out killing 
absolutely (as, for example, adultery is ruled out), then the Christian must reject all 
recourse to force, lethal or otherwise. This would mean, among other things, that 
Christians could not serve as soldiers, policemen, or judges. For Thomas, however, no 
such dilemma arises. He maintains that to harm another is forbidden, even prior to the 
Gospel, unless this harm is a penalty: “Now it is unlawful to do a person a harm, except 
by way of punishment in the cause of justice.”19 To punish as an act of justice is not to do 
evil but good, in that it restores the order violated by the offense.20 At the same time, 
punishment seeks the good of the offender, in that it hopes to move him to hate the evil 
he has done, through the bitterness of the penalty.21 
Why then does Thomas forbid clerics from being involved in executions, if to 
execute may be an act of the virtue of justice? He argues that it is unfitting for clerics to 
exact the death penalty, because they are ministers of the New Law, which does not 
prescribe particular judicial precepts, and also “because they are elected to the ministry of 
the altar, in which is represented the passion of the slain Christ, ‘who when he was 
struck, did not strike back,’ as is said in 1 Pet. 2.”22 This would be a double standard if  
killing was absolutely incompatible with the Gospel. But we have seen that for Thomas, 
loving and doing good to one’s enemies is compatible with punishing them. The New 
Law demands that one be willing to suffer persecution and injury to one’s own person, 
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 S.T. II-II, q. 65, a. 2. 
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 See S.T. I-II, q. 87, a. 1. 
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 See S.T. II-II, q. 108, a. 1; SCG III, c. 142. 
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 S.T. II-II, q. 64, a. 4. 
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for the sake of Christ, but does not demand that one abstain from all bloodshed. Benedict 
Ashley expresses the point using the classical distinction between precept and counsel: 
Hence the words of Jesus just quoted [Mt 26:52] must be understood not a 
universal precept, but as a counsel to be followed as a way of perfection by 
individuals when the protection of third parties is not in question. That is, when 
only one’s own safety is at stake, it is a Christ-like act of love for one’s enemy to 
let oneself be injured by that enemy rather than to injure him.23 
 
To be involved in official killing (as punishment or in warfare) can be an act of justice, 
according to Aquinas, but “[t]he ministry of clerics is concerned with better things than 
corporal slayings, namely with things pertaining to spiritual welfare, and therefore it is 
not fitting for them to meddle in lesser things.”24 This reasoning would apply not only to 
punishing by death, but to meting out other forms of civil punishment, or in general to 
involvement in political affairs. Thus, the current Code of Canon Law bars clerics from 
civil offices.25  
Aquinas’s reasoning about fittingness does not differ substantially from the view 
of Augustine. As a philosopher and theologian, Augustine maintains the legitimacy of the 
state’s right to punish with death and to wage war in certain circumstances.26 In pastoral 
letters, however, he encourages those in civil authority to give lesser penalties to those 
who had harmed Christians or destroyed Church property.27 As a bishop, he is concerned 
with “things pertaining to spiritual welfare,” including the welfare of heretics. Even so, 
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 S.T. II-II, q. 64, a. 4, ad 2. 
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 The 1983 Code states, “Clerics are forbidden to assume public office whenever it means sharing in the 
exercise of civil power.” The Code of Canon Law in English Translation (London: Collins Liturgical 
Publications, 1983), Can. 285.3. 
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 D.C.D. I.21: “There are however certain exceptions to the law against killing, made by the authority of 
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 See Letters 100 (to Donatus), 104 (to Nectarius), 139 (to Marcellinus). 
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he merely counsels and encourages magistrates to abstain from the death penalty; he does 
not condemn the practice. We have no evidence of Aquinas responding to pastoral 
situations such as those Augustine faced; but Augustine was after all a bishop with a 
flock to tend, while Thomas was a mendicant professor. On the speculative level, 
however, the two Doctors are in agreement that CP is not forbidden by the Gospel. 
 
B Recent Church Teaching on CP 
 
Another and more difficult kind of theological objection to the death penalty is 
based on recent teachings of the Catholic Magisterium.28 Here we venture outside of 
objections that Aquinas considered, or could have considered. Nonetheless, bringing his 
theory into contact with such objections is appropriate, since he did not exclude 
theological objections to his philosophical arguments. It is unavoidable for those who 
take the doctrine of the Magisterium as a source of true teaching, as Aquinas certainly 
did. I begin with a brief analysis of the two most authoritative sources for recent Church 
teaching on the death penalty, Evangelium Vitae (E.V.) and the Catechism of the Catholic 
Church. I limit my reflections to these two documents, noting however that individual 
bishops and conferences of bishops have written similarly on CP.29 In addition, the 
Vatican recently has supported the United Nations in its call for a moratorium on the 
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 I do not propose to consider Christian thought on CP as it has developed in the various Protestant 
denominations, since this is not directly relevant to my thesis.  
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 The United States Council of Catholic Bishops has consistently opposed the death penalty since at least 
1974. In 1980, it published its first comprehensive statement calling for an end to the use of the death 
penalty. “Catholic Campaign to End the Use of the Death Penalty.” 
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death penalty.30 The arguments made by individual bishops and conferences of bishops, 
and other ecclesial statements on CP, have been consistent with those found in the 
Catechism and E.V., and typically refer to these two documents as authorities.31  
The Catechism makes the following statement under the heading “Capital 
Punishment”: 
Assuming that the guilty party’s identity and responsibility have been fully 
determined, the traditional teaching of the Church does not exclude recourse to 
the death penalty, if this is the only possible way of effectively defending human 
lives against the unjust aggressor.  
If, however, non-lethal means are sufficient to defend and protect people’s 
safety from the aggressor, authority will limit itself to such means, as these are 
more in keeping with the concrete conditions of the common good and more in 
conformity with the dignity of the human person.  
Today, in fact, as a consequence of the possibilities which the state has for 
effectively preventing crime, by rendering one who has committed an offense 
incapable of doing harm—without definitively taking away from him the 
possibility of redeeming himself—the cases in which the execution of the 
offender is an absolute necessity “are very rare, if not practically non-existent.”32 
 
E.V. follows the same line of thought in its discussion of the death penalty: 
On this matter there is a growing tendency, both in the Church and in civil 
society, to demand that it be applied in a very limited way or even that it be 
abolished completely. The problem must be viewed in the context of a system of 
penal justice ever more in line with human dignity and thus, in the end, with 
God’s plan for man and society. The primary purpose of the punishment which 
society inflicts is “to redress the disorder caused by the offence.” Public authority 
must redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on the 
offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a condition for the offender to 
regain the exercise of his or her freedom. In this way authority also fulfils the 
purpose of defending public order and ensuring people’s safety, while at the same 
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 Benedict XVI, “Address to the Diplomatic Corps,” 7 January 2008: “I rejoice that on 18 December last 
the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution calling upon States to institute a 
moratorium on the use of the death penalty, and I earnestly hope that this initiative will lead to public 
debate on the sacred character of human life.”  
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 For discussion of the doctrinal status of various Church statements on CP, see E. Christian Brugger, 
“Catholic Moral Teaching and the Problem of Capital Punishment” Thomist 68 (2004). I will not address 
this theological question in my paper. 
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 C.C.C. 2267, quoting John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae 56.  
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time offering the offender an incentive and help to change his or her behaviour 
and be rehabilitated. It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature 
and extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and 
ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute 
necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend 
society. Today however, as a result of steady improvements in the organization of 
the penal system, such cases are very rare, if not practically non-existent. 
 
In any event, the principle set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic 
Church remains valid: “If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives 
against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public 
authority must limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the 
concrete conditions of the common good and are more in conformity to the 
dignity of the human person.”33 
 
The first thing to be noted about these statements from E.V. and the Catechism is 
that neither of them rule out the death penalty altogether. However, both texts say that 
non-lethal punishments are to be preferred. Second, both texts maintain that the death 
penalty is only licit “in cases of absolute necessity,” or in other words, if it is “the only 
possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor.” Third, 
the documents offer a practical observation: that is, the penal system today is such that 
cases fitting this description “are very rare, if not practically non-existent.”  
The first principle, that non-lethal punishments are to be preferred to the death 
penalty, presupposes the legitimacy of CP, though no argument for its legitimacy is 
offered. Clearly, legitimacy is not the primary concern here. It is helpful to compare the 
language used in these texts with the language used in the same documents to treat the 
question of abortion. In reference to “the unspeakable crime of abortion,” the language is 
unqualified: “direct abortion, that is, abortion willed as an end or as a means, always 
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constitutes a grave moral disorder, since it is the deliberate killing of an innocent human 
being.”34 In reference to the death penalty, on the other hand, no comparable claim is 
made; neither E.V. nor the Catechism say that to kill a person as punishment is always a 
grave moral disorder. Rather, they limit the use of the penalty to cases of “absolute 
necessity,” and say that such cases now are “very rare, if not practically non-existent.” 
Yet by admitting that CP may be chosen as a valid means of punishment, however rarely 
or theoretically, they do not place CP in the category of “grave moral disorder.”  
A normative claim is being made in these selections: non-lethal punishments 
should be preferred (“public authority must limit itself to such means” and “ought not go 
to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity”). This 
does not imply that public authorities always do prefer non-lethal means when they have 
the choice (it seems likely that they do not), but that in principle these means are better in 
some decisive way, and therefore ought to be preferred. In what way are non-lethal 
punishments better than the death penalty? The documents give two reasons: “the 
concrete conditions of the common good” and “the dignity of the human person.”  
The second principle spells out the limit given in the first principle (that non-
lethal punishments are to be preferred): it is licit to choose a lethal punishment when non-
lethal means are insufficient “to defend human lives” and “to protect public order and the 
safety of persons.” If, in some case, the death penalty is the only way to defend lives and 
protect order, it may be chosen. There seem to be two possible interpretations of this 
second principle: (1) in certain (rare) cases, it is permissible but not necessary to use the 
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death penalty or (2) in certain (rare) cases, it is permissible and necessary to use the death 
penalty. I think the second interpretation is correct, but it could also be misleading. In a 
particular case, it is not that one must first determine whether the penalty is permissible in 
that case, and then whether it is necessary. Rather, its permissibility is determined by its 
necessity. If, and only if, the penalty is necessary, it is permissible. But this leaves us 
with a puzzle. If the death penalty is a morally legitimate form of punishment, why 
should the presumption always be against its use?  
The puzzle is only confirmed when we consider the many pleas made by John 
Paul II on behalf of criminals condemned to death and his frequent criticism of the death 
penalty in speeches, homilies, etc. As moral theologian Janet Smith suggests, it almost 
seems that John Paul would like to say that CP is intrinsically evil, but either will not or 
cannot do so: 
Other Pope-watchers have shared with me their suspicions that Pope John Paul II 
may well wish he could say that capital punishment is intrinsically evil and thus 
ought never to be done. Such a position would, of course, be a radical break with 
traditional Church teaching and thus is unlikely to be true, if not impossible to be 
true.35 
 
Some have answered this puzzle with the idea of a development of Catholic doctrine in 
regard to CP. In this view, the Church is heading toward an absolute condemnation of CP 
as per se evil, though she has not yet made a definitive statement to that effect. Thomas’s 
account is compatible with a relative condemnation of CP, one that says for instance, that 
other punishments are preferable or that in the present social context, CP ought not be 
used, but it is incompatible with an absolute condemnation of CP. If the Church is 
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teaching, or at some point in the future does teach that CP is per se evil, then those who 
accept the authority of the Church must reject Thomas’s account. 
 
C First Objection: There Has Been a Development of Doctrine on CP 
St. Thomas’s teaching on CP defined Church statements on this subject for 
centuries, but his teaching is notably absent from the two most recent authoritative 
documents, which mention CP, E.V. and the Catechism. Some have interpreted this 
absence as a conscious departure from traditional thinking on the death penalty. They 
read these documents as a “development of doctrine,” pointing toward an absolute 
condemnation of CP, and indeed of all intentional killing.36 
The most articulate presentation of the development of doctrine position to date is 
found in E. Christian Brugger’s book, Capital Punishment and the Roman Catholic 
Moral Tradition (2003). This careful study deserves our sustained attention, if we are to 
understand the relationship between Thomas’s teaching and recent Catholic teaching on 
CP. Brugger begins with the teaching on CP found in the 1997 Catechism, and he then 
traces Church teaching from apostolic and patristic times through the pontificate of John 
Paul II. In the final section of the book, he argues that a development of doctrine is taking 
place. Brugger makes several important claims in his book: first, that what the Catechism 
calls poena mortis is not punishment, but collective self-defense; second, that CP is not a 
morally licit punishment because it is intentional killing, and all intentional killing is 
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morally illicit; and third, that the doctrine of the Catholic Church is developing toward an 
absolute prohibition of capital punishment. 
Brugger notes that the 1997 Catechism treats the death penalty under the heading, 
“Legitimate Defense.” In contrast, the Roman Catechism treats it under the heading 
“Exceptions to the Fifth Commandment.” Brugger takes this to be a significant move: 
It is my contention that something new is being said about the morality of capital 
punishment is sections 2263-2267 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church … 
Because the text strictly ties its analysis to a model of self-defense against the 
wider conceptual backdrop of double-effect reasoning, it is reasonable to conclude 
(1) that the act referred to in the text as poena mortis is not, precisely speaking, an 
act of punishment, but an act of collective self-defense by the community against 
a dangerous internal aggressor, and (2) that capital punishment as well as all acts 
of legitimate killing should be limited by conditions traditionally used to limit 
lawful killing in private self-defense.37  
 
In other words, Brugger interprets the Catechism as saying that death may not be chosen 
as a form of punishment, but that in some cases public authority may kill a guilty 
individual as an act of social self-defense. Brugger contrasts his interpretation of the 
Catechism with the “plain-face interpretation” offered by, among others, Cardinal 
Ratzinger: 
Clearly, the Holy Father [John Paul II] has not altered the doctrinal principles 
which pertain to this issue as they are presented in the Catechism, but has simply 
deepened the application of such principles in the context of present-day historical 
circumstances. Thus, where other means for the self-defense of society are 
possible and adequate, the death penalty may be permitted to disappear. Such a 
development, occurring within society and leading to the foregoing of this type of 
punishment, is something good and ought to be hoped for.38 
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According to Brugger, on the other hand, the Church teaches in the 1997 Catechism that 
legitimate defense, whether personal or communal, should be understood using the idea 
of double effect. “Corporate” defense is subject to the same moral limits as individual 
self-defense. Commenting on the transition from self-defense to communal defense in the 
Catechism, Brugger says: 
Although the context has changed from addressing the needs of an individual to 
those of a community, and from the right of an individual to defend his own life 
to the rights and duties of public authority to defend the community for which it is 
responsible, the context is otherwise the same. We are still referring to the need 
(previously individual, and now corporate) to repel an aggressor—here including 
both internal and foreign aggressors—and the requirement that in so doing, only 
the degree of force necessary to render an aggressor unable to cause harm should 
be used. The act of legitimate defense here, as before, is an act of self-defense. 
While section 2265 does not explicitly state that any death following from this act 
of self-defense must be unintended, the reference to collective self-defense in 
2263 requires that this be the meaning of 2265.39 
 
Is CP a legitimate act of collective self-defense? If CP is intentional killing, Brugger’s 
answer is no. Self-defense is legitimate when it does not intend death. But one necessarily 
intends death when performing an execution:  
The lethal nature of the punishment is not ancillary to what is chosen; it is the 
measure of punishment chosen … In the case at hand, then, the plan of action 
very clearly includes the criminal’s death. Until the criminal is dead, the 
punishment is not complete nor is the disorder redressed. In other words, death is 
(among other things) what we are trying to bring about … The intent to kill 
cannot be separated from capital punishment, whatever other intentions 
accompany it.40 
 
However, Brugger thinks that the Catechism also uses CP to refer to something else: an 
act of legitimate defense by society against an internal aggressor in which the death of the 
offender is not intended. Such might be the case in a hostage situation or a prison riot.  
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In Part III, “Rethinking the Church’s Traditional Notion of Justifiable Homicide,” 
Brugger addresses the question of whether CP is the kind of teaching subject to doctrinal 
development. He notes that doctrines (whether of faith or morals) may be infallibly 
asserted or non-infallibly asserted.41 For the former, only one kind of development is 
possible, that which brings about “a fuller and more perfect understanding, and hence 
verbal expression, of the divine mystery, while all the time maintaining continuity with 
antecedent principles and types.”42 For non-infallibly asserted teachings, Brugger 
suggests “that there are two possible patterns of development … The first I will call 
development as filtering and reformulating, and the second, development as 
specification.”43 The first pattern occurs when an assertion contains both true and false 
propositions. Over time, the false propositions are filtered out, leaving only the true 
teaching. For an example, Brugger offers the true teaching on reservation of priestly 
ordination to men alone, which was at one time asserted together with false propositions 
about the inferiority of women.44 
 By specification, the second pattern of development, Brugger does not mean a 
particular determination of a more general teaching, as the name might imply. Rather, he 
means a clarification of ambiguities in a true teaching. 
For example, if “murder” is taken to mean any deliberate act that foreseeably 
results in the death of another, then many more acts are characterized as murder 
than if “murder” is rightly defined as killing the innocent with intent.  
Development in this instance would mean specifying with increasing precision the 
nature of the moral acts under consideration, or the language with which the acts 
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have hitherto been described, with the possible result that the sense in which a 
moral doctrine has been interpreted stands in need of revisions.45 
 
After showing that the teaching on CP has not been asserted infallibly,46 Brugger argues 
that the Church is now developing this teaching by filtering and reformulating it, the first 
mode of development. The filtered teaching put forth in the Catechism then stands in 
need of clarification, the second mode of development.  
Brugger proposes, as the traditional teaching of the Church on CP, the following 
complex assertion A: 
for human dignity and the common good of society to be honored and preserved, 
the deliberate crimes—especially grave crimes—of social offenders should be 
punished, if need be with death. Therefore capital punishment is legitimate and 
should be defended in the face of those who publicly deny it and/or seek to have it 
abolished.47 
 
He divides this assertion into four separate propositions:  
(Y) deliberate crime brings into existence a disorder in civil society, and grave 
crime, grave disorder; (K) to preserve the conditions for the common good this 
disorder must be redressed; (L) proportionate punishment can redress this 
disorder; (M) it is legitimate to impose proportionate punishment upon offenders, 
including grave punishments on grave offenders; and (Z) the act of killing 
entailed in lawfully executed capital punishment is legitimate and should not be 
subsumed under the norm forbidding homicide.48 
 
Brugger suggests that while propositions Y, K, L, and M are true, proposition Z is false 
and needs to filtered out of complex assertion A, producing a new complex assertion B: 
The nature of certain offenses is such that an offender could not complain of 
distributive injustice (i.e., unfairness) if, as punishment, he were deprived of life; 
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yet capital punishment is still wrong, not because it is unfair (in the distributive 
sense just stated), but because as an act precisely intended to destroy human life it 
is a violation of inalienable human dignity and hence a violation of the norm 
singling out and forbidding all such acts. Therefore, although punishing deliberate 
crime is good and necessary for the maintenance of the common good, non-lethal 
punishments should always be chosen.49 
 
He concludes, “This is essentially the conclusion that, as I have argued in chapter 1, lies 
inchoate in the teaching of the Catechism of the Catholic Church.”50  
This new assertion depends, of course, on the existence of a norm against all 
intentional killing. Brugger claims that this norm is contained, at least implicitly, in the 
1997 Catechism, but adds that the terms of this teaching, “would need careful 
specification in order to make clear what kinds of acts are and are not singled out by it as 
contrary to human good.”51 This he does in his final chapter, entitled “Toward an Ethical 
Judgment that Capital Punishment is Intrinsically Wrong.” In the first chapter, Brugger 
presented evidence for his conclusion that the Catechism is doing something new with 
regard to CP; in this last chapter, he presents the term of this movement: an absolute 
norm against intentional killing of human persons. Brugger admits, “The Catholic Church 
has never taught that all intentional killing is wrong,” and that the norm against 
intentional killing of the innocent is “the model used by Aquinas and by Evangelium 
Vitae in the formulations of its three most authoritative negative norms.”52 Nonetheless, 
Brugger wants to formulate a rational account of the norm against intentional killing 
which he takes to be “inchoate” in the Catechism’s teaching on CP.  
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Brugger begins by criticizing Thomas’s account, which he rightly takes to be the 
most developed philosophical defense of CP in the Christian tradition. Brugger’s two 
main objections are ones that we have seen before. He rejects Thomas’s part-whole 
defense of CP, and the comparison of sinner to beast. He concludes, in words similar to 
those of Finnis:53 
Aquinas’ account fails to respond to the charge that capital punishment, because it 
is the willful destruction of an intrinsic human good, is wrong per se. In the 
absence of Aquinas’ arguments for the lawfulness of capital punishment, Catholic 
tradition (and, for that matter, Western philosophical tradition) has no other 
philosophical ground from which to argue that the object chosen in a deliberate 
act of killing the guilty—by the state or any other person—is, morally speaking, 
fundamentally different from the object chosen in an act of killing the innocent.54 
 
According to Brugger, the moral object of an act of execution is the same as the moral 
object of an act of murder; or in other words, that CP is murder: “Simply put, I cannot 
will the death of a human person, any human person, innocent or guilty, with a good 
will.”55  
Brugger’s interpretation of the Catechism as implicitly affirming an absolute 
prohibition of intentional killing is affirmed also by Finnis, Grisez, and Joseph Boyle: 
The Catechism of the Catholic Church, most plainly in its revised edition—in 
relation to killing in capital punishment, and war, and in general … has adopted a 
position like the one defended for thirty years by Grisez. Killing of human beings 
is justifiable only insofar as it is not intended. [Footnote: The revised CCC’s 
entire treatment of cases of justifiable killing is put under the aegis of Aquinas’s 
distinction between the “double effect” of lethal self-defensive actions that do not 
intend the killing of the aggressor …] 56 
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Gerard Bradley agrees with Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle that E.V. and the Catechism aim at 
an absolute norm, but disagrees about whether CP is thereby ruled out. He includes CP as 
public defense of society, which is the “same moral species” as private self-defense.57 
Both seek to “disable aggressors without intending to kill.”58 Brugger makes a similar 
claim. If Bradley and Brugger are right, however, CP as punishment is ruled out. If the 
Catechism does presuppose a norm against intentional killing, then for Catholics, this 
would be a decisive objection to Thomas’s teaching on CP. 
 
Response to the First Objection 
In Chapter IV, I considered the idea of a norm against intentional killing in 
response to the objections of Grisez and Finnis. I argued that this norm does not follow 
from a Thomistic understanding of human action and that it has serious philosophical 
difficulties in its own right. No absolute prohibition of intentional killing can be derived 
from natural law, as Thomas understood it. Yet even if the natural law contains no such 
norm, revealed law might. Thomas tells us that “although the argument from authority 
based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine 
revelation is the strongest.”59  
The Church teaches authentically on morality as well as faith, but arguments 
based on what the Church might teach in the future (the end point of a development that 
is thought to be occurring now) are doubtful. We can only reason about what we know 
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and not what we might know in the future. Therefore, we can only reason about what has 
been revealed, and not what might be revealed by the continued working of the Holy 
Spirit in the Church. The Magisterium has not absolutely condemned capital punishment. 
If it is not evident from reason that CP is immoral, and if it has not (at least not yet) been 
revealed to us through the Church’s ever-deepening interpretation on the Word of God, 
then we have no basis for making such a claim. Still, some have argued that an absolute 
condemnation of CP is implicit in some Church teachings, and so we must consider 
whether this is so. Secondly, we must consider whether the Catechism applies double-
effect reasoning to CP, as Brugger suggests, as a way of reconciling its new teaching to 
the tradition. This would mean essentially that while punishing by death is always wrong, 
what we normally think of as punishment by death is really a kind of self-defense, which 
is justified because the killing is not what is intended. 
Brugger admits that the norm against intentional killing is not found in the 
tradition of Catholic moral theology, but thinks that the norm is implicitly affirmed in the 
1997 Catechism: 
In reformulating the Catholic position on justifiable violence to exclude 
intentional harm to basic goods, I have tied to develop a systematic and 
philosophically consistent account of the morally relevant elements of the new 
position that (I have argued) lies implicit in the teaching of the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church on capital punishment.60 
 
Brugger rightly notes that the 1997 Catechism treats punishment, bearing arms, and self-
defense under the heading of “legitimate defense,” and that the use of this category in 
reference to all three kinds of killing is something new. He takes this new grouping as an 
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indication that the Catechism wants to treat war and capital punishment as specifically 
similar to self-defense. In itself, the grouping of war, punishment, and self-defense does 
not say anything about the species of the acts. Previous catechisms, such as the Roman 
Catechism, treat these topics together, without implying that they are specifically the 
same kind of act. Thomas, as we saw in Chapter II, treats self-defense, CP, and other 
forms of killing together in q. 64, and he clearly does not think they are the same species 
of act.  
The Catechism does not say or imply that all kinds of legitimate defense are 
specifically the same. There may be different species of legitimate defense; the traditional 
view has at least three: self-defense by private persons, self-defense by persons in public 
authority, and defense of others by an act of punishment, which are all specifically 
different.61 After addressing self-defense, section 2266 introduces civil punishment: 
The efforts of the state to curb the spread of behavior harmful to people’s rights 
and to the basic rules of civil society correspond to the requirement of 
safeguarding the common good. Legitimate public authority has the right and duty 
to inflict punishment proportionate to the gravity of the offense. Punishment has 
the primary aim of redressing the disorder introduced by the offense. When it is 
willingly accepted by the guilty party, it assumes the value of expiation. 
Punishment then, in addition to defending public order and protecting people’s 
safety, has a medicinal purpose: as far as possible, it must contribute to the 
correction of the guilty party. 
Several concepts are introduced in this paragraph, which were not part of the explanation 
of self-defense: safeguarding the common good, legitimate public authority, and the 
presence of a guilty party. The Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church 
expands on this definition: “A punishment imposed by legitimate public authority has the 
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aim of redressing the disorder introduced by the offense, of defending public order and 
people’s safety, and contributing to the correction of the guilty party.”62 The 
Compendium and the Catechism essentially affirm the teaching of the Roman Catechism, 
with the additional emphasis on correction. The Roman Catechism says that civil 
punishments tend to “the preservation and security of human life … by repressing 
outrage and violence.”63  
The Catechism and the Compendium provide no reference for their statements 
about the primary end of punishment. Yet of the four quotations in the section on 
“Legitimate Defense,” two are from the Summa Theologiae. More importantly, the 
Catechism reaffirms Thomas’s view that punishment is directed primarily toward 
redressing disorder, and secondarily toward “the correction of the guilty party.”64 That is, 
an act is penal insofar as its object is to redress disorder produced by an offense. This is a 
general definition of punishment, applying alike to eternal and temporal penalties; 
therefore, paragraph 2266 goes on to specify civil punishment: “in addition to defending 
public order and protecting people’s safety, [punishment] has a medicinal purpose: as far 
as possible, it must contribute to the correction of the guilty party.” The text indicates that 
the correction of the wrongdoer is an additional purpose of punishment, distinct from the 
defense of public order. However, “protecting people’s safety” is here presented along 
with “defending public order,” whereas the preceding sentence simply gave “redressing 
the disorder introduced by the offense” as the primary purpose of punishment. The 
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Catechism does not make the protection of public safety a medicinal end of punishment,65 
like the reform of the wrongdoer, but includes it with the primary end of redressing 
disorder. The most reasonable interpretation is that “protecting people’s safety” is a part 
of, or the specification of, “defending public order.”  
As we have seen, Thomas describes different levels of order: the order within a 
man’s soul, the civil order, the order of the universe as a whole. The phrase “protecting 
people’s safety,” specifies how civil punishment goes about redressing disorder. Unlike 
eternal punishment, it does not redress disorder perfectly. It does not give to each exactly 
what his acts deserve in respect to the order of the universe. Civil punishment redresses 
only civil disorder. Thomas observes that only eternal punishments are retributive in an 
absolute sense. Man’s punishments, including those of the state, “are sought, not for their 
own sake, because this is not the final time of retribution, but in their character of 
medicine, conducing either to the amendment of the sinner, or to the good of the 
commonwealth whose calm is ensured by the punishment of evil-doers.”66  
Paragraph 2267 brings all three of the above-mentioned characteristics of 
punishment to bear on its treatment of the death penalty. Paragraph 2267 begins by 
“[a]ssuming that the guilty party’s identity and responsibility have been fully 
determined.” The presence of public authority is mentioned in the second sentence, as is 
the common good: 
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If, however, non-lethal means are sufficient to defend and protect people’s safety 
from the aggressor, authority will limit itself to such means, as these are more in 
keeping with the concrete conditions of the common good and more in conformity 
to the dignity of the human person.  
Thus, all the elements that are characteristic of punishment in the Catechism’s treatment 
are also present in its treatment of CP, implying that CP is being considered precisely as a 
punishment. 
 What about the Catechism’s assertion (2267) that CP is licit if it is “the only 
possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor”? Does 
this indicate a rejection of the public order justification in the case of CP? This simply 
does not follow, especially when we consider that paragraph 2266 identified protecting 
people’s safety as at least one part of defending public order.  
 The Catechism does imply that it is illicit for public officials to use the death 
penalty simply as retribution. They must consider whether a lethal punishment is 
necessary to defend human lives. If necessary—that is, if the available non-lethal 
punishments would be insufficient to defend human lives—then public authority may 
rightly choose CP. This kind of decision-making is obviously subject to many 
contingencies. Non-lethal punishments may turn out to be ineffective in cases when they 
were thought to be adequate, and lethal punishments may be thought necessary in cases 
when they are not. The possibility of error does not make it impossible to make a moral 
judgment. Practical knowledge, since it depends on particulars, not all of which can be 
known by the human agent, does not have the same certainty that speculative knowledge 
has, but it is nonetheless knowledge.  
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 Brugger is mistaken in thinking that because the Catechism stresses the secondary 
or specific justification of the death penalty, it rejects the primary or general justification 
for punishment. The Catechism’s reasoning on CP is similar to the reasoning used to 
justify private self-defense in its insistence that lethal force is a last resort (“the only 
possible way of defending human lives”). But while private self-defense only 
presupposes that the aggressor represents a serious and immediate threat, CP presupposes 
not only that the aggressor represents a threat, but that the aggressor has already 
committed some offense: “Assuming that the guilty party’s identity and responsibility 
have been fully determined, the traditional teaching of the Church does not exclude 
recourse to the death penalty.”67 The Catechism does not deny that the death penalty may 
be used as punishment, but it adds that this punishment ought to be used only when 
necessary for the defense of society.  
 The idea of CP as a kind of defense is not new; the tradition also sees CP as a way 
in which society defends itself from threats and preserves innocent human lives. For what 
is meant by defense of society, if not something very like the “preservation and security 
of human life” and “freedom from external disorders”?68 What is new is the judgment 
that at the present time, situations in which CP is necessary to defense of society are rare. 
The Catechism does not deny the retributive justification for CP, but it emphasizes the 
secondary justification, defense of society.  
 So both Aquinas and the Catechism make retribution a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for the just use of CP. Punishment presupposes guilt (the primary, 
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retributive justification), he says, but the punishments of this life are further characterized 
by their medicinal quality. Not only must the criminal be guilty of a grave crime, he must 
present a grave threat to the common good, in order for CP to be justified. Because this 
world is not the stage for perfect retribution,69 the death penalty is only used to remove 
those offenders who are a grave threat to the civil community: “human justice … puts to 
death those who are dangerous to others, while it allows time for repentance to those who 
sin without grievously harming others.”70  
 The second part of Brugger’s development of doctrine position is the association 
of CP with the principle of double effect. In his treatment of the Catechism, Brugger 
suggests that the death penalty may be justified not as a punishment, but as social self-
defense: 
Because the text [of the Catechism] strictly ties its analysis to a model of self-
defense against the wider conceptual backdrop of double-effect reasoning, it is 
reasonable to conclude (1) that the act referred to in the text as poena mortis is 
not, precisely speaking, an act of punishment, but an act of collective self-defense 
by the community against a dangerous internal aggressor, and (2) that capital 
punishment as well as all acts of legitimate killing should be limited by conditions 
traditionally used to limit lawful killing in private self-defense.71  
 
The application of double effect to CP is problematic for two reasons: it is 
philosophically untenable, and it is not supported by the text of the Catechism. 
 Brugger stretches the idea of double effect beyond its reasonable application. He 
maintains that sometimes CP describes an act of collective self-defense, which does not 
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include death as an intention. This is not a reasonable use of double-effect. The source of 
double-effect reasoning is the article on self-defense in S.T. II-II, q. 64. Thomas argues 
there that killing in self-defense is sometimes licit. He gives the principle, “Moral acts 
receive their species according to what is intended, but not from that which is praeter 
intentionem.”72 Death may result from an act of proportional self-defense by a private 
person, and death in this case is praeter intentionem. Since he has said that what is 
praeter intentionem does not give species to the moral act, it follows that in an act of 
private self-defense, the killing of the attacker does not determine the moral species. In 
the same article, he concludes, “A man may not lawfully intend to kill a man in order to 
defend himself, except for him who has public authority, who, intending to kill a man in 
self-defense, refers this to the public good.”73 While a private person may not intend to 
kill a man, he may use potentially lethal forms of self-defense. As one recent 
commentator puts it, “he may knowingly risk the assailant’s life by defending himself 
with such force that the aggressor’s death, if it results, would be one of the foreseeable 
characteristic consequences of the self-defensive act.”74  
Yet Thomas quite definitely considers those with public authority to be a different 
case. In a previous article, he states the reason for this exception:  
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74
 Thomas A. Cavanaugh, “Aquinas’s Account of Double Effect,” The Thomist 61 (1997). 
  279
It is lawful for any private individual to do anything for the common good, 
provided it harm nobody: but if it be harmful to some other, it cannot be done, 
except by virtue of the judgment of the person to whom it pertains to decide what 
is to be taken from the parts for the welfare of the whole.75  
 
Those like Brugger who fail to distinguish between what is morally required of and 
permitted to a private person, and what is morally required of and permitted to public 
authority, must reject all intentional killing as specifically evil. For Thomas, on the other 
hand, the presence of public authority makes one act of self-defense specifically different 
than the other. It is not that it is good for the public official to do something that is evil 
per se, which would be contradictory, since an act that is evil per se is by definition an act 
that is never good. Rather, the act of intentional killing is insufficiently specified until we 
know who is killing and who is killed. Thomas claims that the act of intentionally killing 
a wrongdoer for the common good is specifically good, but it is only possible to one with 
authority for the common good. This does not mean that the public official intends the 
offender’s death for its own sake, an intention that Thomas condemns.76 This in fact 
would make it an act of hatred, and therefore an evil act.  
The principle that one with public authority may kill for the common good is 
operative also in the case of CP:  
It is lawful to kill an evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole 
community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the community’s 
welfare. Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a decayed limb, when he has 
been entrusted with the care of the health of the whole body. Now the care of the 
common good is entrusted to persons of rank having public authority: wherefore 
they alone, and not private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death.77 
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Again, the point is not made in terms of exceptions to a rule (killing is normally evil, but 
not in cases X, Y, and Z), but in terms of the power to undertake a certain kind of action 
for the good of the community. It is not possible here to explore the Thomistic conception 
of authority, but we must note that in his view all human authority is a participation in 
divine authority. The source of the power to execute, and in fact the source of all 
authority of one man over another, is God.  
The classic reference used to defend the power to execute is Genesis 9:6, 
“Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed.” Brugger interprets 
this passage to mean “the death and resurrection of Christ has effected a change in the 
moral order that eliminates the need for the spilling of blood.” 78 Here Brugger seems to 
conflate the spilling of the blood of beasts in sacrifice with the spilling of human blood as 
punishment. While the sacrifice of Christ has made the former unnecessary, it has not 
eliminated the need for punishment. So the question remains as to whether the authority 
to punish with death has been given to men. Brugger acknowledges that he has not 
answered the question of authority: 
But the passage in Genesis 9:6 seems to affirm that human agents have a 
mediating role in the justice of God which includes as a consequence, in some 
cases, the infliction of death. The passage seems to me to warrant at least a 
provisional conclusion that the biblical author intended to refer to a role belonging 
to humans as such by reason of the relationship of human authority to divine 
authority. A closer analysis of this text would require biblical exegesis beyond the 
scope of the present work, and therefore, the problem it poses to the interpretation 
of the Catechism set forth in chapter 1 will be left standing.79 
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If Scripture affirms that human authority shares in divine authority, then there is reason 
for claiming that those in authority may intend and do things that private persons may 
not. If God, who has authority over life and death, allows men to share in this authority, 
then human authorities have the power to punish with death. Since he leaves this question 
standing, Brugger fails to provide reason for affirming the contrary.  
 
D Second Objection: CP is Incompatible with the Common Good as Understood in 
Catholic Social Teaching  
 
A second objection based on E.V. and the Catechism touches on the notion of the 
common good. One’s view of the common good affects how one views the legitimacy of 
CP. This is true whether one’s view of the common good is determined by philosophical 
or by theological considerations. The theologically-based common good objection begins 
with the assumption that recent Church documents embrace an instrumentalist view of 
the common good. A major source for this assumption is the often-cited passage in  
Gaudium et spes (G.S.): 
Because of the closer bonds of human interdependence and their spread over the 
whole world, we are today witnessing a widening of the role of the common good, 
which is the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or 
as individuals, to reach their fulfillment more fully and more easily.80 
 
This passage seems to say that the common good is merely a means to the fulfillment of 
individuals and groups, an instrumental good only. This is difficult to reconcile with 
Thomas’s assertion of the superiority of the common good to the individual, private 
good, which is essential to his justification of CP. In E.V., John Paul II seems to support 
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an instrumentalist view of the common good, when he speaks of the common good as 
serving the rights and duties of individuals, rather than individuals serving the common 
good:  
Disregard for the right to life, precisely because it leads to the killing of the 
person whom society exists to serve, is what most directly conflicts with the 
possibility of achieving the common good.81  
 
If the common good is merely a means to the fulfillment of individuals and groups, as 
this implies, then it seems that the good of individuals is superior to the common good.  
 
Response to the Second Objection 
In response to this objection, we must ask what G.S. means by the “conditions of 
social life,” and what constitutes the fulfillment of individuals and social groups which 
these conditions make possible. If these conditions are not only means, but genuine, 
though imperfect, ends, and if, moreover, human fulfillment means eternal beatitude, then 
the objection does not hold. If, on the other hand, the conditions are not ends in 
themselves, but only means, and if they are means to a temporal end or ends, then the 
objection does hold. I will argue that the view of the common good articulated by John 
Paul, which draws on G.S. and on the social encyclicals of his predecessors, has more in 
common with the Thomistic view than with a purely instrumentalist view. Most 
importantly, John Paul is committed to a Thomistic view of human nature. I will limit my 
comments to the encyclicals of John Paul, since his pontificate produced the statements 
on CP with which we are concerned.  
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The common good, John Paul says in E.V., is the end that regulates political life.82 
The fact that he calls the common good an end already indicates that he is talking about 
something more than a purely instrumental good. While affirming the positive features of 
a democratic political arrangement, John Paul warns that democracy must be based on the 
natural law, and not on a philosophy of materialism or individualism. A skeptical view of 
political life, one that sees democracy as a “mere mechanism for regulating different and 
opposing interests on a purely empirical basis,” is an insufficient foundation for a stable 
political order.83 While civil law does regulate private interests, its real purpose “is to 
guarantee an ordered social coexistence in true justice, so that all may ‘lead a quiet and 
peaceable life, godly and respectful in every way’ (1 Tim 2:2).”84 Thus, civil law must 
conform with moral law—and here John Paul quotes Thomas: human law is only law 
“insofar as it derives from the natural law.”85 The pope then applies this Thomistic 
insight to the current political situation in many countries. He says that laws allowing and 
promoting abortion and euthanasia are not only opposed to individual goods, but to the 
common good, and that therefore they are not true laws; laws that so blatantly disregard 
the “right to life” are “what most directly conflicts with the possibility of achieving the 
common good.”86 
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In another part of E.V., John Paul comments on the particular role of civil leaders 
in serving the common good.87 But the obligation to serve the common good is not 
reserved to civil leaders alone; all are called to practice the virtue of “solidarity,” which 
he defines as “a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common 
good.”88 This definition calls to mind the Thomistic-Aristotelian virtue of legal justice, 
the virtue that “directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.”89 Both solidarity 
and legal justice are about the individual’s orientation to the common good. 
In these points, John Paul reflects the classical view of the common good: the 
common good is the end of political life, the particular domain of those in civil authority, 
and the end of the virtue by which man is directed in relation to the whole community. In 
E.V., however, devotion to the common good is placed side by side with affirmation of 
inalienable human rights, a decidedly modern notion. It is generally recognized that the 
notion of “human rights” has its origin in Enlightenment thought, and not in Aquinas. 
Still, the papal authors do not rely on the Enlightenment foundation for those rights. 
Rather, they say that human rights are founded in natural law, and in the image of God in 
man. The merits of reasoning from human rights are much debated. But since those rights 
require illumination from another source, and since the papal authors provide such a 
source, it is only fair to make use of it.  
The conjunction of the ideas of rights and the common good raises some 
questions. If the protection of individual rights is the aim of political society, where does 
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that leave the common good? If, on the other hand, political society must aim at the 
common good, does this not make individual rights subordinate to the common good? 
John Paul evidently does not see natural rights as incompatible with the common good. 
Drawing on John XXIII’s Pacem in terris, John Paul says that the best way for 
government to safeguard the common good is by guaranteeing the rights of individuals 
and facilitating the exercise of their duties.90 In particular, “it is impossible to further the 
common good without acknowledging and defending the right to life, upon which all the 
other inalienable rights of individuals are founded and from which they develop.”91 True 
democracy and true peace require the defense of this right to life.92  
Despite his prominent use of rights language in E.V. and elsewhere, John Paul 
maintains that the common good is the end of political life. He connects the common 
good with protecting individual rights, but does not reduce the common good to the 
protection of individual rights. In E.V., John Paul lists a wide range of practices that 
“poison human society” rather than promoting the common good, from abortion to poor 
working conditions.93 To combat these evils is to pursue the common good. John Paul is 
concerned with doing much more than establishing a written set of rights. His support for 
political involvement in issues of employment, poverty, etc. shows that his notion of the 
political common good includes considerably more than a liberal view based solely on 
universal rights. 
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All this is not to say that there is no difference between the classical view of 
political life and the view expressed or implied in the Church’s social encyclicals. The 
emphasis on human dignity is noteworthy. This difference is addressed in the reply to the 
next objection. Although Evangelium Vitae at times seems to endorse a purely 
instrumentalist view of the common good, such a view is incompatible with other 
assertions made there and in other writings of John Paul II.  
For both John Paul II and Thomas Aquinas, the death penalty is licit insofar as it 
is necessary for the common good. But where Aquinas presumably thought the penalty 
necessary on a regular basis, John Paul did not. In E.V., he makes the practical 
determination that the common good, here and now, is better served by bloodless means 
of punishment. John Paul assumes that certain practical conditions obtain, practical 
conditions that presumably did not obtain in the thirteenth century.94 These conditions are 
first, the availability of another equitable punishment for grave crimes; second, the 
effectiveness of this penalty in protecting the common good; and finally, the conformity 
of this alternative with custom, such that the elimination of the death penalty will not 
corrupt the people’s respect for law.  
The idea that CP ought to be limited to cases of necessity was already present in 
Aquinas, who says that a society ought to use this penalty against those who are 
dangerous to others, “while it allows time for repentance to those who sin without 
grievously harming others.”95 E.V. states this requirement in stronger terms, referring to 
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cases of “absolute necessity.” In practice, John Paul II consistently pleaded against the 
use of the death penalty in particular cases. Aquinas presumably would have identified 
many more circumstances in which it was necessary to resort to CP. His own analogy of 
amputation might be used to illustrate this difference. A 21st century doctor and a 13th 
century doctor might both agree that amputation is a legitimate way of practicing 
medicine, but only to be used as a last resort. But in practice, the 13th century doctor 
would probably use the operation more frequently than the 21st century doctor.  
There is also the question of custom. Change in custom, of course, is a difficult 
thing to gauge, and I will not attempt to evaluate the exact state of public opinion of CP 
in contemporary societies. Still, it is obvious that modern sensibilities about CP are quite 
different from those of the 13th century.  If capital punishment had not been both a 
customary and quite common punishment in Thomas’s time, q. 64 of the Secunda 
Secundae might have read quite differently. If Thomas had lived in a society in which CP 
was not part of the law, and in which crime was suppressed in other ways, the principles 
on which his view is based would not have forced him to advocate a change. On the 
contrary, his presumption is against changing the law. Or if he had lived in a society in 
which the written laws prescribed death for certain crimes, but the punishment was not 
customarily used, it is entirely plausible to think that Thomas would have advocated a 
change in the written law, on the principle that “custom has the force of a law, abolishes 
law, and is the interpreter of law” would favor changing the written law.96 
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E Third Objection: CP Violates Human Dignity 
Another objection to Aquinas’s account focuses on the notion of human dignity. 
The objection that intrinsic human dignity is incompatible with the practice of CP has 
been made in purely secular terms, but it is more commonly a theological objection, 
founded on the creation of man in the image of God. At the end of an essay comparing 
Leo XIII’s Rerum novarum to John Paul II’s Centesimus annus,97 Ernest Fortin wonders 
what Pope Leo would have thought of 
John Paul II’s unprecedented insistence on the more or less Kantian notion of the 
“dignity” that is said to accrue to the human being, not because of any actual 
conformity with the moral law, but for no other reason than that he is an 
“autonomous subject of moral decision” (no. 13). The more usual view, which 
Kant was rejecting, is that one’s dignity as a rational and free being is contingent 
on the fulfillment of prior duties. That dignity could be forfeited and was so 
forfeited by the criminal who had no respect for and no desire to abide by the 
moral law. One’s goodness or dignity was not something given once and for all; it 
was meant to be achieved.98  
 
Father Fortin might have wondered the same thing about Evangelium Vitae, which makes 
frequent reference to the idea of human dignity.99 E.V. uses dignity as a reason for the 
goodness of human life (34), in its defense of the Fifth Commandment (53), as a reason 
for the wrongness of abortion (60-61) and other acts, as providing the end of civil society 
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(72), and as a sign of God’s glory (84). John Paul also uses the notion of human dignity 
in his discussion of capital punishment, saying that bloodless punishments “are more in 
conformity to the dignity of the human person” than the death penalty (n. 56). He does 
not explain why capital punishment fails to conform to the dignity of the human person. 
Elsewhere in the encyclical, the Pope says that every person, even the worst criminal, 
maintains his human dignity. One might argue on the basis of n. 56 that to kill an evildoer 
for the good of other men is to disregard the evildoer’s dignity.100 But one ought never to 
disregard human dignity. Therefore, one ought never to kill an evildoer for the good of 
others.  
 
Response to the Third Objection 
My reply to this objection will focus on the different senses of dignity in the 
Summa and in Evangelium Vitae. In examining these different senses, we find that the 
notion of human dignity is an analogical notion. The objection, however, treats it as a 
purely equivocal notion. E.V. does make the connection between forgoing the death 
penalty and respecting human dignity. It does not justify an absolute moral prohibition of 
capital punishment on this basis. We must not neglect the fact that E.V. does allow for 
the use of CP in rare cases. This means that if CP is found to be a violation of human 
dignity in some sense, then the teaching does not absolutely prohibit the violation of 
human dignity. 
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It is worth noting at the start that the concept of human dignity has also been used 
as an argument for capital punishment. Kant’s understanding of respecting human dignity 
by never treating a man merely as a means leads him to conclude that a strict equality 
must obtain between crime and punishment. In “The Science of Right,” he argues that 
punishment cannot be used merely as a means to some other good, “but must in all cases 
be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a 
crime.”101 Specific punishments should be determined by “the principle of equality, by 
which the pointer of the scale of justice is made to incline no more to the one side than 
the other.”102  
But whoever has committed murder, must die. There is, in this case, no juridical 
substitute or surrogate, that can be given or taken for the satisfaction of justice. 
There is no likeness or proportion between life, however painful, and death; and 
therefore there is no equality between the crime of murder and the retaliation of it 
but what is judicially accomplished by the execution of the criminal.103 
 
To mitigate the punishment of death for the crime of murder would be to treat the 
criminal as a means to some social good; for example, to preserve his life for the labor 
that could be extracted from him.104 This does not mean that a punishment cannot serve 
social goods, but that it is not justified by serving those goods.105 Kant admits that in 
some circumstances, it is not possible to punish with exact likeness to the crime: if, for 
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example, the number of those who participated in a murder or murders is so great that 
their execution would endanger the existence of the state, the sovereign may preserve 
their lives and inflict some other penalty.106  
In any case, Kant does not see human dignity as an obstacle to using the death 
penalty. Even those who do not think, as he does, that CP is a necessary punishment for 
certain crimes, may see no contradiction between this punishment and human dignity. 
Philosopher Janet Smith describes this position in an article called “Rethinking Capital 
Punishment,” 
Many believe that, at bottom, the teaching that states have the right to utilize 
capital punishment for certain crimes seems altogether compatible with a culture 
of life and a respect for human dignity, for it indicates the heinousness of certain 
crimes against life and human dignity. It even respects the dignity of the 
perpetrator of the crime, for we acknowledge his right to make his free choices, 
and to accept the proper consequences.107 
 
In contrast to Kant and to contemporary critics like Brugger and Grisez, Aquinas does not 
think that human dignity either forbids or necessitates the death penalty.  
Aquinas never uses the expression “human dignity”; he speaks instead of the 
dignity of human nature. Even this concept he uses in a peripheral way, never addressing 
the notion directly, much less using it as an arguing point. John Paul says that no man, 
however evil his acts, loses his human dignity. Thomas does not think it possible for any 
man to lose his human nature. On the other hand, he does think it possible for a man to 
depart from the dignity of his nature through sinning.108 This seems to indicate that for 
Thomas, as Ernest Fortin puts it, “one’s dignity as a rational and free being is contingent 
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on the fulfillment of prior duties.” 109 In one sense, this is true. But Thomas also implies 
that there is a certain dignity that belongs to human nature per se, insofar as man is an 
intellectual creature, made in the image of God. In the Prima Pars, he considers the 
image of God in man (he uses the word dignitas once in this question—see a. 2, ad 2, 
cited below). He makes a distinction between likeness and image: not every likeness is an 
image, but an image is a likeness in species. Therefore the image of God is not in 
irrational creatures, even though they have some likeness to God.110 Rational creatures, 
on the other hand, are in the divine image, because they have a specific likeness to God, 
on account of their intellects and wills: 
Not every likeness, not even what is copied from something else, is sufficient to 
make an image … But the nature of an image requires likeness in species … Now 
it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. But some 
things are like to God first and most commonly because they exist; secondly, 
because they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; and these last, as 
Augustine says (q. 83, q. 51) “approach so near to God in likeness, that among all 
creatures nothing comes nearer to Him.” It is clear, therefore, that intellectual 
creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God’s image.111   
 
The second objection says that non-rational creatures are made to the image of God, as 
illustrated by Dionysius when he compares the sun’s ray to the divine goodness. Thomas 
responds, “Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality; 
not as regards its natural dignity which is involved in the idea of an image.” 112 An image 
shares somewhat in the dignity of its exemplar; yet image does not imply equality. 113 
Since an image may be an imperfect likeness of the exemplar, it may also be less in 
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dignity than its exemplar. The more perfect the image, the more it approaches the dignity 
of the exemplar, and a perfect image is equal in dignity to its exemplar. And the more it 
departs from the image of the exemplar, the less it has of the dignity of the exemplar. Yet 
as long as something can still be called an image of the exemplar, it has something of the 
dignity of that exemplar. 
 In a. 4 of this question, Thomas shows that the divine image is present in varying 
degrees in different men. Man imitates God by being an intellectual being, and he 
imitates God more perfectly the more he imitates God’s own intellectual activity, which 
consists in knowing and loving God. For the mind imitates God, not by knowing just 
anything, but by knowing God. 114 Thus, the first way that man is an image of God is in 
his “natural aptitude for understanding and loving God,” and since “this aptitude consists 
in the very nature of the mind,” it is common to all men. 115 Second, man is an image of 
God insofar as he “actually and habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and 
this image consists in the conformity of grace.” 116 As there are varying degrees of actual 
grace and of knowledge and love of God among men on earth, 117 so there must be as 
many variations in degree of likeness to God within this second category. Finally, man is 
in the image of God “inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly; and this image 
consists in the likeness of glory.” 118 Since among the blessed, there are also varying 
degrees of love of God, this category too must have degrees. Thomas concludes, “The 
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first [likeness] is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the 
blessed.” 119  
Since the first way in which man is an image of God is simply in being an 
intellectual creature, with the capacity to know and love his Creator, it follows that unless 
man ceases to be man, he cannot cease to be the image of God in some sense. Therefore, 
even the evildoer is an image of God:  
[It] is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can make use of reason, 
in which sense we have already said that the image of God abides ever in the soul; 
“whether this image of God be so obsolete,” as it were clouded, “as almost to 
amount to nothing,” as in those who have not the use of reason; “or obscured and 
disfigured,” as in sinners; or “clear and beautiful,” as in the just; as Augustine 
says (De Trin. XIV.6). 120 
 
If man’s dignity is derived from his being in the image of God (the “natural dignity which 
is involved in the idea of an image”), and all men are such an image, but to varying 
degrees, then all men share in the dignity of that image, but again, to varying degrees. 
The idea that dignity exists in varying degrees is affirmed in another way, where 
Aquinas speaks of man’s loss of dignity as the result of original sin. Here, one of the 
punishments for original sin is the loss of the dignity that belonged to the state of original 
justice, in which man’s body was entirely subject to his reason: “But since, by the just 
sentence of God, man is destitute of original justice, and his reason bereft of its vigor, this 
impulse of sensuality, whereby he is led, in so far as it is a penalty following from the 
Divine law depriving man of his proper dignity, has the nature of a law.” 121 The present 
state of man represents a fall from the dignity he once possessed, a dignity that Thomas 
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explains as a divine gift—not part of man’s nature, but proper to it. As original justice 
was a divine gift, so sanctifying grace is a divine gift. As man lost the dignity of the first 
gift, he can lose the dignity of the second. Through serious sin, man loses the dignity of 
the gifts that perfect his nature. On the other hand, nothing a man does can erase his 
capacity to know and love God, which is in him by nature. In this sense, man’s dignity is 
never lost. 
Evangelium Vitae also uses the notion of dignity in different senses. Despite the 
difference in vocabulary, the different senses used in E.V. are basically the same as the 
three senses used by Thomas. The first, preponderant, sense of human dignity in E.V., is 
the human dignity ascribed to man by virtue of his being made in the image of God. For 
example, commenting on Genesis 9:5, John Paul says, “The biblical text is concerned to 
emphasize how the sacredness of life has its foundation in God and in his creative 
activity: ‘For God made man in his own image’ (Gn 9:6).”122 In Chapter 3, he declares 
that “to kill a human being, in whom the image of God is present, is a particularly serious 
sin.”123 Man’s dignity and the “sacredness” of his life are clearly related to man’s being 
in the image of God. In this sense, human dignity can never be lost (“Not even a 
murderer loses his personal dignity, and God himself pledges to guarantee this”).124 
When we consider the theme of E.V., it is not surprising that John Paul focuses on the 
first sense of dignity, the dignity common to all men. In this encyclical, one of his two 
main targets is abortion, which denies this equal and basic dignity to the unborn. Against 
                                                 
122
 E.V. 39. In the encyclical, dignity and sanctity seem to be used interchangeably. I will treat them as 
equivalent expressions. See the end of this section for a note on dignity and sanctity. 
123
 E.V. 55. 
124
 E.V. 9. 
  296
this error, the Pope affirms a dignity that is common to all men, made in the image of 
God. 
John Paul also refers to the sanctity or sacredness of human life.125 He often uses 
this concept interchangeably with human dignity, and rhetorically, it seems to serve the 
same purpose; it is given as a ground for man’s obligation to treat his fellow men in 
certain ways: not to kill, to protect the weak, to pay fair wages, etc. In using the word 
sacred (i.e., holy, set apart) to refer to all human life, the encyclical emphasizes the 
difference between human and other animal life. Man is not simply alive; his life has a 
quality that sets it apart from all other living beings. What sets man apart from other 
living things is his intellectual nature. Thus the sanctity of human nature seems to relate 
primarily to this first sense of human dignity, the dignity that man has by virtue of his 
rational nature. 
While on the one hand, E.V. says that human dignity is equally in every person 
and cannot be lost, on the other hand, it speaks of threats to and attacks on human dignity, 
and the need to preserve and defend human dignity.126 These points only make sense if 
one can lose dignity, in some way. This second sense of human dignity is the dignity that 
comes from acting in accord with the moral law (the more traditional sense referred to by 
Fr. Fortin). In this sense, one loses human dignity when one violates God’s 
Commandments, “a gift of grace entrusted to man always and solely for his good, for the 
preservation of his personal dignity and the pursuit of his happiness.127 Grace increases 
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human dignity: “[The] Gospel exceeds every human expectation and reveals the sublime 
heights to which the dignity of the human person is raised through grace.”128 Practices 
that violate the moral law, on the other hand, defile and cheapen human dignity.129  
But a person can also lose human dignity, not by what he does, but by what is 
done to him. This third sense has to do with the external aspects of human life: bodily 
necessities, work, living conditions, civic participation, etc. This sense of dignity is 
derived from the second: it pertains to the conditions necessary for achieving the second 
form of dignity. John Paul calls attention to this sense of dignity it when he quotes 
Gaudium et spes: 
Whatever insults human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary 
imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution, the selling of women and 
children; as well as disgraceful working conditions, where people are treated as 
mere instruments of gain rather than as free and responsible persons; all these 
things and others like them are infamies indeed.130 
In the third sense, a person possesses human dignity when he has the conditions in which 
he can live in accord with his dignity in the second sense (i.e., in which he can live well). 
This sense of dignity is more often encountered in John Paul’s social encyclicals. In 
Sollicitudo rei socialis, for example, he says that what is at stake in the problems of 
poverty and underdevelopment “is the dignity of the human person, whose defense and 
promotion have been entrusted to us by the Creator.”131 He speaks of the responsibility of 
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individuals to work for economic and political goods, since “this is what is demanded by 
the present moment and above all by the very dignity of the human person, the 
indestructible image of God the Creator, which is identical in each one of us.”132 When 
he speaks of the dignity of work, by which man imitates the creative action of God, he 
speaks of something that may be harmed, for example when workers are treated unjustly 
(made to work in poor conditions, paid unjust wages, etc.).133 In these cases, human 
dignity is something that requires certain external conditions, whose lack lessens but does 
not destroy human dignity. 
Like St. Thomas, John Paul connects human dignity to human nature, for he 
grounds man’s dignity in his being formed (i.e., given a form or nature) in the image of 
God. Each sense of dignity used in E.V. characterizes an aspect of human nature. First, all 
men share in the same nature, which can in no way be taken away from them as long as 
they live. This nature, in the image of God (i.e., having intellect and will) is the source of 
the first sense of dignity. In this sense, a human person can never lose his dignity, 
because his dignity comes from being human. However, if nature is also understood in 
the sense of end, as Aquinas understands it, then one man may come closer to this end 
than another. This is the sense of the second kind of dignity. In this sense, we may say 
that the virtuous man is more fully human because he is more perfected as a man. The 
perfection of nature is the source of the second sense of dignity, which is increased by 
man’s good use of intellect and will. Finally, while external goods are not part of man’s 
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nature strictly speaking, they are necessary if he is to practice the virtues and fulfill his 
end as man. As Aristotle observes, sufficient material goods are a necessary condition for 
practicing virtue, and therefore for being perfected as a human being.134 The external 
goods pertinent to nature are the source of the third sense of dignity; they create 
conditions in which men can more or less easily reach the fullness of human dignity. 
The Catechism nicely summarizes the three senses of dignity and their source in 
human nature: 
The dignity of the human person is rooted in his creation in the image and 
likeness of God; it is fulfilled in his vocation to divine beatitude. It is essential to 
a human being freely to direct himself to this fulfillment. By his deliberate 
actions, the human person does, or does not, conform to the good promised by 
God and attested by moral conscience. Human beings make their own 
contribution to their interior growth; they make their whole sentient and spiritual 
lives into means of this growth. With the help of grace they grow in virtue, avoid 
sin, and if they sin they entrust themselves as did the prodigal son to the mercy of 
our Father in heaven. In this way they attain to the perfection of charity.135 
 
The first sense of dignity is clearly indicated in the first clause: the root or foundation of 
human dignity is that man is made in the divine image and likeness.136 The second sense, 
the dignity man acquires through his perfection as man, is indicated in what follows. The 
passage says that “the dignity of the human person … is fulfilled in his vocation to divine 
beatitude,” and describes how the individual person must direct himself to this 
perfection.137 The third sense is less evident, but we have a hint of it when we read that 
men “make their whole sentient and spiritual lives into means of this growth” toward 
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perfection. That is, the means for growth in perfection are found not only in man’s use of 
his spiritual faculties, but his whole “sentient life” (vita sensibili). While “deliberate 
actions” are the cause of progress towards the fulfillment of human dignity, external 
goods are means that can be used for this fulfillment. For example, the article on social 
justice includes the following statement: “Respect for the human person proceeds by way 
of respect for the principle that ‘everyone should look upon his neighbor (without any 
exception) as ‘another self,’ above all bearing in mind his life and the means necessary 
for living it with dignity’ [Gaudium et spes 27.1].”138 
From the three senses of human dignity, we must conclude that John Paul, like 
Thomas, uses human dignity in an analogical way. The source of man’s dignity is not the 
fact that he is an “autonomous subject of moral decision,”139 but the fact that he is made 
in God’s image.140 This is the most basic sense of dignity. In this sense, man’s dignity is 
constant and inviolable, but not absolute. Man’s dignity is always relative to his Creator, 
the source of that dignity:141 God has the “absolute sovereignty over life and death,” 
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whereas man’s authority over life is limited and relative.142 In the second sense, a man 
has more or less dignity insofar as he acts in accord with the divine exemplar. Through 
his actions, a man can be a more or less perfect image of the Creator. In the third sense, 
human dignity is the external conditions in which man can live more and more as an 
image of God (by increasing in virtue and being receptive to grace).  
Which sense of dignity is being used in E.V.’s teaching on capital punishment? 
Quoting the Catechism, E.V. says that  
If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and 
to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself 
to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of the 
common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person.143  
Is it that to kill the evildoer is to disregard his dignity as a man, made in the image of God 
(the first sense of dignity)? But the encyclical allows for recourse to the punishment of 
death in some circumstances, however rare. If this penalty was incompatible with the 
dignity of man as image of God, a dignity which no man forfeits, then public order and 
safety could not justify it, even in rare cases. By the fact that capital punishment is not 
ruled out altogether, as abortion and euthanasia are in the same document, we must 
conclude that the penalty is not simply and in itself a violation of the basic dignity of 
human life.144 
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Problems also arise when we read the passage as referring to the third sense of 
dignity—those goods and conditions which are necessary for man to reach the perfection, 
and therefore the full dignity, of human nature. By depriving someone of bodily life, one 
takes away the most basic condition necessary for him to live a truly human life. So in 
that sense, CP certainly takes away dignity. But all punishment always takes away some 
good, something that could be used as means for attaining human perfection. The 
prisoner has a limited scope in which he can perfect his faculties and pursue virtue. In 
this sense, all punishments deprive man of some of his dignity. John Paul cannot mean to 
discourage punishments that deprive men of lesser external goods, since he is promoting 
non-lethal punishments as alternatives to the death penalty. Therefore, we can rule out the 
third sense of dignity here. We can also rule out the idea that the encyclical condemns 
every violation of dignity, since dignity includes this third sense. 
E.V. 56 is more reasonably interpreted as referring to dignity in the second sense, 
the dignity that is determined by the goodness or evil of the individual’s own will. But if 
this is the sense of dignity that John Paul has in mind, this has more to do with the dignity 
of the one punishing than the dignity of the one being punished. For it is in what one 
does, not what one suffers, that virtue is acquired or lost.145 While he does not say that to 
inflict CP violates the moral law (which indeed is ruled out, since he allows for its use in 
rare cases), he does imply that it is more virtuous for men not to resort to killing when 
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there are alternative punishments available. E.V. gives us some hints as to why this might 
be the case. The act of taking human life, even when it is justified, always carries the 
danger of disrespect for human life.146 The death penalty, though valid, may always 
become an occasion for hatred or cruelty. The encyclical further implies that when a 
society cares for the lives even of violent criminals, it offers a powerful witness to the 
respect it holds for innocent human life.147 In conclusion, the best interpretation of E.V.’s 
statement on CP is that non-lethal punishments are being encouraged as more in 
conformity with the dignity of the human person, because more virtuous.  
F Conclusion 
Among the theological objections addressed in this chapter, I have given 
particular attention to the apparent contradiction between Thomas and the recent teaching 
of the Catholic Church. In my response to this apparent contradiction, I argued that the 
Church, like Thomas, maintains that the death penalty is a legitimate but not a necessary 
form of punishment. Admittedly, the Church documents do not use Thomas to articulate 
this position. On the other hand, they do not reject his rationale; nor do they propose 
some alternative rationale, such as double effect reasoning, in order to make their case. 
The most reasonable conclusion we can draw is that instead of explicitly defending the 
legitimacy of the death penalty as a last resort to protect the common good of society, the 
Church documents presuppose the legitimacy of the punishment. With this 
presupposition, they focus on reasons to prefer bloodless penalties: these penalties ought 
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to be preferred whenever possible, because they are more in conformity with human 
dignity and the common good.  
It may be that recent Church documents have avoided making use of the 
Thomistic justification of CP, even where this could have made their reasoning clearer, 
for fear that such arguments would be misunderstood, or in order to make a clearer case 
for forgoing the penalty. This is where I hope a clearer understanding of what Thomas 
actually says about CP will be helpful. Certainly, a more detailed explanation of the 
notions of common good and human dignity as used in Evangelium Vitae, in Gaudium et 
Spes, and in the social encyclicals would be welcome. Until then, I offer these thoughts as 
a way of reading Evangelium Vitae in light of Thomistic principles. 
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